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EDITOR’S NOTE
As Cal Poly comes to the end of another academic year, it is with great honor 
that I announce the fourth volume of The Forum, Cal Poly’s journal of history. 
Although an endeavor of this magnitude is not without its trials, the experience 
has nevertheless been fulfilling; one that will stick with me for years to come.
The last two years, The Forum has been recipient of the Gerald D. Nash History 
Journal Award in both print and “digital” categories. This year, we hope to 
maintain the tradition of quality that editors past have instilled in the journal 
with the presentation of Cal Poly’s finest historical writing by students. 
This issue is marked by its variety of cultural and political topics, incorporat-
ing research papers and historiographies written by both undergraduate and 
graduate students. As it is Phi Alpha Theta’s mission to promote the study of 
history through the exchange of learning and ideas, I believe the variety and 
creativity of topics represented in this issue, medicinal beer, presidential lega-
cies, and cannibalism amongst others, achieves these goals. 
As I finish my graduate work in the coming months and bid farewell to both 
The Forum and Cal Poly, I have nothing but confidence that the journal will 
continue to improve and grow in the coming years. Since its inception, The 
Forum has been an excellent example of Cal Poly’s “learn by doing” philosophy 
and truly acts as a forum for students to express their passions for history. I 
have no doubt that future editors will continue this legacy. 
Hilda Iorga
Executive Editor
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ARTICLE SUMMARIES
The Case For Context: Eisenhower Post-Revisionism and Third 
World Nationalism | Seth Draine
In this historiography, the conclusions made by historians of the revision-
ist camp that assert the hidden handed yet ultimately successful legacy of 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower is placed under review by considering 
the work of post-revisionist scholars’ assessment of the Eisenhower 
administration’s foreign policy decisions during the 1950s.  Specifically, 
the insights and arguments made by such scholars suggest that the admin-
istration’s hasty use of covert action in Guatemala, Iran, and Indonesia 
failed to recognize national movements and histories, ultimately 
leading to detrimental effects to both citizen and state.  Rather than 
damn the Eisenhower administration from the safety of hindsight, this 
paper seeks to give context to this crucial period in American and world 
history by complicating our understanding of Cold War foreign policies 
to include geopolitical and economic strategies as well as a deconstruction 
of the post-colonial environment in which such decisions were enlisted. 
It will conclude that although Eisenhower’s ultimate goal was to avoid 
the casualties of conventional global war and the devastation of nuclear 
aggression, the covert actions pursued during his time in office and the 
atrocities accrued within the Third World must be given more weight 
when assessing the president’s legacy.
A Curious Elixir: Medicinal Beer in the Age of Prohibition | 
Andrew Engdahl
Though it may be seen as outlandish by modern medical standards, 
alcoholic beverages were widely prescribed as a form of medicine prior to 
the advent of Prohibition in the United States. In fact, “medicinal beer,” 
specifically, was so widely accepted for its importance as a therapeutic 
agent that the question of its viability caused a determined group of 
American physicians to launch a legislative battle that had a lasting 
impact on the domestic politics of the United States in the early 1920s. 
Although The New York Times covered this debate extensively from 1909 to 
1922, the movement for medicinal beer has largely remained a historical 
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enigma of the early twentieth century. I aim to argue that the debate 
over the validity of this curious elixir led several American doctors to 
join together to form the first solid legislative resistance movement to 
the restrictions of the Eighteenth Amendment. This paper will initially 
explore the traditional uses of medicinal beer in the late 1800s, the 
debate over the therapeutic merits of beer within the medical community 
at the turn of the century, and the various internal and external factors 
that influenced the rise of the movement. Furthermore, I will illustrate 
the major elements of the medicinal beer movement after the passing of 
the Eighteenth Amendment, discuss the motivations and actions of the 
major supporters and opponents of the movement, and ultimately 
elaborate on how the movement failed to re-legalize beer. Though these 
obstinate physicians stood together in the name of beer, the focus of their 
ire did not revolve around the questionable therapeutic benefits of the 
dubious brew alone; in the eyes of the medical community, the government 
had overstepped its bounds by trying to control what a physician could 
determine to be medicine.
Hanging Prosperity on a Wall: Private Art Collecting as Conspicuous 
Consumption, United States, 1945-1960 | Elise Erb
Thorstein Veblen laid forth the theory of conspicuous consumption in 
1902, but his ideas were perfectly suited to the art collecting tendencies 
of the American social elite after the Second World War. This conspicuous 
consumption was demonstrated in the world of private art collecting in 
three primary ways. The first manner in which the social elite demonstrat-
ed their wealth though the art market was by purchasing art. Whether or 
not a new piece was acquired at a sale, just having the time to attended 
demonstrated wealth. The second way that conspicuous consumption 
was demonstrated in the art market was through owning pieces that held 
status in the art world. This status was acquired through attributes such 
as artist, style, and the previous history of the piece. The final way that 
conspicuous consumption was practiced was through the advertisement 
of art acquisition in the newspapers, both before and after the sales. All of 
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these efforts put together made art collecting in the period right after the 
Second World War more about making a social statement than making 
a cultural or economic statement. Private art collecting after the Second 
World War served as a perfect vehicle for the American elite to show 
their wealth.
From Novelty to New Art: The Evolution of the Intellectual Critics’ 
Opinion of Talkies | Samantha Hennes
This essay focuses on the critical reception of early talkie films and how 
this critical consensus of the artistic value of the talkie film changed over 
time. Rather than examine mainstream critics of the era this essay looks 
at the intellectual critic who represented a different class of movie-going 
citizens. The intellectual critic hated the talkie when it first arrived, 
however, as they began to look at talkies with different aesthetic standards 
their views on the talkie became more positive.  By using movie reviews 
and essays written by famous intellectual critics spanning a period of 
about three years, this essay comes to the conclusion that movies were not 
the only thing that changed with the introduction of sound, but rather 
the way that intellectual critics viewed movies changed as well. 
Ambiguous Identity: The Question of Middle Class in Late Imperial 
Russia | Elizabeth Metelak
In most understandings, the middle class stands as one of the unique and 
defining factors of the modern era. While most American and European 
analysis characterizes the middle class as the driving force of modern so-
ciety and politics, historians should proceed with caution when expand-
ing these ideas to the case of the late Russian Empire. For this paper, I 
have focused on a variety of publications - novels, newspaper articles, 
plays, and philosophical essays - in order to unravel the various levels and 
interactions that define the Russian middle class. Through my analysis of 
literature and public actions, I conclude that Russia’s middle class actually 
formed in three layers of wealth and refinement defined most accurately 
by the ambiguities between them rather than their marked differences. 
Moreover, the internal and external conflicts faced by these categories 
undermined the political and social influence of the middle class within 
the empire. These conclusions present a Russian middle class decidedly 
different from the middle classes often presented in Western scholarship, 
challenging assumptions that the middle class develops along a universal 
pattern and plays the same roles regardless of historical context. to learn 
the ways of the ruling class.
Between Domesticity and Revolution: Inherent Contradictions in the 
Early Women’s Rights Movement | Laura Neylan
The purpose of this paper is to analyze how A Domestic History of the 
American Revolution reflects the time period in which it was written: 1850. 
Elizabeth Fries Ellet authored this account of the American Revolution 
amidst a transitional period for women’s rights. The fact that a female 
wrote the book is notable, yet the contradictory portrayal of women in 
the book is even more compelling. Ellet conveys that women challenged 
their stereotypical gender sphere during the revolutionary conflict and yet 
simultaneously depicts women in a stereotypical, virtuous manner. This 
contradiction reflects the competing ideas on women’s rights during this 
period. The Declaration of Rights and Sentiments was created two years 
before the publication of Ellet’s work, which suggests that ideas about fe-
male equality would have been familiar to Ellet. However, the ideology of 
the cult of domesticity—the notion that women belonged at home—was 
also prevalent at this time. Thus the dualistic portrayal of women by Ellet 
in her work reflects these contradictory ideas. 
From the Darkness to the Family: Evolving Orientalist Representations 
of the Katipunan in Euro-American Travel Literature, 1899-1917 | 
Andrew Pagan
On July 7, 1892 in the Philippines, Andres Bonifacio founded the 
Katipunan, a revolutionary society intent on the elimination of Spanish 
rule from the region. Despite the high hopes of many Katipuneros, 
Spanish control did not cease until American forces claimed sovereignty 
over the Philippine Islands in 1898. The United States quickly established 
control over the Philippines, crushing militant Filipino resistance in a 
two year conflict they termed the “Philippine Insurrection,” but Filipinos 
more accurately refer to it as “The Philippine-American War.” In the early 
twentieth century, European and American travelers penned firsthand 
accounts of the Philippines, describing various aspects of Filipino culture, 
life, and history. Previous examinations of these documents have proven 
partially successful in terms of constructing a history of the region, but too 
few scholars have spent time examining the motivations and prejudices 
behind these works. I suggest that American and European portrayals of 
the Katipunan from 1899-1917 evolved over time to justify changing 
American colonial policies in the Philippines. Travelogues published 
during the years of the Philippine-American War consistently stressed the 
“secret” and “mysterious” natures of the Katipunan in order to imply that 
the Philippine people did not share their revolutionary goals.  Later, while 
the United States made it imperial policy to aid their “little brown brothers,” 
travel account discourse functioned to characterize the Katipunan as an 
organization that suffered under the cruelty of the Spanish, and, like the 
rest of the Filipino people, required American aid and direction. 
A New Era In American Foreign Policy: Jimmy Carter, Human Rights 
And Iran | Elena Reynolds
Jimmy Carter, of all United States presidents, was perhaps the most 
passionate advocate of human rights. Upon assuming the presidency, 
Carter announced the beginning of a new era in American foreign poli-
cy—one centered on human rights. His hope was to see his “fundamen-
tal tenet” realized throughout the world. Having witnessed mistreatment 
and injustice throughout his childhood in segregated southern Georgia, 
Carter felt compelled to make the world a better place—a place where 
men and women could experience true freedom. For him, human rights 
meant more than ending arbitrary torture, arrest, and imprisonment. 
It demanded the active pursuit of democratic principles, including the 
restoration of morality and the implementation of racial, religious, and 
gender equality. To accomplish these goals, the United States would have 
to lead by example. However, trying to convince world leaders to stop 
their oppressive ways was no easy task. This essay will focus specifically 
on Iran, the country that challenged Carter’s human rights vision the 
most. First, it will explore how Carter’s fundamental tenet shaped his 
policies in Iran. Second, it will examine whether or not his human rights 
policies were to blame for the Islamic Revolution and the Islamization of 
Iran. Third, it will seek to determine the success or failure of his human 
policies in Iran and as a whole.during the years of the Philippine-
American War consistently stressed the “secret” and “mysterious” natures 
of the Katipunan in order to imply that the Philippine people did not 
share their revolutionary goals.  Later, while the United States made it 
imperial policy to aid their “little brown brothers,” travel account 
discourse functioned to characterize the Katipunan as an organization 
that suffered under the cruelty of the Spanish, and, like the rest of the 
Filipino people, required American aid and direction. 
British and Dutch Perceptions of Cannibalism in Borneo, 1882-1964 |
Adrienne Smith
In the nineteenth century, Europeans occupied Southeast Asia seeking 
to spread trade and colonial rule. British and Dutch travelogues written 
during 1800-1905 often contained accounts of cannibalism in Borneo. 
Motivated by imperialism, and a fascination with cannibals, Europeans 
ventured further into Borneo’s interior to learn more about these tribes 
while gradually establishing colonial rule. The way these travelogues 
conveyed Borneo cannibalism contributed greatly to the impression 
of the Orient in Europe. The logs depicted the indigenous people as 
savage and desperate, shaping how Europeans rationalized bringing the 
values of the West to Borneo.  British and Dutch perception of Borneo 
cannibalism defined the indigenous people as barbaric and justified 
European colonization.
Fashion and Feminism: The Mass Mockery of Twentieth Century 
Suffragettes | Nicola Williams
A vast array of historical research has been conducted that relates to the 
struggle of earlier suffragettes in the United States, but far less attention 
has been paid in this sense to later waves of the suffragette movement. It is 
important for historians not to make the teleological mistake that as 1920 
and women’s suffrage approached, the women’s fight became increasingly 
easier. For this paper I have used the New York Times as a limiting 
lens through which to analyze the reaction to women’s suffrage during 
these later periods in the United States. Through my analysis of letters, 
articles and cartoons, I have managed to conclude that as 1920 approached, 
men and women who valued conventional expectations regarding 
gender stratification, became increasingly scared of the potential for change 
generated by the suffragettes. This same collection also prove that instead 
of trying to unite the public against suffragettes purely through political 
argumentation, these traditionalists advertised a mockery of women’s 
fashion as a tangible, highly relatable way to suggest that women lacked 
the mental sense required for voting. As opposed to other research, which 
has revealed occasional, brash forms of opposition to the suffragettes 
at their rallies, my research suggests that this ridicule was continuously 
pervasive around New York City, on a daily basis. My research, using 
primary sources from New York City, commonly known as the birth-
place of the Women’s Rights Movement, makes a valuable contribution 
to the historical record by complicating the accepted, over-simplified 
picture of the suffragette movement.
articles
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31 Steven Rabe, “Eisenhower Revisionism: A Decade of Scholarship,” Diplomatic History vol 
17, no 1 (1993): 97-98; Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Volume Two, The President (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 10; For a highly contested and generally unaccepted argument for 
the centrality and successful policy guiding of John Foster Dulles during the Eisenhower presi-
dency see Frederick W. Marks III, Power and Peace: the Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles (Westport 
Connecticut: Praeger, 1993).  Both Ambrose and Richard Immerman deliver calculated, scathing 
reviews citing Marks’ biased document selection leading to general misinterpretations of policy 
decisions and their impact.
THE CASE FOR CONTEXT: EISENHOWER POST-REVISIONISM 
AND THIRD WORLD NATIONALISM
By Seth Draine
Assessment of President Eisenhower’s foreign policy legacy by “revisionist” his-
torians beginning in the late 1970s revealed the leader’s decisive and insightful 
tactics that kept America in relative peace at the beginning of the Cold War. 
Contrary to the image of Ike as an amiable golfer, removed from the tough 
policy decisions that not only preceded and followed his presidency but existed 
during his time in office, the majority of Eisenhower scholarship agrees that 
through tactful and decisive actions, Ike “ran the show.”1
Stephen Ambrose is one such esteemed and well-versed scholar of the 
Eisenhower presidency who, having met and conversed at length with the former 
president, has produced a substantial number of publications on the subject 
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and remains the preeminent scholar on Eisenhower. Throughout his writings, 
Ambrose maintains that, for better or for worse, Eisenhower’s “impressive agility, 
quickness, and intelligence of mind” guided his own style of foreign policy.2 For 
Ambrose, guiding Eisenhower’s foreign policy was his firm belief that “nuclear 
war was unimaginable, limited conventional war unwinnable, and stalemate 
unacceptable,” while stressing the importance and readiness to fight commu-
nists “with every weapon at his disposal—just as he had fought the Nazis.”3 
Ambrose acknowledges the administration’s failures within the Third World, 
including perceiving and overreacting to communism within social reform 
movements as well as a borderline obsession with falling dominoes, however, 
Ambrose withholds judgment from these policy decisions claiming that “to 
say Eisenhower was right about this or wrong about that is to do little more 
than announce one’s own political position.”4 To this end, Ambrose questions 
the historians’ ability to remove Eisenhower from the Cold War containment 
framework of the decolonizing world due to “domestic pressures, the relentless 
engagement of Moscow and Peking” meddling in the Third World, and the 
“unrealistic expectations of Third World leaders in their requests for military 
and economic aid.”5 
Other scholars of the revisionist camp take a less-balanced yet equally 
celebratory portrait of the President. H.W. Brands defends Eisenhower’s in-
volvement in the developing world by suggesting that despite the Eisenhower 
administration’s packaging of their policies “in the wrappings of ideology, the 
product they sold reflected primarily a geopolitical interpretation of American 
strategic, military, diplomatic, and economic interests and demonstrated shrewd 
weighing of the effects on the international balance of power of the particular 
activities of specific nonaligned countries.”6 The most recent biography on the 
President by journalist Jim Newton, by far the most disappointing considering 
the wealth of declassified information available since the 1970s and 80s, offers 
2 Ambrose, Eisenhower, 11.  For a more condensed rewriting of Ambrose’s argument, see 
Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991).
3 Ibid., 111, 130.
4 Ibid., 621-622, 619.
5 Stephen Ambrose and Gunter Bischof, Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 10.
6 H.W. Brand, The Specter of Neutralism: the United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 
1947-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 9.
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a repetition of earlier works with a glossier nostalgia for “a nation [left] freer, 
more prosperous, and more fair” after Eisenhower left office. 7 Questionable 
policy decision are legitimized and long-view consequences are acknowledged yet 
disregarded as the Iranian coup of 1953 “seemed costly” yet in the end, “Iran lay 
safely nestled within the American orbit for the balance of Eisenhower’s tenure,” 
agreeing that “for the first time in three years, Iran was quiet—and still free.”8
Despite the insightful validity that the majority of the revisionist perspec-
tive provides, much of the “post-revisionist” scholarship has asked readers to 
give more weight, when considering Eisenhower’s legacy, to the use of covert 
actions within decolonized regions and the impact it has had on the developing 
world. Following Ambrose’s intentions for a clearer picture of the Eisenhower 
administration, this historiographical essay seeks to give this crucial period in 
American and world history the context it deserves. Specifically, it will examine 
the insights historians have provided on the motivations and impact of covert 
operations, suggesting that a misreading or failed recognition of regionally 
specific contexts led the foreign policies of the Eisenhower administration 
down interventionist paths with detrimental results in the Middle East, Central 
America, and South-east Asia. Thus, context, rather than damnation from the 
safety of hindsight, is the purpose of examining Eisenhower’s use of covert 
action throughout the Third World. By complicating our understanding of 
Cold War foreign policies to include geopolitical and economic strategies, as 
well as deconstructing the Cold War and post-colonial environment in which 
such decisions were enlisted, a more complete understanding of America’s use 
and impact of covert action will arise.
Despite this historiography’s argument for context, it does not strive 
to be a fully exhaustive historiographical narrative, nor an all-inclusive ac-
counting of covert action and intervention during the Eisenhower years. For 
the purpose of brevity, only the most well received scholars on each regional 
intervention are discussed followed by a deconstructive account provided by 
historians of cultural studies to add an additional dimension to Eisenhower’s 
foreign policy decisions. Nor does this historiography include other interven-
tions and plans pursued around the world such as in the Congo, Indochina, 
Burma, Laos, Venezuela, or Cuba. What proceeds is a chronological and regional 
7 Jim Newton, Eisenhower: the White House Years (New York: Doubleday, 2011), 357.
8 Ibid., 119
the forum
6
discussion of the CIA covert operations in Iran, Guatemala, and Indonesia by 
“post-revisionist” historians and authors. It seeks to dissect the motivations 
and impact of Eisenhower’s covert foreign policy decisions and the dangers of 
ignoring crucial regional contexts.
In All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle Eastern 
Terror, Stephen Kinzer’s spy novel-like coverage of the players, intricacies, and 
motives surrounding the 1953 overthrow of Iranian president-elect, Muhammad 
Musaddiq, provides a bilateral, economic context for the CIA led coup and 
the dramatic repercussions that have plagued the region since. Taking a criti-
cal stance on the orchestrating and participation in the coup, Kinzer argues 
that British oil control in the region was threatened by Musaddiq’s desire to 
nationalize the industry, propagating unfounded fears of Iran’s path toward 
communism. The result was the re-installation of Reza Shah who supported 
British and American oil interests yet continued an oppressive tyranny that 
ultimately led to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, inspiring fundamentalists 
such as the Taliban to gain strength and momentum in a post-Cold War world.
Despite Kinzer’s suspense ridden prose, his revealing narrative through 
the use of both Iranian and American sources (following on the heels of leaked 
CIA documents in 2000 to the New York Times that both confirmed and added 
to historians’ knowledge of the American led events in 1953) has contributed 
to an argument that supports the long view of history—where actions have far 
reaching and often unforeseen impacts. To develop this argument, Kinzer ad-
dresses the three parties present during the build-up to the coup—Muhammad 
Musaddiq of Iran, Winston Churchill of Britain, and from the United States, 
Dwight Eisenhower and Allen and John Dulles—and their varying desires and 
motives during the crisis. 
Kinzer sets the stage with a brief overview of Iran’s long historical dilemma 
between moral obligation and authoritarian foreign rule, beginning with the 
rise of Zoroastrianism during the sixth century B.C.E. and ending with the 
corrupt and irresponsible economic behavior of the Qajar monarchs in 1925, 
allowing British colonial rule to overwhelm the political and economic (oil) 
institutions of the region. Fast-forward twenty-four years of modernization 
attempts, Nazi sympathizers, and a British/Russian invasion to instate Reza 
Shah Pahlavi, Kinzer reveals his tragic protagonist, Mohammad Musaddiq. As 
a secular nationalist, Musaddiq was a champion of the democratic process, free 
press, and the right of Iranians to discard British colonial subjugation in the 
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political process and their primary economic industry—oil. On this secular 
nationalist platform, Musaddiq was elected as Prime Minister in 1951, and 
soon thereafter, nationalized the Anglo Iranian Oil Company.
For the second party, Britain, this development was unacceptable on two 
counts: Britain maintained the right to rule their established colonies, and that 
the oil profits from their colony sustained the British economy.9 Inciting help 
from the third party, the United States, proved to be a necessary yet difficult 
task. For former president Harry S. Truman, Cold War anxieties consumed his 
worldview and colonialism was merely a waning, outdated mode of international 
relations. After failed attempts at negotiation and reconciliation between Iran 
and British interests, what ultimately bridged this ideological gap, for Kinzer, 
were the Korean War and Soviet international communism. With the return of 
the Conservative Churchill and the election of more active containment policies 
of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the White 
House was sold on the threat of Iran’s takeover by communists as not only 
endangering the Middle East, but British supported efforts in Korea as well.10 
If Kinzer paints the White House as being courted and persuaded by 
the British, it was the clever work of the Secretary of State John Foster and his 
brother, head of the CIA, Allen Dulles that ultimately convinced Eisenhower 
to approve the CIA-led coup of Musaddiq. By distorting the implications of 
negotiation deals between Britain and Iran concerning their oil holdings as well 
as stirring dissent among prominent ties in Iran, the Dulles brothers were able to 
make the case to remove an unreasonable and unsupported Musaddiq regime. 
After expressing his “desire not to know too much,” Eisenhower was given the 
“broad brush [strokes]” of the coup, leaving the ground work of Operation 
AJAX up to CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt who implemented the operation’s 
psychological warfare of propaganda and mob insurrection that ultimately led 
to the arrest, overthrow, and imprisonment of Musaddiq.11
As stated in the preceding paragraphs, one of the major contributions 
of Kinzer’s work to the fields of American history and foreign policy has been 
his insistence of, not merely economic and Cold War anxieties as agents of 
9 Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (New 
Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 88-91. 
10 Ibid.,130-132.
11 Ibid., 152-154, 156, 159-160.  
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intervention within the Third World, but allied pressure and manipulation 
of these factors toward unscrupulous ends. Furthermore, Kinzer’s extensive 
historical accounts of both British era colonialism and pre-modern roots of 
foreign distrust and contempt offer a more complete understanding of regional 
problems and priorities. However, such a macro-approach does have its pit-
falls. Just as Kinzer takes the long view of historical impact leading up to the 
election of Musaddiq, his conclusion that the events that followed the coup’s 
reinstating of Reza Shah Pahlavi’s oppressive regime led to the overwhelming 
distrust and anger toward the United States and the West creates a simplified 
picture of the Middle East. Certainly Reza Shah’s oppression and imprison-
ment of religious leaders and political adversaries contributed to the Islamic 
Revolution and terrorist fringe that spiraled from it. However, overall distaste 
for the West must include other factors such as the Suez Crisis just three years 
later, Kennedy’s land and liberal reforms imposed on the Shah, and Johnson’s 
and Nixon’s support of Israel.12 Kinzer’s contribution to our remembering of 
the 1953 CIA-led coup is invaluable, riveting, and illuminating, however, by 
presuming such a clear line of causation, he simplifies the very region that he 
works so diligently to complicate.
Just as Kinzer works to expand our understanding of the Iranian coup by 
concentrating on the persuasive arguments made by European allies and within 
the White House, John Foran’s “Discursive Subversions: Time Magazine, the 
CIA Overthrow of Musaddiq, and the Installation of the Shah” complicates 
the policy decision further through a deconstruction of U.S. domestic influ-
ences. By examining popular cultural discourse in America during the 1940s 
and 1950s, Foran sheds light on the influences of Orientalism within the press 
and its great impact on American foreign policy in Iran and the subsequent 
CIA-led coup in 1953. For Foran, along with the Cold War context of the 
political economy of oil and geostrategic power within the Middle East, the 
1953 coup was a product of a battle over discursive hegemony between the 
Orientalist discourse of American and Iranian actors, specifically Musaddiq. 
Ultimately, it was Time Magazine’s condemnation of the tumultuous region 
12 Masoud Kazemzadeh, “All the Shah’s Men book review,” Middle East Policy 11, 4 (Winter 
2004): 122.25
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during Truman’s presidency that helped bring about an administration more 
willing to intervene in Iran’s internal affairs.13
Due to his source emphasis on popular press, Foran first seeks to articulate 
his “thick descriptive” theoretical dimensions by defining and explaining cultural 
studies in the context of Marxist literary criticism and subaltern studies to create 
what he defines as “third world cultural studies.”14 Within these general and 
fluctuating boundaries of his version of cultural studies, Foran contends that 
the press, most notably Time magazine, “framed” public and elite discussion 
through its ability to create a general popular mood, provide a check on policy 
elites, and to give or withhold legitimacy from dissenting views. In turn, these 
“frames” of constructed social realities, reflected long-standing Orientalist images 
and stereotypes of Easterners as inferior, childish, and feminine.15 
To understand how Time influenced American foreign policy, Foran 
argues that from its inception, the magazine was a key shaper of American po-
litical culture and through its devotion to Republican, pro-business lines, and 
commitment to bringing the “serious issues of world politics” to an educated 
American audience, by the 1940s and 50s Time (and its subsidiary Life) had 
become the most influential shaper of public opinion in America.16 To demon-
strate this assertion, Foran reveals not only the fluctuating attention by Time 
to the events in Iran and the change in U.S. administration, but the language 
used to report on it throughout each stage of the international development. 
In this instance, although all politics in Iran were covered as corrupt in the 
U.S., the treatment of Reza Shah and Musaddiq differed significantly. While 
the Shah maintained both Middle Eastern stereotypes of youthful ignorance 
and Western sensibilities of class and educated business interests, Musaddiq 
is at first briefly depicted as honest, of Western education, and devoted to 
13 John Foran, “Discursive Subversions: Time Magazine, the CIA Overthrow of Musaddiq, 
and the Installation of the Shah” in Cold War Constructions: the Political Culture of the United 
States Imperialism, 1945-1966, ed. Christian G. Appy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 2000), 182.
14 Clifford Geertz’ use of “thick description” was intended to understand human behavior and 
language by deconstructing their historical, social, and cultural contexts.  Marxist literary criticism 
benefits from Geertz’ work by referring to “texts” as reflections of their historical and social surround-
ings, thus revealing the silent language of class consciousness hidden beneath the text.  Subaltern 
studies works to reveal the agency of actors outside of a world-systems hegemonic power structure.
15 Foran, 161-162.
16 Ibid., 165.
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democracy and anti-Soviet communism, but then quickly turns into a weak 
man of childish fanatical tantrums.17 
By the time of the 1952 election, much of Time and Life magazine had 
been devoted to criticizing the Truman administration’s weak stance on con-
tainment and supported the installation of “strong men” in order to insure 
stability and “order” in regions of interest.18 With Eisenhower’s election (Henry 
Luce, editor-in-chief of Time and Life, often bragged that his editorial work 
had elected Ike into office), Time and Life publications were at the forefront 
of positing communist “domino theories” with Iran, not Vietnam, at the top. 
Both publications heavily supported the removal of Musaddiq under these 
presumptions. However, for Foran, this fear was a view held at the top, not 
by lower-level Iranian specialists within the State Department, who arguably 
had more contextual knowledge of the region and its underlining nationalist 
prerogatives. Thus, the influence of the press in sustaining a Cold War view 
of the world helped legitimize the necessity of a coup and in the aftermath of 
political trials of Musaddiq, the benefits of a redefined “older,” “wiser”, yet a 
rejuvenated and “firm” Shah.19 
Foran qualifies his theoretical approach by admitting the absence of a 
clear line of causality between Orientalist discourse and foreign policy deci-
sions. However, this does not make these mindsets irrelevant, as they serve as 
contextual realities that reveal themselves in the language used by policy officials, 
perpetuating and applying ideas of weakness versus strength, masculinity versus 
femininity, and aptitude versus child-like ignorance. Therefore, a deconstruction 
of why and how ideological frameworks are created and sustained is crucial 
for understanding the decision making process of top foreign policy leaders. 
In his well received analysis, The CIA in Guatemala, Richard Immerman 
argues that though protection of United Fruit (UFCO) business interests in 
Guatemala was paramount, a basic misunderstanding of Guatemalan people 
and history by the U.S. government and public resulted in the ensuing coup and 
conflict between the two nations. Rather than “merely another instance of big 
stick diplomacy,” American covert action in Guatemala illustrates McCarthy-
era, Cold War ethos of economic and ideological security abroad from a Soviet 
17 Ibid., 169-171.
18 Ibid., 174.
19  Ibid., 179.
Seth Draine
11
international-conspiracy. The result was a skewing of regional revolutions where 
the line between nationalism and communist subversion was narrowed to a 
point where threats to U.S. interests became the only discernible difference. 
To thwart communist subversion, the Eisenhower administration pushed for 
the use of decisive and preventative covert measures as opposed to costly and 
thinly spread containment policies. 
The argument for context begins with an understanding of the 1944 
Guatemalan Revolution and the nationalist desire to overthrow a legacy of 
exploitation and underdevelopment by foreign rule in Guatemala. Immerman 
traces back racial divisions and land consolidation to sixteenth-century Spanish 
rule, however, the dichotomy between imperial growth at the cost of Guatemalan 
underdevelopment explodes with the liberal era of industrialization, foreign 
investment, and public services beginning in the late nineteenth century. 20 
Specifically, Guatemala’s growing dependence on U.S. business investment, most 
notably but not solely United Fruit, resulted in the skewing of land ownership, 
exploitation of indigenous labor, reliance on an export based resource economy 
for revenues and imports to sustain population needs, and political leaders that 
accommodated such foreign investments at the cost of the Guatemalan people. 
In October of 1944, such disparities within the nation were taken to the streets 
and with it the overthrow of the oppressive regime of Jorge Ubico Casteneda. 
In his place emerged the revolution’s first elected president, Juan Jose Arevalo, 
under promises of land and labor reform as well as social programs that would 
become the cornerstone of the new Guatemalan government.21 
From the October Revolution in 1944 to the election of Jacobo Arbenz 
in 1950, Immerman contends that U.S. lack of preparedness (Ambassador 
Boaz Long admitted to the State Department that the overthrow of Ubico 
was “the farthest thing from my thoughts”) and understanding of the causes 
behind the decade’s revolutionary and nationalizing events was due to a state of 
denial about the capabilities of the “children” of Guatemala.22 Therefore, when 
Guatemalans voiced dissent of “Yankee imperialism”—signified by United 
Fruit-led government corruption, tax evasion, racist policies, and indifference 
20 Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: the Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1982), 22.
21 Ibid., 48.
22 Ibid., 85.
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to public welfare and wages—materialized in the revolutionary government’s 
capitalist modernization plans for infrastructure development and agrarian 
reform, UFCO lobbyists cried foul. What followed was a suspicious eye on 
the labor reform policies under Arevalo, and a heightened sense of anxiety over 
the election of Arbenz with his promise to continue Arevalo’s social reforms as 
well as initiate agrarian reforms. Such agrarian reforms sought to expropriate, 
with compensation, land left idle by 2.2 percent of the population (which, by 
1950, claimed 70 percent of Guatemalan land) to the rest of the Guatemalan 
people, thereby diversifying Guatemala’s export-based economy and reduc-
ing their dependency on imports.23 Arbenz’ measure was soundly rejected by 
UFCO which voiced its fear of a loss of stability to policy makers within the 
United States government.
However, as opposed to what authors Schlesinger and Kinzer have writ-
ten on the influence of United Fruit lobbyists and the revolving door between 
the company and U.S. political office, Immerman maintains that even without 
such business influences and pressures, a government led removal of Arbenz 
was imminent simply within the Cold War beliefs of communist international 
threats.24 For Immerman, a misunderstanding by U.S. policy makers of the 
intentions of Guatemalan reforms coupled with the broad definition of com-
munism developed within the polar world of Cold War ethos brought about the 
perceived need for intervention. By the time the more active anti-communist 
foreign policy of Dwight Eisenhower (in comparison to Truman) was elected 
into office and John Foster Dulles was appointed as his Secretary of State, much 
of Washington was in agreement that communism could be defined as simply 
“opposing United States interests” and that identifying such elements could 
be concluded through a “duck test” where the accused were guilty by merely 
walking or talking like a communist.25 
Immerman relies on the wealth of behind-the-scenes insights revealed 
through the Eisenhower Diaries, NSC documents, and “Whitman file” tran-
scripts between the President and Dulles to reveal the hard-line, anti-communist 
beliefs that guided the President and Secretary of State in opposition to what 
23 Ibid., 65.
24 For an argument blaming the infiltration of business into U.S. politics resulting in the 
Guatemalan coup see Stephen Kinzer and Stephen Schlesinger, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American 
Coup in Guatemala (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982); Immerman, 123-124. 
25 Immerman, 105 
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they believed were the failed containment measures of the Truman administra-
tion in China and Korea. In light of these documents, Immerman contends 
that ignorance and a general lack of information and evidence did not stop the 
administration from green lighting project PBSUCCESS, the covert operation 
to overthrow Arbenz, into action. Repeatedly, “tenuous and indirect” evidence 
as well as intelligence that showed “nothing conclusive” for an international 
communist conspiracy left Dulles continually frustrated in his attempt to find 
a connection.26 This lack of direct communist evidence to support covert inter-
vention strengthens Immerman’s argument for a nationalist revolution unable 
to be translated into the absolutist language of Cold War polarity. 
Christian Appy expands on the argument for a lack of evidence and 
understanding of the Guatemalan people used to justify military intervention 
into Guatemalan politics. However, in his article “Eisenhower’s Guatemalan 
Doodle, or: How to Draw, Deny, and Take Credit for a Third World Coup,” 
Appy concentrates on Eisenhower’s personality, a product of his competitive 
spirit as well as societal trends of Cold War urgency and polarity to make his 
unique argument. For Appy, the means by which the Eisenhower administration 
both denied involvement as well as took credit for the 1954 Guatemalan coup 
is emblematic of the mentalité that drove the administration to intervene in the 
first place. Just as policy makers created a shaky, yet unchallenged narrative to 
comment on their Latin American success, so too did Eisenhower and Dulles 
“file the edges” of Guatemalan communist evidence to make their actions fit 
their predetermined national security priorities. Appy argues that this is partially 
indicative of Eisenhower’s competitive, score-keeping spirit, where the odds 
for success (cited in classified papers as merely twenty percent) were pitted 
against images and assumption of “Amero-centric” “superpower arrogance” 
that shaped much of Cold War policy. Thus, as Appy writes: “Once Eisenhower 
had concluded that Guatemala had fallen within the ‘Soviet orbit,’ that satel-
lite’s internal life and history was, by definition, rendered largely irrelevant.” 27
Though much of Appy’s argument is informed by the work of highly 
26 Ibid., 185.
27  Christian Appy, “Eisenhower’s Guatemalan Doodle, or: How to Draw, Deny, and Take 
Credit for a Third World Coup” in Cold War Constructions: the Political Culture of the United States 
Imperialism, 1945-1966, edited by Christian G. Appy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 2000), 190.
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regarded scholars on the subject, his original vantage point is guided by the 
many personal letters and diary entrees available through the Eisenhower Library. 
The most interesting, and unique, source used sets the tone and trajectory of 
Appy’s deconstruction: a sketch drawn by Eisenhower the day after the coup on 
a morning meeting agenda outline (for an image of the “Eisenhower doodle” 
see Figure 1).28 From the roughly sketched images of a bare-chested Anglo (pre-
sumably a self portrait), gun boat and non-military vessels, as well as “Internal 
security” and “Guatemala” written twice, underlined, and traced repeatedly, 
Appy attempts to deconstruct the images as representative of the assumptions 
and themes that shaped U.S. Cold War foreign policy. For Appy, these im-
ages shed light on how “Eisenhower envisioned the world he so profoundly 
affected”—a faceless world, void of the individual Guatemalans he sought to 
redirect, in need of Anglo strength and security. Thus, despite Eisenhower’s self-
publicized support of the non-existent “Guatemalan counterrevolutionaries” 
and “people-to-people” exchanges, “he left no evidence of any serious interest 
in the people of Guatemala.”29
Those readers who have little patience for cultural abstractions and de-
constructions will be pleased that Eisenhower’s doodle does not serve as a 
“smoking gun” or central primary source for any argument of subconscious 
motives or actions. Rather, through the use of personal letters by Eisenhower, 
Appy extracts a common theme of competition, from the golf course to the 
bridge table, which can be seen in his secret organizing and public explanation 
of the 1954 coup. 30 From laughing at Secretary of State Dulles’ and assistant 
Henry Holland’s warning of the twenty percent chance for a successful coup 
of Arbenz as well as its legality under international agreements, to his preoc-
cupation with golf games leading up to and during the time of the coup and 
his desires to take credit for what was projected as another notch within the 
anti-communist struggle, Appy raises important questions concerning the level 
of interest Eisenhower had for the actual people of Guatemala—that Eisenhower 
was at once intricately involved yet emotionally removed from the coup itself.
28 Appy’s work is informed by prominent scholars on the subject including Stephen Schlesinger 
and Stephen Kinzer, Richard Immerman, Piero Gleijese, Jim Handy, Blanche Wiesen Cook, and 
Nick Cullather.
29Appy, 186.
30 Ibid., 197-198.
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Along with the actual planning of the coup, media propaganda within 
Guatemala as well as the United States played a key role in its success. At 
once, the administration faced the difficult task of denying U.S. involvement, 
presenting Guatemala as a dangerous “communist beachhead,” and revealing 
a popular Guatemalan resistance that did not exist, while taking credit for 
the covert operation.31 To achieve this ambitious goal, Appy suggests that the 
threat of communism within Guatemala was relentlessly presented as a real 
and dangerous international threat while descriptions of the actual “popular 
revolt” were left vague and inconclusive. Any challenges to the legitimacy of 
the revolt were not only dismissed as a “communist lie” but “regarded as a ret-
roactive justification for the very operation they were disavowing.”32 Thus, the 
vilification of the Arbenz government and the subsequent dismissal of foul play 
31 Ibid., 205.
32 Ibid., 209
Fig. 1: “Eisenhower Doodle.”
(Photocopy from Christian Appy, Cold 
War Constructions: the Political Culture 
of the United States Imperialism, 
1945-1966. Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2000, 184.
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closely paralleled the domestic fear mongering campaigns of McCarthyism. In 
the end, through a complacent press and presidential memoirs and speeches, 
both Eisenhower and Dulles were able at once to affirm Guatemalan popular 
support for the counterrevolution as well as cite the event as a victory for U.S. 
desires to thwart the communist threat throughout the world.
As with most actions, the true impact of the intervention is only revealed 
in its enduring legacy. For Immerman and Appy, the impact of the Guatemalan 
coup was indeed far reaching. Primarily, the 1954 coup reinstated the life 
Guatemalan’s had fought to diminish. Castillo Armas, the first in a long line of 
U.S.-supported presidents after the coup, not only reversed the land and labor 
reforms to support United Fruit once again, but installed an oppressive regime 
that fell hard on dissent through “Gestapo-like tactics” resulting in a fifty year 
cycle of repression and killing of over 200,000 lives.33 Beyond the persecution 
of the Guatemalans themselves, both Immerman and Appy make a compelling 
argument that the perceived success of the 1954 coup led to misguided conclu-
sions that were applied to subsequent interventions. Just as the Iranian coup 
a year earlier provided a framework for the events in Guatemala, the blanket 
model of combining military threats, covert operations, and indigenous alliances 
are argued to have been directly applied to the soon to follow intervention in 
Indonesia and the Bay of Pigs invasion the following decade. 
Both Immerman’s and Appy’s discussions of Cold War policy through 
preemptive action in Guatemala complicates our understanding of the motiva-
tions and assumptions behind Cold War covert actions. Although in one sense 
Immerman’s and Appy’s work testifies to the incredibly blurred and uncertain 
world in which foreign policy leaders worked, it also speaks to this paper’s theme 
of selective ignorance of regional historical directions and the extent to which 
the Eisenhower administration was willing to ensure economic, political, and 
ideological security in Latin America. Thus, during a time when the actions of 
individual actors became increasingly more powerful, and the implications of 
such decisions more detrimental, an examination of personalities and viewpoints 
has the potential to reveal additional context to motivations and reasoning of 
Cold War policies.
During the beginning years of the Cold War, little room was left for 
neutrality as Soviet/American bipolarity effectively mapped out and kept a 
33 Immerman, 199;  Appy, 196.
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running score of regional ideological and political affiliation. For the Eisenhower 
administration, the Sukarno government in Indonesia fit this mold of dangerous 
neutrality and, running on the momentum of perceived successful subversive 
action in Iran, Guatemala, and the Congo, opted for another round in CIA- led 
covert political disruption. In Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower 
and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia, Audrey and George Kahin argue that the co-
vert operations used to provoke and abet a major revolution and civil war in 
Indonesia during the late 1950s is attributed not only to “presidential prejudice” 
of popular elected leaders, but a reliance on poor intelligence gathering by the 
CIA and the political naïveté that followed. With a wealth of over 45 years of 
research including both CIA and Indonesian documents as well as firsthand 
accounts and interviews conducted by George Kahin in Indonesia during the 
1940s revolution, the Kahins’ critical yet sophisticated assessment of the failed 
1959 coup warn of the dangers in using past and ultimately detrimental CIA led 
actions as guidelines when applied to complex and varying regional contexts.
To give context to American involvement in the region and Indonesia’s 
non-alignment decision, the Kahins describe America’s favorable yet at times 
contradictory role in the 1949 Revolution. Though America had supported the 
popular revolution against Dutch colonial control, after the successful declara-
tion of the independent Indonesian state the U.S. refrained from holding the 
Dutch accountable in the United Nations to relinquish its control over the 
culturally significant region of West Irian (New Guinea). The Kahins maintain 
that although the Dutch were probably correct in their desire to withhold the 
small portion of the island to appease the nationalism of chauvinistic elements 
in Holland needed to pass the decolonization agreement through Parliament, 
the Indonesians saw the act as an illegitimate retention of culturally significant 
land. 34 Ultimately for the Kahins, the support of the United States behind the 
Dutch West Irian issue as well as unscrupulous, U.S.-mediated debt negotia-
tions that favored the Dutch made Indonesian alignment with the U.S. a less 
than favorable resolution.
In an act of realism and balance, much of which has come from George 
Kahin’s residency and connections in Indonesia during the post-revolution 
34 Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower 
and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia  (New York: The New Press, 1995), 34-35.
the forum
18
era, the Kahins portray the revolution’s shaky government as a less than ideal 
system, far from a popular utopia of democratic self-determination. Due to 
the region’s unfortunate history during WWII, Japanese occupation, and the 
revolution against the Dutch, much of the country’s government, infrastruc-
ture, economy, and social well being had been either dismantled or destroyed. 
With the country experiencing growing hardships and the colonial hegemonic 
educational structure severely weakened during the decade leading up to the 
revolution, much of the incoming political contenders espoused left of center 
variants of socialist, anti-foreign capital control. Within this context, Sukarno, 
Indonesia’s president from 1945 to 1967, sought a “guided democracy” to 
strengthen national unity where exploitation of weaker groups would be avoided 
through a more balanced power structure. 35 
This desire for unity sounded alarms for President Eisenhower, Secretary 
of State Dulles, and CIA operatives in Java (including brother, Allen Dulles). 
Following the Truman administration’s loss of China, criticized for allowing the 
weakening Nationalist government to maintain its territorial integrity and thus 
unity in time of crisis, the Eisenhower administration perceived the proposed 
plan for Indonesian unification as a potential threat for communist subver-
sion. Criticism and warnings by U.S. ambassador in Indonesia, John Allison, 
that the barriers which propped up non-alignment sentiment in the country 
were rooted in the debt and territorial issues surrounding the United State’s 
support of the Dutch, were ignored and ultimately led to his reassignment in 
Czechoslovakia. Based on the inaccurate conclusions of a communist “abso-
lute majority” on select islands made by the CIA (specifically John’s brother, 
Allen Dulles), despite counter evidence provided by ambassador Allison, the 
Eisenhower administration not only chose to support rebel colonels against the 
government, but discouraged compromise between the opposing sides through 
a refusal to bend on the Dutch territorial and debt issues as well as through 
encouragement and support of rebellious army colonels. Though the opposing 
sides were far from willing or prepared to engage in another war, the U.S. had 
anticipated the possibility of a civil war and was already building up support 
for the rebels during the ultimately futile negotiations. 36
35  Ibid., 53. 
36 Ibid., 95, 115-119, 143.
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37 Ibid., 190.
38 Ibid., 220. 
39 Ibid., 228.
As U.S. officials had predicted, the result was a civil war in 1958 between 
the Sukarno government and the rebels, secretly backed by American forces 
through unmarked air support and armaments. For two years leading up to 
and during the war, U.S. support continued for the rebels, yet due to an over-
estimation of popular support for rebel leaders (hurt by Indonesian awareness 
of U.S. support), an underestimation of nationalist support for Sukarno, and 
the capture of American pilot Allen Pope, the Eisenhower administration was 
forced to reassess its policy. In a move to increase flexibility, yet in hindsight 
painfully contradictory, Secretary of State Dulles and President Eisenhower 
made the decision to switch their support to the Sukarno government while 
continuing, albeit severely limited, support for the rebels. 37 In the end, U.S. 
meddling in the affairs of Indonesia had strengthened the very forces Americans 
had tried to diminish: the non-alignment of the Sukarno government, the army’s 
increased authority through martial law, as well as the now growing popularity 
of the communist PKI party due to their capitalization of outrage over U.S. 
involvement. The result was a tripolarization between these now enlarged, 
tense, and brittle fractions leaving neither an effective form of governance nor 
political stability, paving the way for a major political explosion ending in a 
failed communist coupe, an army-led counter-coup, and the beginnings of a 
singular military dictatorship under Suharto in 1965, lasting until 1998. 38 
As what is now embarrassingly clear and yet frustratingly absent during 
the time, was any consideration to dissenting views of intervention. However, 
despite these inconsistencies, an argument for a clearer vision based on the pres-
ent benefit of hindsight is perhaps too much to ask of historical actors. Rather, 
what is particularly troublesome with the case of covert action in Indonesia 
is not only the flip-flopping of U.S. support during the civil war, but more 
importantly the willingness of the Eisenhower administration to encourage 
such a steadfast, uncompromising division that would most certainly lead to a 
devastating loss of life (thousands during the Civil War and over half a million 
during the 1965-66 massacre under the military coup victor, Suharto) and 
societal cohesion. 39 Thus, as with the covert actions in Iran and Guatemala, 
despite intentions of precision and strategic action meant to ultimately save lives 
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by avoiding conventional or atomic warfare, the intervention methods chosen 
ultimately reflect a failure to gather as well as consider known intelligence of 
regional and historical circumstances, resulting in the loss of life and societal 
disruption well beyond the organizers’ predicted consequences.
This stage within the Cold War offers a glimpse of the world at the height 
of modernity: societal power and structure whittled down to two competing 
ideologies, one claiming supremacy as the bearer of history and the future, 
while the other asserting its authority as the protector of human rights and 
freedom; technological might to annihilate thousands at the push of a button; 
and the ability to overrule the natural boundaries that had once offered societ-
ies security and comfort from foreign threats. With the amazingly destructive 
power to human life, society, and nature displayed during the Second World 
War, many saw the urgency of this global crossroads and chose to act, not with 
the total might of their visible arsenal, but with the precision and quickness 
only possible under the cloak of secrecy. 
With modernity, however, the perceived ability of individuals to supersede 
and manipulate humankind and the natural world in which they reside, comes 
the responsibility to use all of the knowledge at one’s disposal. Though President 
Eisenhower was merely a single individual, surrounded by persuasive cabinet 
members and consumed by a Cold War culture of uncertainty, distrust, and 
urgency the actions he chose to pursue failed to set a precedent for appropriate 
conduct within a new and changing world. With the perception of repetitive 
triumphant operations so close in their rearview mirror, Eisenhower and his 
administration continued down an interventionist path, ignoring evidence that 
challenged what they believed had been successful manipulations of foreign 
government and society. For the Eisenhower administration, despite their ef-
forts to use far less invasive and physically damaging methods, societal scars left 
from the coups d’état had far reaching implications. By validating or glossing 
over events that had such a detrimental effect on the people, government, and 
overall well being of developing nations, historians not only risk promoting a 
repetition of such short-sighted decisions, but also threaten our global reputa-
tion as a nation that holds freedom above oppression.
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A CURIOUS ELIXIR: MEDICINAL BEER IN THE AGE OF 
PROHIBITION
Andrew Engdahl
Though it may be seen as outlandish by modern medical standards, alcoholic 
beverages were widely prescribed as a form of medicine prior to the advent of 
Prohibition in the United States.1 In fact, “medicinal beer,” specifically, was 
so widely accepted for its importance as a therapeutic agent that the question 
of its viability caused a determined group of American physicians to launch a 
legislative battle that had a lasting impact on the domestic politics of the United 
States in the early 1920s. Although The New York Times covered this debate 
extensively from 1909 to 1922, the movement for medicinal beer has largely 
remained a historical enigma of the early twentieth century. 
Thus far, most of the scholarly discussion of Prohibition has tended to 
focus more generally on subjects such as bathtub gin, the American flapper 
1 Lewis Shapter, “The Use Of Alcohol In Relation To Public Health,” The British Medical Journal 
2, no. 1071 (Jul. 9, 1881): 44-46; “Convenient Diet-Lists for Private Duty Nurses,” The American 
Journal of Nursing 1, no. 2 (Nov. 1900): 119-129; E.C. Hamill, “The Fort Bayard Hospital for 
Tuberculosis,” The American Journal of Nursing 18, no. 8 (May 1918): 665-667; A.S. Blumgarten, 
“The Administration of Medicines (Continued),” The American Journal of Nursing 15, no. 4 (Jan. 
1915): 285-290; A.S. Blumgarten, “The Administration of Medicines (Continued),” The American 
Journal of Nursing 15, no. 7 (Apr. 1915): 565-572. 
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girl, the swinging speakeasy, and the infamous life and crimes of Al Capone.2 
Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of historians that have addressed the 
subject of beer in relation to Prohibition have predominantly focused their dis-
cussions on the development of the Women’s Christian Temperance Movement, 
the rise of the Anti-Saloon League, and the general trials and tribulations of 
major American breweries like Anheuser-Busch, Coors, and Pabst.3 Be that 
as it may, there have been a select few scholars that have touched upon the 
subject of the medicinal beer debate in their writings, but only to a certain 
extent. Dr. Charles Bamforth, the Chair of the Department of Food Science 
at the University of California, Davis, provides a reasonable glimpse of the 
movement for medicinal beer by noting that the campaign for “medicinal beer” 
arose in 1921 when a group of brewers and physicians lobbied the government 
for the right to produce and distribute beer as medicine.4 However, Bamforth 
provides very little information on the subject beyond the most basic of de-
tails. Furthermore, his writings also lack statistical figures that would provide 
a sense of scope for how many physicians actually did perceive beer to be a 
viable medicinal supplement.5 Likewise, Dr. Stephanie Pain, the associate edi-
tor of the peer-reviewed journal New Scientist, and Beverly Gage, an associate 
2 Terry Ganey and Peter Hernon, Under the Influence: The Unauthorized Story of the Anheuser 
Busch Dynasty (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1991); Mark Abridge and Swarna Weerasinghe, 
“Homicide in Chicago from 1890 to 1930: Prohibition and its Impact on Alcohol- and Non-
Alcohol-Related Homicides” Addiction 104, no. 3 (March 2009): 355-364; Jack S. Blocker Jr., 
“Did Prohibition Really Work?” American Journal of Public Health 96, no. 2 (Feb. 2006): 233-243; 
Melissa Burdick Harmon, “The Life and Crimes of Al Capone” Biography 5, no. 5 (May 2001): 
100; Seth Kugel, “Speakeasies: Tell Them Seth Sent You,” The New York Times, April 29, 2007; 
“Feb. 14 1929: The St. Valentine’s Day Massacre in Chicago,” History Today 59, no. 2 (Feb. 2009): 
10; Charles Bamforth, Grape vs. Grain: A Historical, Technological, and Social Comparison of Wine 
and Beer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
3 Philip Van Munching, Beer Blast: The Inside Story of the Brewing Industry’s Bizarre Battles for 
Your Money (New York: Random House, 1997); Ronald Jan Plavchan, A History of Anheuser-Busch 
1852-1933 (New York: Arno Press, 1976); Tom Goyens, Beer and Revolution: The German Anarchist 
Movement in New York City, 1880-1914 (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2007); 
Terry Ganey and Peter Hernon, Under the Influence: The Unauthorized Story of the Anheuser Busch 
Dynasty (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1991); William L. Downard, The Cincinnati Brewing Industry 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1973); Thomas C. Cochran, The Pabst Brewing Company: The 
History of an American Business (1948; repr. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975); Blocker, 233-243; 
Dan Baum, Citizen Coors: An American Dynasty (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 2000); 
Stanley Baron, Brewed in America (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1962).
4 Bamforth.
5 Ibid.
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professor of history at Yale University, each have written articles that address 
the motivations of the doctors that pushed the movement for medicinal beer, 
but do not elaborate extensively upon the movement’s overall impact on U.S. 
Prohibition as a whole.6 Although I agree with the majority of the claims that 
are made by these scholars, I feel that there is much more to be said about the 
medicinal beer movement than has been presented thus far. With that in mind 
I intend to further illuminate this historical enigma so that it may be more ap-
propriately recognized as an important element of the early Prohibition years. 
I aim to argue that the debate over the validity of this curious elixir led 
several American doctors to join together to form the first solid legislative resis-
tance movement to the restrictions of the Eighteenth Amendment. This paper 
will initially explore the traditional uses of medicinal beer in the late 1800s, 
the debate over the therapeutic merits of beer within the medical community 
at the turn of the century, and the various internal and external factors that 
influenced the rise of the movement. Furthermore, I will illustrate the major 
elements of the medicinal beer movement after the passing of the Eighteenth 
Amendment, discuss the motivations and actions of the major supporters and 
opponents of the movement, and ultimately elaborate on how the movement 
failed to re-legalize beer with the passing of the Willis-Campbell Law. Although 
these obstinate physicians stood together in the name of beer, the focus of their 
ire did not revolve around the questionable therapeutic benefits of the dubi-
ous brew alone; in the eyes of the medical community, the government had 
overstepped its bounds by trying to control what a physician could determine 
to be medicine. 
Although beer has long been viewed as a recreational beverage, it was 
widely perceived to be a relatively versatile medicinal agent toward the end of 
the nineteenth century. For example, according to Frederick William Salem, an 
ardent beer activist of the 1880s, the U.S. Department of Agriculture published 
a report in 1866 that stated that “moderate use of pure beer [would] aid diges-
tion, quicken the powers of life, and give elasticity to the body and mind.”7 
6 Beverly Gage, “Just What the Doctor Ordered” Smithsonian 36, no. 1 (April 2005): 112-117; 
Stephanie Pain, “The Battle for Medicinal Beer” New Scientist 199, no. 2680 (Nov. 2, 2008): 44-45; 
“Scientists in Journalism: A Profile of Stephanie Pain, Associate Director of New Scientist” Nature 
402, no. 6758 (Nov. 11, 1999): 13; Yale History Department, “Beverly Gage, Associate Professor” 
Yale University, http://www.yale.edu/history/faculty/gage_b.html (accessed May 8, 2011).
7 Frederick William Salem, Beer, Its History and Its Economic Value as a National Beverage 
(1880; repr. New York: Arno Press, 1972); Shapter, 44-46.
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This position received further support in 1881 when The British Medical Journal 
printed an article that praised the merits of alcoholic beverages like beer for their 
merits as nutritious stimulants.8 By the early 1900s, the perceived medicinal 
benefits of beer had grown so extensive that it became widely accepted as a vi-
able therapeutic agent in the treatment of typhoid fever, constipation, diabetes, 
staph infection, and tuberculosis.9 Lastly, medical professionals praised beer 
as a useful solvent in the administration of other drugs because they believed 
that it could effectively slow the absorption rate of hypnotic drugs to maxi-
mize the duration of their effects.10 From a modern perspective these supposed 
medicinal qualities of beer might seem laughable, however, it is important to 
note that advancements in the field of medicine at the turn of the century led 
many doctors to reevaluate just how effective their malty remedy really was.11 
In the early 1900s, it became obvious that professional opinions of the 
therapeutic merits of medicinal beer began to shift, as the debate over the subject 
within the medical community soon rose to national prominence. According 
to a New York Times article from 1909, some medical students contended that 
alcohol had no therapeutic benefits at all, and even if it did, its use in the medi-
cal field had diminished significantly.12 By 1917, the viability of alcohol was 
called into question further by Dr. Haven Emerson, the Health Commissioner 
of New York City, who had correctly identified alcohol to be a depressant 
that caused “damage to the heart, kidneys and blood vessels, as well as to the 
stomach and liver.”13 In response to these comments, Dr. Abraham Jacobi, an 
ardent advocate of the medicinal benefits of alcohol, contended that alcoholic 
beverages still remained “valuable” and “indispensible” as traditional remedies, 
and that the “prohibition movement kept up by ‘400,000’ women [was] no 
8 Shapter, 44-46.
9 “Convenient Diet-Lists for Private Duty Nurses,” 119-129; Hamill, 665-667; “Reports And 
Analyses And Descriptions Of New Inventions, In Medicine, Surgery, Dietetics, And The Allied 
Sciences,” The British Medical Journal 1, no. 2161 (May 31, 1902): 1342-1343; Shapter, 44-46. 
10 Blumgarten, “The Administration of Medicines (Continued),” (Jan. 1915): 285-290; 
Blumgarten, “The Administration of Medicines (Continued)” (Apr. 1915): 565-572; “Reports 
And Analyses And Descriptions Of New Inventions, In Medicine, Surgery, Dietetics, And The 
Allied Sciences,” 1342-1343. 
11 “Value of Alcohol in Medicine Small.” The New York Times, March 18, 1909; “Medical 
Science on the Side of Alcohol.” The New York Times, Sept. 2, 1917; “Prohibition And The Medical 
Profession,” The British Medical Journal 1, no. 3194 (Mar. 18, 1922.): 448.
12 “Value of Alcohol in Medicine Small.” 
13 “Medical Science on the Side of Alcohol.” The New York Times, Sept. 2, 1917. 
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proof” that alcohol had lost its edge as a mainstream medicine.14 In retrospect, 
the decline in the use of beer in medicine can perhaps be best explained by the 
fact that advancements in the medical field began to show that beer was simply 
not as effective in treating disease as it had once been thought. However, as Dr. 
Jacobi made abundantly clear, the influence that the Prohibitionist movement 
wielded over the debate cannot be ignored. 
By the time the debate over the validity of beer had risen to national 
prominence, support of Prohibition in U.S. politics had grown substantially. In 
the late 1800s and early 1900s, organizations, such as the Women’s Christian 
Temperance Movement and the Anti-Saloon League campaigned heavily to 
rid the country of alcoholic beverages in every capacity, and this increasingly 
popular sentiment likely had an impact on how some doctors handled their 
treatment of medicinal alcohol.15 Prohibitionists wanted to use any information 
they could to have alcohol outlawed, and the growing doubts about the thera-
peutic benefits of beer within the medical community likely served beneficial 
to their cause. Regardless of whether or not these temperate sentiments held 
any sway over the medical community at large, the Prohibitionists ultimately 
succeeded in rendering alcohol illegal through the passing of the Eighteenth 
Amendment on January 16, 1919. Shortly afterward, Congress also passed the 
Volstead Act, which served as the Eighteenth Amendment’s bill of enforcement 
in that it levied harsh penalties for the production, sale, and transport of bever-
ages that exceeded 0.5% in alcohol content.16 The passing of the Eighteenth 
Amendment and Volstead Act caused the debate within the medical profession 
to shift sharply from being a question of whether or not beer was truly a viable 
medicine to being a question of what the government had the right to regulate 
within in the medical field.
On March 18, 1922, The British Medical Journal published an article titled 
“Prohibition and the Medical Profession.”17 Summarizing the results of a survey 
distributed among 53,000 medical practitioners in the United States by the 
Journal of the American Medical Association, the article was meant to objectively 
14 Ibid.
15 Munching; Plavchan; Goyens; Ganey and Hernon; Downard; Cochran; Blocker, 233-243; 
Baum; Baron.
16 Downard, Dictionary of the History of the American Brewing and Distilling Industries (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1980). 
17 “Prohibition And The Medical Profession,” 448.
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frame the state of opinions within the American medical community over the 
viability of medicinal alcoholic beverages. One of the central elements of the 
discussion revolved around the relevance of medicinal beer in the contemporary 
treatment of patients. Of the original 53,000 U.S. medical practitioners that had 
been asked to participate in the study (37% percent of all physicians working 
within the U.S. at the time), 31,115 chose to offer their responses. It is unclear 
why 21,885 physicians chose not to participate in the study, but any number 
of reasons could have contributed to this statistic. Laziness or indifference on 
the part of some of the physicians could have influenced these results, but such 
assertions are purely speculative. Regardless, assuming that these figures were 
accurate, one can infer that this statistical sample had captured the opinions 
of nearly 22 percent of the approximate 143,243 doctors that were in active 
practice in the United States at the time.18 Based on these numbers alone, there 
is no question that the subject of Prohibition was a hot topic for debate within 
the medical profession because over one-fifth of all physicians in the United 
States had decided to weigh in on the issue. 
Overall, the Journal of the American Medical Association’s survey findings 
yielded peculiar results. On the question of whiskey as being a necessary me-
dicinal agent, the survey had generated a nearly even distribution of professional 
opinions, in which 51 percent of the respondents found its effects valuable 
and 49 percent did not. When posed with the same question with regard to 
wine, just 32 percent considered it a viable medicine while 68 percent did not. 
However, perhaps the most surprising response of all was the fact that, of the 
doctors surveyed, only 26 percent of them found beer to be a viable medicine.19 
Dr. Stephanie Pain referenced these survey results in her essay titled “The Battle 
for Medicinal Beer,” but she limited her discussion solely to the statistics on 
medicinal whiskey.20 What needs to be emphasized here is that the overwhelm-
ing majority of physicians in the United States (approximately 74% of them) 
did not feel that beer was a viable medicinal supplement when compared to 
whiskey and wine. Although it was apparent that the use of medicinal beer was 
on the decline, it is important to note that a sizeable minority of physicians 
still valued the beverage as a therapeutic agent. When framed in this context, it 
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Pain, 44-45.
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becomes readily apparent that a consensus was shared by many doctors during 
the period that the government had no place in trying to control what they and 
their colleagues could determine to be viable medicinal treatments. Regardless 
of whether they were advocates or skeptics of the viability of medicinal beer, 
many physicians believed that, as a result of their education and years of train-
ing in the medical field, the responsibility of what a doctor could prescribe as 
medicine should have been up to the discretion of the doctor, and him alone. 
As such, many within the American Medical Association chose to fight for their 
right to prescribe medicinal beer as a matter of principle.21 
After a great deal of public debate and lobbying, the medical profession 
finally won a small victory for itself when Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer 
issued a ruling that rendered medicinal beer exempt from the constraints of 
the Volstead Act on March 3, 1921.22 Palmer ruled that the Internal Revenue 
Bureau did not have the power to limit the number of permits that it could 
distribute for the manufacture and sale of medicinal beers and wines, with the 
only stipulation being that only reputable brewers would be eligible to apply for 
the permits.23 Though Palmer had long been a strong advocate of Prohibition, 
his decision to loosen the regulations on the production and distribution of 
medicinal beer had essentially rendered it legal. Although it is unclear exactly 
why Attorney General Palmer chose to make this surprising turnaround, there 
are a couple of plausible explanations. Beverly Gage noted that his motivations 
likely lied in the fact that Palmer had been under a considerable amount of 
pressure from what remained of the U.S. brewing industry. When coupled with 
the fact that the Attorney General was only days away from being replaced, as 
Warren G. Harding had just been elected to the presidency of the United States, 
it is entirely possible that Palmer’s imminent replacement may have influenced 
his decision to shake up the political environment for his successor. However, 
one can never know for certain and this is likely the result of speculation on 
Gage’s part.24 Needless to say, Palmer’s decision to accept a doctor’s right to 
prescribe medicinal beer had left the Prohibitionist organizations feeling bewil-
dered and threatened. The Anti-Saloon League, specifically, became so incensed 
21 Anti-Beer Bill.” The New York Times, Nov. 21, 1921.
22 Pain, 44-45; Bamforth; Gage, 112-117; “Medical Beer,” The New York Times, March 12, 1921.
23 Ibid.
24 Gage, 112-117.
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with the success of the medicinal beer campaign that they filed an appeal to 
the Department of Justice against the Treasury’s ruling.25 
Given the circumstances of this situation, it is easy to understand the 
frustration that was felt by the Prohibitionists at the time. Since it had been 
established in 1893, the Anti-Saloon League had worked tirelessly to break the 
spirit of the American saloon and to bring about the complete and total ban of 
alcohol in the United States.26 With this one decision by the Attorney General, 
the organization came to feel that the “booze-free” America that they had spent 
nearly three decades trying to build had been undermined. The members of the 
Anti-Saloon League knew that the American Medical Association’s motivations 
did not lie simply in the endorsement of beer’s supposed medicinal benefits. 
The Anti-Saloon League recognized that there was more to the medicinal beer 
campaign than met the eye, and they stood resolute in the assumption that the 
entire movement served as a front for American doctors to use their strategic 
position in the medical field as a loophole with which they could take advantage 
of reintroducing recreational alcohol to the general public.27 Though there may 
be some truth to these negative sentiments, it is important to note that though 
a minority of a mere 26 percent, over a quarter all physicians within the U.S. at 
the time still found beer to be a vital and entirely necessary medicine.28 There 
may very well have been a handful of corrupt doctors that wanted to take 
advantage of the medicinal beer movement for the sake of personal gain, but 
I would argue that it is more likely the case that the majority of doctors that 
stood for medicinal beer did so because they supported the right of their col-
leagues to practice medicine as they thought best for their patients.29 However, 
regardless of the true motivations of the advocates of medicinal beer, Attorney 
General Palmer’s decision to allow reputable brewers and doctors to produce 
and prescribe medicinal beer went into full swing in the later months of 1921. 
Immediately following Attorney General Palmer’s decision to allow phy-
sicians to prescribe medicinal beer a mere eight months earlier, the Internal 
Revenue Bureau began to institute a sweeping set of new regulations on October 
25 “Medical Beer.”
26 Downard. 
27 “Medical Beer”; Pain, 44-45; Gage, 112-117.
28 “Prohibition And The Medical Profession,” 448.
29 Pain, 44-45; “Prohibition And The Medical Profession,” 448; “Physicians Ask Veto of Anti-
Beer Bill.”
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30 “Beer as Medicine 2.5 Gallons at a Time,” The New York Times, Oct 25, 1921.
31 “Only 9 States Get Beer as Medicine,” The New York Times, Oct. 26, 1921. 
32  “Ready to Give Permits to Make Medical Beer,” The New York Times, Oct. 27, 1921. 
33 Ibid. 
34 “Beer Stein for Sick,” The New York Times, Nov. 13, 1921. 
35 “Only 9 States Get Beer as Medicine”; “Medical Beer”; Pain, 44-45; Gage, 112-117; Bamforth.
24, 1921 that began to lay the framework with which medicinal beer was to 
operate within the confines of Prohibition regulations. Among these new regu-
lations were stipulations that held doctors to a standard in which they could 
not write prescriptions for themselves nor prescribe more than one pint of beer 
per patient in a ten-day period.30 Furthermore the privileges for the produc-
tion and sale of medicinal beer were only extended to nine states: California, 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.31 Lastly, the breweries within these states were 
required to obtain permits before they were able to begin to produce beer for 
medicinal consumption. Any brewery that had openly produced beer after the 
Eighteenth Amendment became the law of the land remained ineligible for 
these permits once they became available.32 
However, regardless of these circumstances, the Prohibitionists only viewed 
these regulatory measures as temporary concessions to the medical and brew-
ing industries as they endeavored to revise the provisions of the Eighteenth 
Amendment so that medicinal beer could be rendered illegal once more.33 The 
“dry” faction within the United States at the time had felt that the push for 
medicinal beer had “outraged” the Volstead Act and the Eighteenth Amendment 
by rendering druggists as the new “bartenders,” drug stores as the new “saloons,” 
and doctors as “beer dictators” that would only serve people who wanted to 
drink.34 By late November of 1921, Congressman Andrew Volstead and Wayne 
B. Wheeler, the author of the Volstead Act and the national counsel of the 
Anti-Saloon League, respectively, succeeded in their goal of passing the Willis-
Campbell Law through Congress. This new legislation effectively rendered 
medicinal beer to be illegal in every capacity, while wine and whiskey were 
deemed to be viable medicinal supplements that could only be prescribed in 
quantities of less than half a pint per ten-day period.35 This development is 
notable because the Prohibitionists had allowed themselves to come to the 
same conclusions about wine and whiskey as the wide majority of medical 
professionals at the time. Both physicians and Prohibitionists alike considered 
the forum
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the two substances to be far superior to beer in seemingly every way in terms 
of their therapeutic effectiveness.36 However, despite this new consensus, there 
was still a portion of the medical community that felt that government had 
betrayed them by passing the new law.37 As such, when the Willis-Campbell 
Law passed, some physicians continued to lobby the government in the hopes 
that medicinal beer would be granted a reprieve. 
Following the leadership of Dr. John P. Davin, the Executive Secretary 
of the New York Medical Association, the doctors of the New York Medical 
Association petitioned President Harding to veto the Willis-Campbell Law im-
mediately after the bill passed.38 However, when these fervent requests fell upon 
deaf ears, a last stand on the subject was made not by a coalition physicians, 
but by a brewery lawyer. On December 31, 1921, William M.K. Olcott, an 
attorney to a couple of brewers known as the Piel Brothers, argued on behalf 
of both physicians and the brewing industry alike before the Federal Court of 
Brooklyn that the Willis-Campbell Law stood in violation of the Constitution. 
He made his case on the grounds that the law had invaded upon the personal 
rights of physicians to be able to prescribe what they deemed fit in the treatment 
of their patients, and was thus unconstitutional in nature.39 Furthermore, Olcott 
contended that the law had interfered with human rights because it destroyed the 
right of breweries to cooperate with the medical field, and that the government 
had overstepped its bounds by usurping police powers that it had never been 
given before to interfere with the power and authority of the states.40 Although 
Olcott made a valiant effort on the part of the brewing industry, he ultimately 
failed to convince the government to grant beer medicinal status, thus ending 
the medicinal beer movement and rendering the manufacture and consump-
tion of beer illegal until Prohibition was eventually repealed eleven years later.41
Though only a small facet of the historical monolith that is the subject of 
U.S. Prohibition, the narrative of the medicinal beer movement provides a fas-
cinating perspective of the history of the early 1920s. The advent of Prohibition 
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in the United States led many determined doctors to campaign for their right 
to prescribe beer to their patients. Though not all within the medical profes-
sion agreed upon the viability of beer as a medicinal agent, many supported 
the medicinal beer movement because they believed that the government had 
overstepped its bounds by putting restrictions on what a doctor could prescribe 
as medicine. Conversely, Prohibitionist organizations like the Anti-Saloon league 
believed that the advocates of medicinal beer secretly harbored ulterior mo-
tives in pursuit of their beer-lauding agenda. The Prohibitionists believed that 
by granting beer official legal status as “medicine,” doctors would be able use 
their professional influence as a means with which they could reintroduce the 
recreational consumption of beer to the general public. As such, the Anti-Saloon 
League fought incessantly to put the debate to rest and discredit the therapeutic 
effectiveness of the curious elixir once and for all. However, regardless of the 
suspicions of the movement’s critics, the campaign for medicinal beer served 
to show that not all American citizens were happy with the changes that had 
been implemented by the Eighteenth Amendment. Although the movement 
ultimately failed, it still served as the first solid legislative resistance movement 
to the constraints of Prohibition. Through Attorney General Palmer, physicians 
and brewers alike had won a brief period of legal status for medicinal beer, but 
the Prohibitionists were determined to stop them and repealed the ruling. The 
advocates of medicinal beer took the issue to court and lost, but their struggle 
had shown the government that they would not readily submit to the federal 
controls that had been forced upon them. The determined medical profes-
sionals that had supported the medicinal beer movement in the early 1920s 
did not want to relinquish their right to treat their patients as they sought fit, 
and though they ultimately failed to get the government to grant beer lasting 
medicinal status, they refused to go down without putting up a valiant fight.
34
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HANGING PROSPERITY ON A WALL: PRIVATE ART COLLECTING 
AS CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION, UNITED STATES, 1945-1960
Elise Erb
On a brisk evening in New York in the spring of 1949, cars pulled up on 57th 
Street. Out of the cars stepped well-dressed women, and well-educated men, each 
met by attendants in striped trousers.1 These members of high society stepped 
out not in front of a theatre or the latest restaurant; instead, they arrived at an 
art auction at Parke-Burnet galleries during the boom period of the American 
art market after the Second World War. Such patrons brought Parke-Burnet 
Galleries their most lucrative season ever in 1945, grossing more than six million 
dollars; the same spring that saw the end of the Second World War in Europe, 
bringing massive social and political changes to the world.2 
The art market provides the perfect way to study American society as a 
whole in the time period of 1945 to 1960. Scholars have examined all of the 
pieces that played into the art market after the Second World War: the general 
post-war climate, the economic trends in art collecting, and the theft of art 
during the war.3 All of these topics have been studied without intersecting 
1 Aline B. Louchheim, “Where Art and Economics Meet,” New York Times, March 13, 1949. 
2 “Art Auction Sales at Record High,” New York Times, June 24, 1945.
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3 Works such as: Russell Bertrand, Détente or Destruction, 1955-1957 (London: Routledge, 2005); 
Michael Scheibach, Atomic Narrative and American Youth: Coming of Age with the Atom, 1945-1955 
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2003); Michael D. Pearlman, Truman and MacArthur: Policy, 
Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); 
Larry W. Blomstedt, “ The Forgotten Attempts to End the Forgotten War: Congress, Korea, and 
McCarthyism,” The Historian 72, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 781; Ted Morgan, Reds: McCarthyism in 
Twentieth Century America (New York: Random House, 2003); Louis Uchitelle, The Disposable 
American: Layoffs and their Consequences (New York: Knopf, 2006); Francis H. Heller, ed., Economics 
and the Truman Administration (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1981); Matthew B. Anderson, 
“The Discursive Regime of the ‘American Dream’ and the New Suburban Frontier: The Case of 
Kendall County, Illinois,” Urban Geography 31, no. 8 (November 2010): 1080-1099.; Mickey 
Lauria, ed., Reconstructing Urban Regime: Regulating Urban Politics in the Global Economy, (Thousand 
Oaks: Sage, 1997).
4 Marty Jeezer, The Dark Ages: Life in the United States, 1945-1960 (Boston: South End Press, 
1982), 83.
5 Ibid., 119.
6 W. G. Constable, Art Collecting in the United States of America (London: Thomas Nelson and 
Sons Ltd, 1964): v; William N. Goetzmann, “Accounting for Taste: Art and the Financial Markets 
Over Three Centuries,” The American Economic Review 83 (December 1993): 1375.
7 Lynn H. Nicholas, The Rape of Europa: The Fate of Europe’s Treasures in the Third Reich and the 
Second World War (New York: Knopf, 1994): 325.
the three. The years from 1945-1960 encompassed a period when the average 
American lived in fear of “the bomb” and communism, watched jobs disap-
pear as soldiers returned from the war, and traveled across the country on 
Route 66, the ultimate American road-trip.4 However, elite Americans found 
themselves with more disposable income than ever; income which they spent 
on art.5 Scholars have often examined art collecting as a broad topic from an 
economic standpoint, ignoring the life that art takes on as a social phenomena 
and an indicator of status. This view overlooks the human desire involved in the 
acquisition of a piece of art. Scholars such as William Goetzmann and W. G. 
Constable acknowledged that as the wealth of collectors increases so does the 
demand for art, but none took the step to explore the logic and social ramifica-
tions behind art collecting.6 Another topic of recent interest to scholars is the 
tragedy of Nazi and Soviet art theft. We know that the United States government 
established the elite military division of Reparations, Deliveries and Restitution 
dedicated to the return of looted works, but we do not know what the art elite 
in the states might have felt about these exploited works.7 The idea that the 
American social elite might have valued the unique history of a recovered piece 
of art is one that deserves further study. I argue that conspicuous consumption 
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became critical in post-war America in order for elites to show that they had not 
only survived the war, but were in fact now more prosperous than ever before.
Conspicuous Consumption: Applying Veblen to the Post-war Art Market
Private art collecting typically serves as a prime example of conspicuous con-
sumption. Thorstein Veblen first presented the idea of conspicuous consumption 
in 1902 through his work The Theory of the Leisure Class. At its most basic, the 
concept suggests that society valued the consumption of goods for unproductive 
means because it became a mark of social status, especially the consumption 
of desirable goods.8 Veblen applied his ideas to servants, food, lifestyle and 
household goods in the early Victorian period in which he wrote. 
In his writing, Veblen never specifically mentions the application of his 
ideas to art collecting among the social elite as a display of wealth, but I believe 
it to be a logical application of Veblen’s ideas that has heretofore been unex-
plored. Veblen believed that conspicuous consumption could only be practiced 
in a “quasi-peaceable” time, which the United States achieved for the fist time 
in more than a decade during the post-war period.9 Collecting art took both 
time and money, things not squandered in times of turmoil. It took time to 
go to galleries and seek out pieces for purchase and viewing in New York. 10 
Americans did not experience art on a public and daily basis like Europeans 
living in old cities filled with old masters did.11 Art collecting allowed conspicu-
ous consumption of both time and large amounts of money, showing that the 
money did not need to be used for practical means.
A critical part to understanding conspicuous consumption depends on 
understanding Veblen’s definition of waste. Veblen defines waste in his context 
as the expenditure of time or money that does not serve human life or well 
being in general, not a misuse of time or money, as we tend to define waste in 
modern daily conversation.12 Through this definition, Veblen recognized that 
conspicuous consumption serves a purpose and is not useless, as an outsider 
might perceive it. For a modern audience, it is key to remember Veblen’s un-
derstanding of waste as we apply his ideas to private art collecting. 
8 Thorstein Veblen, “Conspicuous Consumption,” The Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: 
Macmillan, 1902): 53.
9 Ibid., 65.
10 Aline B. Louchheim, “Art: Mecca and Marketplace,” The New York Times, February 1, 1953.
11 Ibid.
12 Veblen, “Conspicuous Consumption,” 73.
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Conspicuous Use of Idle Time: The act of buying as a social spectacle
In the post-war art world, the show of status and conspicuous consumption 
began the moment the buyer set foot in the establishment where they would 
later purchase a work of art. Large-scale art auctions and private buying sessions 
became the two primary ways to legally acquire art in the United States after 
the Second World War. Different social implications came with each method 
of buying art: one showed conspicuous consumption through presence, and 
the other through the implied prestige of the work purchased.
Art auctions served as major social events, on the same scale as theatre. 
In her 1953 New York Times article, “Where Art and Economics Meet,” Aline 
Louchheim described the scene at Parke-Burnet Galleries, the largest auction 
house in New York at the time, during one particular auction. She described 
the sale as an “exciting spectacle” with women dressed in mink coats and men 
peering at art through magnifying glasses.13 Louchheim said that attendants 
wearing “striped trousers” met these high-class potential buyers when their fancy 
cars glided up outside.14 Such ostentation would have been impossible for the 
rest of the social elite and passers-by to ignore.By showing up at the auction 
dressed in their finery, high society members gained status among their peers. 
In this case, it became more a matter of being seen than what they actually 
bought or did at the auction. Veblen addressed the idea that mere presence 
could serve as conspicuous consumption when he said that one’s presence at an 
event served as a way to show strangers that one possessed social status.15 The 
social buying practices of the American elite in the post-war period perfectly 
evidence this idea. A socialite certainly did not purchase pieces at every auction 
attended, but every event they attended added to their social prestige and status.
Private buying provided an experience on the other end of the art-buying 
spectrum from art auctions. Dealers like Wildenstein & Co. made their name 
selling only the finest and most desirable pieces of art. One news article, printed 
8 Thorstein Veblen, “Conspicuous Consumption,” The Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: 
Macmillan, 1902): 53.
9 Ibid., 65.
10 Aline B. Louchheim, “Art: Mecca and Marketplace,” The New York Times, February 1, 1953.
11 Ibid.
13 Louchheim, “Where Art and Economics Meet.”
14 Ibid. 
15 Veblen, “Conspicuous Consumption,” 65.
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to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the firm, called Wildenstein & Co. the 
“Cartier of the art world,” a true testament to the caliber and prestige of the 
firm.16 When buying art from a dealer like this, the buyer would be ushered 
into a room covered in rich drapery with two chairs in the middle. The dealer 
would then bring paintings into the room to be shown one at a time, no more 
than six in a session.17 Only those who could afford the best and rarest of works 
could participate in the private buying experience. 
While it may not seem that private buying would be conducive to dis-
playing wealth publicly, this method brought status to the buyer through the 
prestige of the acquisition. The amount of money that Wildenstein & Co. 
brought in allowed them to build up an impressive stock that included works 
by the likes of Rembrandt and Winslow Homer. The firm could then take their 
time selling the pieces for the best price and to the most prestigious buyer.18 
Aline Louchheim explained the company’s sales strategy: “Many of the greatest 
objects have been in the firm for twenty-five or thirty years. Many are rarely 
offered.”19 This meant that while buying a piece from private sessions did not 
provide a public venue to display wealth, more prestige came from the act of 
owning a piece from one of these elite institutions. Visiting one of these institu-
tions alone did not act as conspicuous consumption, but walking out having 
purchased something there certainly did.
The act of going to a public auction to purchase art was the most con-
spicuous act of the art acquisition process because it made the act of buying 
art public. Just as Veblen said that conspicuous waste of time should become 
an integral part of conspicuous consumption, going to art sales became a social 
expectation in order to maintain status.20 Whether purchased at an auction as 
part of a grand spectacle, or purchased in the privacy of a private buying room, 
the process of buying a work of art became a way of practicing conspicuous 
consumption. The pageantry of an auction and the prestige of owning a rare 
work of art showed status and wealth.
16 Aline B. Louchheim, “A Half-Century of Dealing in Art,” New York Times, November 11, 
1951.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Veblen, “Conspicuous Consumption.” 62. 
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Conspicuous Use of Idle Money: Owning as a social spectacle
The conspicuous consumption did not end with the purchase of a piece of art. 
Just owning a piece of art did not automatically confer status upon the owner. 
Different attributes of the piece created different levels of conspicuous con-
sumption. In his book Art as an Investment, Richard Rush explained that the 
determining factors in a painting’s price in America in the post-war period were 
the following: artist and period of work, quality compared to other works by 
the artist, subject and size of the work, condition, previous ownership history, 
signature, who had owned the painting previously, seller, location, and timing 
of the sale, and who attended the sale.21 
Aline Louchheim noted in 1949 that nineteenth-century French artists 
were the most desirable and most popular, along with newer realist and anecdotal 
paintings.22 Works by these artists sold for the most money on a regular basis. 
Owning one of these paintings would act as conspicuous consumption because 
other collectors knew that these works were of high value, and therefore had 
spent a significant amount of idle money to acquire the piece. Of course, the 
more rare the piece, the more money it took to purchase. Private dealers such 
as Wildenstien and Co. often sold pieces like this, meaning that prices came 
to be known only through anecdotal evidence.23 
In 1961, approximately 500 people in the world were buying the high-
est priced works of art, those over 50,000 dollars.24 Not everyone buying in 
the United States at this time would have been in this elite category of buyers. 
However, the art buying public would have known which artists and styles 
were selling for the highest prices, so displaying certain works would display 
higher status.
The previous ownership and story of a piece also conferred value upon 
a painting. Ownership was important because if a painting had a well-known 
owner in the past, it had probably undergone examination for authenticity. 
The greater the number of previous owners, the better a reputation the paint-
ing had.25 Paintings with documents proving its authenticity, origin, and past, 
21 Richard H. Rush, Art as an Investment (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1961): 
290.
22 Louchheim, “Where Art and Economics Meet,” “Degas Work Brings $25,000,” New York 
Times, December 12, 1948.
23 Louchheim, “A Half-Century of Dealing in Art,” and “Where Art and Economics Meet.”
24   Rush, Art as an Investment, 352.
25 Ibid., 286.
44
the forum
brought even more value to the piece.26 Previous ownership would also give a 
price history to the work, showing the new owner if the work gained or lost 
value and popularity.27 
While previous ownership was an important part of the history of a work 
of art, the more recent history of art tragedy proved more exciting to buyers 
in this post-war period. Buyers in the years directly following the war were 
suddenly looking at pieces that had the unique history of being victims of 
Nazi and Soviet art theft during the war. The public knew what had happened 
because the major newspapers at the time ran stories about Nazi and Soviet 
atrocities during the war.28 The Nazis and Soviets began looting the nations 
that they invaded in the autumn of 1942, even going as far as creating specially 
trained art theft battalions. While pillaging occurred wherever the Nazis went, 
the majority of art raids took place in the private collections and museums of 
Europe.29 One writer for the Los Angeles Times, stationed in Paris at the time, 
wrote about watching as the French government moved the Mona Lisa out of 
the Louvre to protect it from Nazi looting. The pieces that were stolen either 
became part of the private collections of high-ranking Nazi leaders, or were 
tragically burned.30
As the Second World War drew to a close, the Allied forces created a task 
force commonly called the Monument Men, who retrieved as many of the 
looted pieces as they could.31 While this history is never specifically mentioned 
as a reason why the value of a piece would rise, this attribute is mentioned by 
Louchheim in her article “Where Art and Economics Meet” when discussing 
the pieces in a specific sale in 1949.32 This suggests that the tragic and exciting 
history of a piece would increase its value for the consumer of the day.
Because of the new history of the Second World War, this post-war period 
gave rise to new ideas as to what made a work of art valuable. Walter Benjamin 
was one of the thinkers who brought forth new ideas in this period. Benjamin 
posed the idea that works of art with unique histories would garner more money 
26 Russell Lynes, “The Taste Makers,” Harper’s Magazine, June 1947, 486.
27 Ibid., 288.
28 Eugene Tillinger, “History’s Greatest Art Theft,” Los Angeles Times, June 6, 1943.
29 Nicholas, The Rape of Europa, 72, 15.
30 Tillinger, “History’s Greatest Art Theft.”
31 Nicholas, The Rape of Europa, 415.
32 Louchheim, “Where Art and Economics Meet.”
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on the market. In “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” 
Benjamin said that the “unique existence of the work of art determined the 
history to which it was subject to throughout the time of its existence.”33 This 
meant that the work of art gained value and authenticity as time passed and 
it became a part of the fabric of history. In the context of private art collect-
ing, this meant that pieces with a unique history could raise the potential for 
conspicuous consumption more than a work without a significant history. 
Price necessarily served as the final indicator of conspicuous consumption 
in the art world. During the 1944-1945 season, the New York art market made 
its largest amount of money to that date, more than six million dollars.34 The 
post-war period was a time of economic boom, so the elite had much more 
money to invest into the purchase of art.35 This desire to purchase art created a 
bull market in the art world.36 This meant that the art market was selling more 
lucratively than in recent historical memory. Some scholars suggested that part 
of this desire for luxury items was fueled by Hollywood movies such as Gilda 
starring Rita Hayworth. Now Americans had the money to buy the luxuries 
highlighted in films for the first time in over fifteen years.37 Since no one had 
the money to buy luxury items during the war, purchasing art became a suc-
cessful manner of conspicuous consumption because it created that Hollywood 
look for the first time since the war ended. This explains why a bull market in 
art occurred right after the war, the social elite wanted their due again having 
temporarily lost their wealth with the crash of the stock market and the entry 
of the United States into the war.38
The sheer act of spending money on a piece of art served as means of 
conspicuous consumption. However, for the piece to obtain status, it needed 
to have certain qualities of style, artist, price, and history. Americans showed 
33 Walter Benjamin. Illuminations, ed. H. Arendt and trans. H. Zohn, (London: Fontana: 
1992 (orig. 1936)), 98.
34 Two articles differ on the exact amount in sales during this season. The figure is quoted as 
$6,165,920 in “Art Auction Sales at Record High.” and as  $6,604,045 in Aline B. Louchheim, 
“Where Art and Economics Meet.” 
35 Rush, Art as an Investment, 215.
36 Goetzmann, “Accounting for Taste: Art and the Financial Markets Over Three Centuries,” 
1373.
37 Jeezer, The Dark Ages: Life in the United States, 1945-1960, 118.
38 Ibid., 34.
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their newly reacquired wealth by spending on the luxury items they gave up 
during the preceding depression and war, including art.39
Making Conspicuous Consumption Conspicuous: Advertising the 
spectacle.
The social elite of the post-war period went through the process of going to sales 
and buying art, but what good did this process serve it if no one knew about 
their purchases? Conspicuous consumption was about being seen. To ensure 
visibility, the social elite used the art sections of newspapers to advertise their 
newly acquired wealth to both those within and outside of, their social circles. 
The primary way of advertising the procurement of art was through news 
“blurbs.” Both before and after the sale, newspapers would run a story, often 
no more than a few lines, about the auction. The articles after the auctions 
summed up what had been bought, how much it cost, and when the buyer 
or seller allowed disclosure, who bought it.40 Articles printed before the sale 
would tell the reader the previous ownership of the works being sold, and 
highlight any important pieces.41 When the art auctions were in the paper 
before the actual sale occurred, it added status to the sale, and to the pieces 
bought there. One 1947 article detailed all of the works that would be sold at 
auction that weekend from the estate of Mrs. Walter B. James of New York.42 
The pre-advertisement of a sale ensured a large turnout including the most elite 
members of art collecting society, which drove up the prices of the works and 
increased prestige.43 Articles that ran after the sale made sure that all members 
of society knew what had been bought by whom and for how much. Since 
not all of high society would be at any auction, high profile purchases were 
advertised so that wealth and social standing could be displayed for all to see. 
The short advertisements in newspapers provided just such an opportunity for 
39 Goetzmann, “Accounting for Taste: Art and the Financial Markets Over Three Centuries,” 
1373.
40 “$45,720 Art Sale,” New York Times, February 27, 1947; “Painting Brings $5,700,” New York 
Times, December 15, 1949; “Degas Work Brings $25,000 at Auction,” New York Times, December 
12, 1948; “Art Works Bring $50,970,” New York Times, March 12, 1948; “Auction Yields $87,945,” 
New York Times, December 14, 1947; “Tapestry Brings $1,900,” New York Times, November 9, 
1947; “Painting Sold for $4,000,” New York Times, March 12, 1946; “Jade Vase Brings $1,700,” 
New York Times, April 20, 1947.
41 “Rembrandt Works on Sale Tomorrow,” New York Times, March 16, 1947.
42 Ibid.
43 Rush, Art as an Investment, 289.
Elise Erb
47
those who were not in attendance to see what was bought. This advertisement 
of what was bought allowed the vicarious consumption of the non-elites who 
could not participate in the art market because of the restrictive cost involved. 
The “Arts” sections of major metropolitan newspapers provided another 
way of advertising wealth. These sections were not necessarily written for the 
elites already purchasing art. A critical reading Louchheim’s article “Where Art 
and Economics Meet,” reveals that everyday newspaper readers were likely the 
intended audience, not the art collecting elite. The article gives an in-depth 
description of what an art auction was like and what went into each auction.44 
The art buying elite would not have need to be told what happened at an art 
sale because they would have known from experience, however, the general 
public would have held a high interest into what happened at an art auction. 
After years of economic turmoil, the American people needed a way to prove 
that the worst was over and they were once again on top of the global market.45 
The social practices of the rich, art buying elite provided the perfect way to see 
proof of the return of good times. 
In order for this to be clear in the packed metropolises of post-war 
America, conspicuous consumption needed advertisement. Veblen recognized 
this and said that wealth could not be properly advertised unaided.46 In other 
words, Veblen meant that wealth would not advertise itself. Conspicuous con-
sumption of art meant making sure that all members of society knew about the 
acquisition of art. The newspapers were the best way to achieve this advertise-
ment in the post-war world. 
Conspicuous Consumption: Showing America that better days were here 
again
In the post-war period in America, the art world became an outlet for social 
elites to practice conspicuous consumption. From the moment society members 
stepped out of their shiny black cars in front of an auction house, they proved 
that they had achieved prosperity once again. Even those who bought their 
art in the confines of private buying rooms showed their wealth through the 
prestige attached to their purchases. The art itself gained or lost prestige based 
44 Louchheim, “Where Art and Economics Meet.”
45 Jeezer, The Dark Ages: Life in the United States, 1945-1960, 120.
46 Veblen, “Conspicuous Consumption,” 57.
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on various attributes of the painting including artist, price, and previous history. 
In this post-war period, previous history came to include the history of Nazi 
and Soviet art theft during the Second World War. Art collection would have 
gone largely unnoticed if newspapers had not published stories about the art 
market, and specific art sales, for art collecting elites and everyday people alike. 
The act of conspicuous consumption became important in the post-war 
era because the elites needed to show they survived the sixteen-year period of 
war and economic depression that just ended. The social elite needed a way to 
prove they more than just survived, but came out as affluent as before, if not 
more. This may have seemed like a waste of time and money, but it proved they 
did not need that time to work, or that money to buy necessities: a luxury that 
had not existed just a few years before. Art became more than just something 
to hang on a wall. It became a way to demonstrate status in a world where 
status could once again be relevant, perhaps even reveled in, and not be seen 
as distasteful.
49
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FROM NOVELTY TO NEW ART: THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
INTELLECTUAL CRITICS’ OPINION OF TALKIES
Samantha Hennes
Those involved in the movie industry during the late 1920s spoke constantly 
about talking pictures. Opinions on the “talkie” varied greatly, common head-
lines in both the Los Angeles Times and New York Times ranged from negative 
articles with headlines, such as “Beauty Lost in Talkies,” “Talking Films Try 
Movie Men’s Souls,” and “Union’s Discount ‘Talkies’” to more supportive ar-
ticles, such as “All Films to Be Talkies,” “Another Movie Miracle,” and “Talking 
Picture New Era.”1 While some viewed talkies as something to ridicule, calling 
them “moanies” or “squeakies,” others viewed them as the future of the motion 
picture industry.2 The different opinions on talkies were not specific to certain 
member of the movie industry. Not all movie producers or directors liked talkies 
and not all critics or actors hated them. Monte Bell, a prominent film director 
of the time best explained the debate by using producers as an example. Bell 
1 “Beauty Lost in Talkies,” Los Angeles Times (December 16, 1928) c16., “All Films to Be 
Talkies,” Los Angeles Times (March 8, 1928) A5, Chapin Hall, “Talking Films Try Movie Men’s 
Souls,” New York Times (June 8, 1928), 43. “Another Movie Miracle,” New York Times (April 3, 
1927) X7, Earle E Crowe, “Talking Picture New Era,” Los Angeles Times (April 24, 1928) 12.
 2 Harry M, Geduld, “Appendix A” in The Birth of Talkies From Edison to Jolson (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1975), 269-274.
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4 Kenneth MacGowan, “When the Talkies Came to Hollywood,” The Quarterly of Film Radio 
and Television 10, no.3, (Spring 1956), 294.
5 These works include: Scott Eyman, The Speed of Sound Hollywood and the Talkie 
Revolution1926-1930 (New York: Simon &Schuster, 1997); Andrew Sarris, “You Ain’t Heard 
Nothin’ Yet” The American Talking Film History and Memory 1927-1949 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998); Donald Crafton, The Talkies: American Cinema’s Transition To Sound 
1926-1931 (New York: Macmillan Library Reference USA, 1997); E.S. Gregg, The Shadow of 
Sound (New York: Vantage Press, 1968); Harry M. Geduld, The Birth of The Talkies From Edison 
to Jolson (London: Indiana University Press, 1975).
6 Myron Osborn Lounsbury, The Origins of American Film Criticism 1909-1939 (New York: 
Arno Press, 1973), 152.
had three producers who each gave the public different opinions on the talkie. 
While one producer claimed that silent film was dead, his counterpart would 
claim that silent film still had merit while another claimed that the talkie would 
revolutionize the industry.3 In examining the talkie debate, it becomes clear 
that opinions about the talkie were dynamic. As the silent film era came to a 
close many who spoke harshly of the talkie during its infancy came to support 
it. In general, movie directors and the public favored the talkie.4 One of the 
strongest voices in the early years against the talkie, however, was that of the 
intellectual film critic who represented a “higher-brow” movie-going audience 
that considered film to be art rather than just an entertainment. In order to 
better understand why this change of opinion in the talkie debate occurred I 
plan to examine the changing views of the intellectual critic during the silent-
to-sound transition era.  
Thus far, scholars who mention the opinions of members involved in the 
talkie debate, only mention the opinions rather than analyze them, however 
the work of Myron Osborn Lounsbury examines the film critic and serves as 
a starting point for my analysis of the intellectual critic during the talkie era.5 
While the primary focus of Lounsbury’s book The Origin of American Film 
Criticism is the shift in vocabulary during the thirty-year period between 1909-
1939, she does focus on an influential movement in film criticism that occurred 
during the talkie era, called the “little cinema movement”. The “little cinema 
movement” had three goals: to exhibit foreign films that were unpopular to the 
masses but deemed important by intellectuals, to re-examine older but contro-
versial movies, and to develop an audience for independent and experimental 
film makers.6 According to Lounsbury this movement influenced the quality of 
the forum
54
7 Benjamin B. Hampton, History of the American Film Industry from its beginnings to 1931 
(1931; repr, Dover Publications, 1970), 375.
motion picture writing. Essentially what Lounsbury’s examination of the “little 
cinema movement” suggests is that to some film, moved more towards the way 
of a serious art, rather than merely a source of entertainment. This notion of 
film as a serious art was a rather new concept during this time, however, it helps 
to explain why the intellectual critic was so harsh to the talkie. The intellectual 
critic, influenced by the “little cinema movement”, held film to strict aesthetic 
standards and the talkie challenged their notion of these standards.
The intellectual critic of the talkie era explored the possibilities of film 
through their critiques of movies, and what they praised or neglected gave a 
great deal of insight into their opinions. In examining opinions and reviews 
of early and late talkies, it appears that the intellectual critic became more ac-
cepting of the talkie as they changed how they evaluated film. Before the talkie, 
the intellectual critic viewed film as a purely visual art; therefore they placed 
great importance on the visual aspects of a film, like the camera angles rather 
than the quality of dialogue. However, the talkie caused the intellectual critic 
distress because the use of sound and dialogue transformed what was once 
purely visual into a hybridization of forms, which confused their evaluation 
process. To reconcile this distress, the intellectual critic showed disdain for the 
talkies and dismissed it as a novelty. However, when it became clear that the 
talkie was not a fad, the intellectual critic readjusted, first, they stopped viewing 
film as a purely visual art and focused more on the actor on screen and then 
they moved toward improving the talkie in order to make it into a new form 
of art, that emphasized a harmony between visual aspects of film and dialogue. 
Intellectual Superiority: What Differentiated the Intellectual Critic from 
the Average Critic? 
The intellectual critic represented a movie-going population with sophisticated 
taste who expected more from the movies then than the masses.7 They viewed 
film as a source of art rather than just a source of entertainment. Unlike the 
studios the amount of money a movie made in the box office had little merit 
when it came to the evaluation of a film. To the intellectual critic, a film 
was enjoyable if it had artistic merit. Due to this emphasis on artistic merit 
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the intellectual critic represented a higher-minded audience that separated 
themselves from other critics by asserting their intellectual superiority. The 
intellectual critic achieved this by distancing themselves from the consumer 
aspects of film and the opinions of the masses. 
The intellectual critic viewed the talkie as a gimmick to make money 
rather than a quality movie, so they used their intellectual superiority as a means 
to defend the artistic merit of film. One of the loudest voices in the attack of 
the talkie was artistic critic Gilbert Seldes. Seldes was a seasoned critic of the 
arts and wrote The 7 Lively Arts which examined various forms of art such as 
theater, music and dance.8 When it came to film evaluation, Seldes was more 
concerned with what he considered the “theoretical” approach in examining 
film, such as aesthetics, and was against what he considered the “practical” ap-
proach often taken by the movie industry that relied more on making money.9 
Seldes attacked those involved in the practical side of the talkie debate; arguing 
that, “the director preoccupied with practical matters of the dull-witted and 
ignorant owner of movie property” did not handle movies for a “high-brow” 
audience well.10 Seldes’ attack is a perfect example of how important it was for 
the intellectual critic to distance themselves from the consumer aspect of the 
movies. The fact that Seldes, uses words like “dull-witted” or “ignorant” indeed 
of words like “greedy” show that Seldes is more concerned with the intellectual 
aspect of a movie rather than its success or monetary value. He choice of words 
that attack the intelligence of movie makers, make the comparison that while 
these talkie makers are “ignorant” Seldes himself is intelligent for noticing 
these problems. Intelligence asserted the notion that film critics like Seldes 
understood the difference between good and bad cinema as opposed to the 
amount of money a production made. 
Echoing back to ideals of “the little cinema movement” intellectual critics 
also asserted their intellectual superiority by reviewing unpopular movies they 
valued for artist merit as opposed to popular movies valued by the masses that 
were merely entertainment. Welford Beaton was an intellectual critic who voiced 
his praise for unpopular films as a way to differentiate himself from the masses. 
8 Gilbert Seldes, The Seven Lively Arts, (New York: Sagamore Press, 1924)
9 Seldes, An Hour With the Movies and the Talkies, (Philadelphia: J.B Lippincott Company, 
1929) 96.
10 Ibid., 96.
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Beaton owned The Film Specter which was a Hollywood periodical known for 
providing “a refreshingly unbiased Hollywood insider’s view of the movies.” 
Beaton he reviewed countless movies in this publication many of which were 
praised by Seldes.11 Beaton’s review of the movie The Crowd exemplified the 
ideas of the intellectual critic as opposed to that of the masses. The Crowd was 
a silent film that came out during the talkie era and was considered widely 
unpopular. According to Beaton the film would not do well in the box office 
but he considered the film worthy of great deal of praise.12 The box office was a 
way for theater owners to hear the voice of the masses. When critics like Beaton 
went against the idea of the masses they suggested that film was something 
more than a product to them and that their ideas about film as an art were 
more thoughtful than those of the average film-going masses. 
A Visual Art: The Intellectual Critic’s View of Film before the Talkie
When the intellectual critic evaluated film, prior to the talkie era, one of the 
main things they focused on was the visual aspects of the films. The word 
choice in reviews of silent films suggests a great appreciation for the visual 
components of film. To the intellectual critic the camera was a key component 
in the process of making good films. The talkie challenged the idea of visual 
aspects of film being most important, and this explains the intellectual critics’ 
initial resistance to the talkie. 
When intellectual critics evaluated film they praised visual aspects of 
film because to them sound and dialogue were an unnecessary component of 
a good film. Gilbert Seldes’ book An Hour With the Movies and the Talkies is a 
prime example of the amount of importance the intellectual critic placed on 
the visual aspects of films and emphasizes the importance of movement in silent 
films. He looked at the physical action of moving and talked about pantomime 
artists such as Charlie Chaplin. He notes Chaplin’s facial expressions during 
a scene in The Gold Rush where Chaplin starts to dance the ballet, and Seldes 
explains how “you can see what is going on in his mind and what awaits him 
at the dinner party.”13 To Seldes the facial expression was enough to tell a story 
and therefore it is easy to see how sound essentially is unnecessary to an art that 
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needs only visuals. Seldes rarely mentioned the plot or story of a film and his 
neglect of other aspects of film solidified the importance of the visual aspects to 
the intellectual critic. The language he used to describe films such as The Last 
Laugh suggested that a strong visual element made a film into art. He stated 
that, “It was as solid as a Dutch painting; as a movie it was interesting because 
everything that could be touched or heard or felt was somehow translated into 
visual terms.”14 His comparison suggests that films were strengthened when 
their visual components fit together well.15 In fact, the intellectual critics during 
this era were so focused on visual aspects of film that to many, sound seemed 
unnecessary. The intellectual critic believed that art thrived when it worked 
within the limitations of its medium.16 For the intellectual critic this medium 
was purely visual and adding sound would change the medium, and the art. 
The intellectual critic’s notion of film being a visual art was challenged 
by the introduction of the talkie because it restricted the camera’s freedom of 
movement.  Before the introduction of the talkie the motion picture camera 
was thought to be not only the basis of the motion picture industry, but also 
highly perfected and readily portable.17 Many foreign silent film directors ex-
perimented with revolutionary camera angles. One example, the Russian cinema, 
mentioned in Seldes’ book, featured increased camera movement and sweeping 
long shots. 18 Consequently, the release of the talkie put a halt to much of this 
experimentation. Sound microphones restricted the movement of actors as well 
as the camera. Director Clarence Badger pointed out the flaw with the use of 
the camera when filming a talkie, “The difference is that the same lighting is 
serving both medium shot and close-up, so that one or the other is bound to 
lose something of its photographic beauty.”19 The loss of photographic beauty 
would have been devastating to the intellectual critic since the visual aesthetics 
of film were of such great importance to them. The talkie changed the way that 
films were made; it demanded close-ups and soundproof stages which limited 
the forum
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the camera movements and the overall aesthetic style of the silent film praised 
so highly by the intellectual critic. 
Early Views on the Talkie: The Intellectual Critics Uncertainty in 
Evaluating the Talkie
The talkie changed the way that films were made and how they looked. This 
caused a tension in the reviews of critics who did not know how to handle the 
shift. In the reviews of early talkies, there was a tension between the old style 
of film review, i.e. visual aspects, and the new review, which would appeal to 
the masses. At first, the intellectual critic was still too focused on comparing 
the talkie to silent films and this approach lead to a general dislike of talkies. 
Talkies confused early intellectual reviewers because visual aspects were 
not longer the only way to tell a story, and while focusing on visual aspects 
alone was enough to evaluate a silent film, this was not a comprehensive enough 
evaluation for the talkie. Welford Beaton’s review of the early talkie The Jazz 
Singer revealed the early tension film critics felt because of the talkie. In his 
review Beaton quickly criticized the overuse of the close-up.20 Seeing as the 
intellectual critic of the day was so focused on the camera and the visual aspects 
of film, the overuse of a close-up went against everything the intellectual critic 
found valuable in film. The problem with Beaton’s review however, was that 
unlike the silent film, the talkie was not a purely visual art. Essentially the talkie 
was not purely visual because the addition of sound added a new aspect to the 
film. Dialogue replaced the sole reliance of facial expressions and movement 
to tell a story and this confused early talkie reviewers. Beaton seems aware of 
this dilemma and he acknowledges the fact that the talkie is a new kind of 
film.21 In his review he suggested that he would be unable to use typical motion 
picture standards to criticize this film. Although Beaton understood that the 
talkie was something new, because of this newness Beaton was ill equipped to 
evaluate the film. 
Beaton was against sound in early talkie pictures because, like many other 
intellectual critics, he felt that sound was unnecessary, however Beaton was 
one of the first intellectual critics to realize that the talkie would dominate the 
movie industry. To Beaton, sound was unnecessary because, “Nothing that can 
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be left to the imagination should be included in a motion picture.”22 Beaton 
thought the sight of a closing door was enough to allow the audience the chance 
to imagine the sound. The audience gave life to a silent picture, but with the 
talkie, the movie did that itself.23 So when Beaton reviewed the first talkie, The 
Jazz Singer, it seemed only natural that he would be against the use of sound. 
Although he was against sound, he also suggested that movie producers support 
the talkie because it would be foolish for them not to. According to Beaton, 
“As speaking pictures become better known the public will demand them.”24 
Beaton’s mention of the public pointed out that the talkie was intended to 
please the masses, not the intellectual class of movie patron, but he also realized 
that ultimately the masses controlled the movie industry, and understood the 
inevitably of the talkie replacing silent films. 
While Beaton understood that the talkie was inevitable, many other in-
tellectual critics were not as certain; most of them did not evaluate the artistic 
aspects of the talkie because they considered it a passing fad.  It was clear that 
the talkie was not something they took seriously. Richard Watts Jr’s who wrote 
for The Film Mercury reviewed the talkie, The Broadway Melody and used 
the word “heart-warming” to describe it. When Watts uses the word “heart-
warming” he is describing the emotion of the piece rather than evaluating the 
technical aspects of the film that make one feel this emotion, in doing this he 
focuses on the entertainment value of the piece rather than the intellectual or 
artistic value of the piece. In another review, Welford Beaton said the talkie 
The Cocoanuts did what it set out to achieve as it made the audience laugh.25 
While both Watts and Beaton’s reviews are positive about the talkies, they lack 
the critical scrutiny used in their evaluations of silent films suggesting the talkie 
was insignificant. After all, the role of a critic is to “ask and answer valuable 
questions about a work of art” and since critics failed to do this with certain 
talkies, it was clear they did not consider the talkie a work of art.26 
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The Talkie is Here to Stay: How the Intellectual Critic Came to Accept 
the Talking Picture
It was clear that the intellectual critic felt a great deal of dissonance when it 
came to the talkie.  Alexander Bakshy, a critic similar to Seldes because of his 
background as an art critic, remarked, “It is a sad reflection of the limitations 
of intellectuals and artists all over the world to see history repeat itself in the 
contemptuous resentment with which they are greeting the talkie.”27 While 
Bakshy appeared to argue against his fellow critic, in the same essay he critiqued 
the talkie. Bakshy’s statement displays two separate needs: a shift in focus for 
the intellectual critic and improvements for the talkie. In order to accept the 
talkie, the intellectual critic needed to focus less on visual aspects of film and 
more on the presence of the character and also suggest ways in which the talkie 
could improve. 
Richard Watts Jr. represented a major shift in how the intellectual critic 
viewed the talkie because of his focus on personal aspects of films. One of 
the first people Watts praised, James Gleason, was the writer of the talkie The 
Broadway Melody. In Watts’ review, he highlighted the fact that the writer role 
gained significance as an important aspect of film. He praised Gleason in his 
review and said, “Nevertheless there was manifest with pleasant frequency 
throughout the picture a quality of dialogue and characterization…”28  As the 
talkie grew in public popularity many Broadway playwrights and journalists 
were involved in the scripts of movies because they understood how to write 
dialogue. Watts placed a great deal of importance on people involved in the 
movie, i.e. actors, writers, directors, etc. suggesting that because of a greater 
focus on people the intellectual critic was less focused on the visual aspects of 
film as the talkie grew in popularity. 
The intellectual critics’ shift in emphasis from a visual to personal aspects 
is best explained by the work of scholar Robert Spandoni whose research on 
the audiences’ reception of early sound films suggests a growing importance 
of the “figure” or actor in sound films. While Spandoni’s article focuses on 
audiences in general, his concept can still be applied to that of the intellectual 
critic because they were ultimately still members of the movie going audience. 
27 Alexander Bakshy, “The ‘Talkies’” in American Movie Critics An Anthology From the Silents 
Until Now, ed. Phillip Lopate (New York: The Library of America 2006), 47.
28 Watts, “The Broadway Melody,” in Selected Film Criticism 1921-1930, 51.
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Spandoni argues that the figure on screen in sound films struck viewers as very 
present.29 It is obvious that the presence of these figures was noticed by the 
intellectual critic as evident in reviews from critics like Watts. As sound film 
became more and more popular the figure on screen became more important to 
the intellectual film critic. While Spandoni’s work focuses on the beginning of 
the talkie era as well as the general publics’ opinion, his work is still applicable 
to the intellectual critic in later years because their reception of the talkie was 
similar to that of the general public. 
As the intellectual critic began to accept the talkie, it became clear that 
they wanted to evaluate the talkie as a new art, and therefore not compare the 
talkie to existing forms such as the silent film or theater. Before I go into the 
commentary these critics had on the talking picture I would first like to em-
phasize the word “new” when it came to the art to the talkie. Apart from silent 
films, the talkie was commonly compared to the stage. The intellectual critic 
of later talkies felt that the talkie was something different than both silent films 
and the stage which meant it would need to develop artist merit differently 
than existing forms. In fact, Gilbert Seldes was adamant that the talkies not 
borrow too heavily from the stage. Seldes thought that if the talkie borrowed 
from the stage it would hinder the medium’s ability to grow.30 Similarly, Bakshy 
pointed out the flaw in comparing the talkie to the stage stating that the com-
parison implied that they dealt with the same material when in actuality they 
did not.31  To the intellectual critic of the late talkie it was clear that in order 
for the talkie to develop into something worthy of their time, improvements 
needed to be made; to make the talkie into a new art that was independent of 
the silent screen and the stage. 
The intellectual critics felt the way the talkie handled dialogue did not meet 
the artistic standards they wished this new art to hold, and therefore because 
they were willing to critique it shows their acceptance of the talkie as more than 
just a fad. Seldes explained that one major flaw with motion picture dialogue 
was the strong reliance on it. He gave an example in his book An Hour With 
the Movies and The Talkies using a parting of two lovers. He explained that the 
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two lovers in a talkie would merely say “we must part” as opposed to showing 
the emotion of the scene by saying the line and also showing an embarrassed 
young man and an angry young woman.32 Seldes was not alone in this opinion 
of the overuse of dialogue in the talkie. Another important intellectual critic 
of the era, Harry Potamkin, suggested that dialogue was the “anti-cinema” and 
thought that “speech-as-utterance” was a better route in use of natural speech.33 
Overall, the intellectual critic wanted sound in films to be natural, not forced 
or unnecessary. However, the fact that these intellectual critics were paying at-
tention to improving the talkie suggested that it was important to them. While 
they may not have accepted the talkie as art in the same respect as the silent 
screen, it became clear that the intellectual critic considered that, with some 
improvements, the talkie could be a new art. 
As the intellectual critic accepted the talkie, their critical attitude and their 
reception coincided with that of the public. Famous scholar Walter Benjamin 
suggested that with most forms of visual and emotional enjoyment there would 
be a distinction between criticism and enjoyment. However, when it came 
to the screen there was no distinction, instead criticism and enjoyment coin-
cided. 34 While I agree with Benjamin’s theory, he suggested that this fusion of 
criticism and enjoyment happened instantaneously. This was the case for the 
general public. However when applied to the intellectual critic it becomes clear 
that the fusion of criticism and enjoyment happened gradually over time. The 
intellectual critic of the late 1920s and the 1930s was a complex individual. 
Struggling to separate themselves from the masses and representing a different 
set of the movie-going population, the intellectual critics’ acceptance of the 
talkie did not happen at the same time as the general public. 
Once they looked at the talkie in a different light many of these intellectual 
critics became more accepting of the talkie as a new art, rather than something 
to be compared to silent films. To the intellectual critic, film was a purely 
visual art that they held to strict aesthetic standards. With the introduction of 
the talkie the visual performance of these films did not meet the standards of 
the intellectual critic. This caused a great deal of disagreement amongst critics. 
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While in the early years many intellectual critics viewed the talkie as something 
for the masses, once it became clear that the talkie had staying power, the intel-
lectual critic found a new way to evaluate film. Rather than focusing on visual 
aspects alone, they focused on the personal aspects of film. They also realized 
that the talkie needed to be improved before they could completely accept the 
new art. The talkie presented the intellectual critic with a way to re-evaluate 
what elements were important to the art of film, and while the talkie was still 
very much in infancy during this time their critiques showed that they believed, 
with some improvement, the talkie could reach a new level of artistic merit. 
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AMBIGUOUS IDENTITY:
THE QUESTION OF MIDDLE CLASS IN LATE IMPERIAL RUSSIA
Elizabeth Metelak
In the first decades of the twentieth century, Russia struggled to present the 
world with a coherent image. The1905 Revolution, a series of strikes and riots 
sparked when Tsar Nicholas II ordered his soldiers to fire on peaceful demon-
strations, died down only when Nicholas reluctantly conceded to the creation 
of the Duma, the first parliamentary system the Russian empire had ever seen. 
As the autocracy begrudgingly accustomed itself to the existence of the Duma 
and a quasi form of constitutional autocracy, Russian political tendencies re-
mained in a state of constant flux - each elected Duma would clash with the 
autocracy and find itself disbanded within a few short months. Terrorist attacks 
and massive labor strikes periodically unsettled matters even further, as did the 
outbreak of war across Europe in 1914. Simultaneously, Russian society wrestled 
with new ideas of identity and culture, only compounding the uncertainties 
of this volatile atmosphere. Central to these questions lay the emergence of a 
middle class that had steadily grown over the preceding decades, a segment of 
society considered above the peasants and industrial laborers, but still beneath 
the wealth and refinement of Russia’s aristocratic elite. 
In American and European understandings, the middle class has 
come to epitomize the modern era, as when Vanessa Schwartz alludes to the 
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modernization of Paris as designed by and for the Parisian bourgeoisie.1 In 
Western regions, political processes and democratic ideals are said to rely on the 
middle class while simultaneously catering to its wants and needs - developments 
characterized by the birth of such trends as political liberalism and consumer 
culture. While room for debate certainly still exists within these frameworks, 
most accept such characterizations with little hesitation, often extrapolating 
to create a sort of universal middle class based upon them.
Meanwhile, scholars of Imperial Russia have debated the role and nature 
of their own middle class practically as long as it has existed, but have found 
seemingly little to agree upon except the uniqueness of the Russian experience 
of modernity.2 In her analysis of suicides between the revolutions of 1905 and 
1917, Susan Morrissey perceives increasing suicide rates among the educated 
population as a response to the failure of the 1905 Revolution and a modern 
middle class society increasingly defined by materialism.3 Sally West, however, 
claims that this same materialistic consumer culture served as a normative 
influence that guided the development of an increasingly diverse Russian soci-
ety.4 Meanwhile Stephen Lovell focuses on a growing suburban estate culture 
as evidence of the impossibility of social cohesion within the middle class(es), 
dwelling on the ambiguously intermediate status to which this culture testified.5 
For Roshanna Sylvester, as well as Samuel D. Kassow, James L. West, and Edith 
W. Clowes, this ambiguity becomes the focus of their discussions on crime and 
civil society respectively. Through their analysis, a vaguely three-tiered middle 
class emerges faintly from the surrounding haze – the lower-middle class mesh-
chanstvo, the mainstream bourgeoisie, and the more intellectual ranks of the 
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intelligentsia – but even these groups find themselves marked by a measure of 
overlap between their members and a certain fluidity between their definitions. 
Delving deeper into the material and literary displays of the early twentieth 
century reveals cultural clashes and characteristics that simultaneously define 
and obscure the existence of a Russian middle class, handicapping its abili-
ties to strongly influence the development of modern politics. Through these 
discussions, we see the ambiguous nature of Russian middle class society as 
its most consistent aspect, and perhaps the only truly defining factor thereof.
The Russian middle class began with the birth of the intelligentsia, a 
segment of educated Russians determined to distance themselves from the au-
tocratic regime with which they vehemently disagreed. While this once uniquely 
Russian social category has subsequently spread worldwide, its long and active 
legacy in nineteenth-century Russia gives rise to its reputation as the oldest and 
highest tier of middling society.  This group’s cohesiveness stems not from an 
economic sense of class, but from a unified ideology grounded in education and 
progress.6 Previous efforts to shape the course of Russian development, from 
the Great Reforms in the 1860s to the Liberation Movement at the turn of the 
century, bolstered this identity and endowed the intelligentsia with a certain 
credibility of opinion.7 While not its most defining factor, Sylvester nonethe-
less demonstrates that economic status helped establish the intelligentsia as a 
role model for the rest of respectable middle class society, a standard to which 
others strove to live up to at least in appearance, if not in character.8 She il-
lustrates this with the appeal of Odessa’s Literary-Artistic Society, which, while 
designed for a strictly intelligentsia clientele, actually resonated more with the 
lower middling groups striving to attain a similar appearance of refinement and 
legitimacy.9 Moreover, the intelligentsia possessed an acute awareness of and 
sense of pride in this role, made apparent by their vocal rejections of anything 
they perceived as a corrupting influence. Hence their quickness to discard the 
overtly sexual themes of the novel, Sanin, as amoral and pornographic, a sign of 
cultural exploitation and an offensive departure from acceptable behavior and 
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morality.10 Odessa’s literary intelligentsia expressed similar views as they strove 
to implement social and cultural improvements through their publications. 
Sylvester presents the “civilizing mission” of Odessan journalists on numerous 
occasions, illustrating how authors presented developments in well-meaning 
calls for reforms, hoping to lift the dregs of urban society to civilized heights.11
As strong as these reforming urges from the intelligentsia may seem, 
however, the strength and influence of the intelligentsia found itself under siege, 
particularly in the wake of the 1905 Revolution and its failure to bring about 
effective political changes. The post-revolutionary years found many willing to 
question the heart and soul of the intelligentsia, to reevaluate its legacy in light 
of twentieth century developments. Landmarks, a collection of essays published 
in 1909, sets about critiquing the intelligentsia and providing suggestions for 
a possible revival. Aleksandr Izgoev’s essay dismisses the guiding influence of 
the intelligentsia by focusing on their “powerlessness” to mold their own fami-
lies according to their beliefs or to create any sort of “ideological inheritance” 
that would provide them with a sense of continuity.12 He holds the Russian 
student to be a sham, who “[studies] rather little and poorly,” caught up in a 
culture of peer pressure and lack of content, from which he will emerge into 
the void that is intelligentsia life.13 Others testify to this period as a time of 
crisis for the intelligentsia, where it must either acknowledge its past mistakes 
and rectify them, or become the ruin of Russia.14 Nikolai Berdyaev, author and 
religious philosopher, accuses them of cliquishness and dogmatism, sequestering 
themselves from mainstream society and failing to engage in truly intellectual 
dialogue.15 While he acknowledges the crippling influence of the autocracy on 
the intelligentsia’s development, he does not excuse them from culpability for 
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their own actions.16 Together, these authors present an intelligentsia waning 
in influence - stagnant and in desperate need of ideological reinvigoration. For 
them, the intelligentsia might succeed in influencing Russia’s modern political 
and cultural ways of life, but without updating their perspective, that influence 
must indubitably come in a negative form.
Of all the middling social groups, the bourgeoisie find themselves most 
often categorized as the heart and soul of the middle class, but this holds true 
more in Western Europe than in Russia at this period. For Russian society, this 
position developed less distinctly and much more tenuously. Some attribute 
the bourgeoisie with the advent of progress, prosperity, and consumption in 
Russia’s urban atmosphere, along with all the “trappings of western bourgeois 
civilization”- banks, offices, museums, cafés, universities and more.17 Coupled 
with this constant search for novel ways to improve and enjoy the comforts 
of their urban existences lie increasing attempts to mold the lower echelons 
of society to reflect bourgeois values.18 Fierce and vocal protest against this 
process and way of life, however, became just as integral to its role in modern 
society. The trend of hooliganism as investigated by Joan Neuberger testifies 
to the presence of middle class-ness in modern Russia while simultaneously 
undermining its power and influence.
Literally “town dwellers,” bourgeois families sprang up from Russia’s tradi-
tional merchant estate into a distinctly urban tradition of bustling commercial 
activity and industrialization in the late nineteenth century. The relative newness 
of a cultured bourgeois led many to perceive its claims to respectability as ut-
terly pretentious, founded upon borrowed and outdated intelligentsia literature 
and a putting on of airs that they viewed as laughably offensive.19 Through 
petty crimes and loud public displays, hooligans rebelled against these airs in 
an “outrageous” lack of public decorum.20 Their crimes ranged from causing 
drunken ruckuses in intentionally public arenas to loosening the bolts of park 
16 Ibid., 10. 
17 Sylvester, 20.
18 West, 347.
19 “A Slap in the Face of Public Taste” (1912), in Russian Futurism through Its Manifestoes, 1912-
1928, ed. Anna Lawton (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 51-52.
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benches in order to embarrass unsuspecting members of respectable (middle 
class) society and assaulting the taxi of a well-known Odessan police chief and 
his wife.21 The artistic players in these spontaneous forms of rebellion, the self-
proclaimed futurists, outlined the intentions of these riotous actions in the 
title of one of their earliest publications, proclaiming a strong desire for their 
behavior to serve as a “Slap in the Face of Public Taste.”22 They went beyond a 
mere rejection of proper bourgeois appearances, commercialization, and mor-
alistic literature to launch a full scale assault against the overbearing triviality 
they saw within these institutions.23 Their willingness to tell bourgeois society 
to “Go to Hell!” worried recipients of these attacks by emphasizing the fragile 
construction of their position and their vulnerability to lower class vulgarity.24 
The involvement of middle class students in hooligan-style attacks only reiter-
ated this vulnerability, and helped blur the lines between working-class and 
bourgeois culture to an even greater degree.25 By challenging the bourgeoisie, 
the hooligans and futurists do inadvertently acknowledge its growing influence 
on urban cultural standards. Ultimately, however, the hooligans’ cultural attacks 
and public mockery of “bourgeois propriety” testify to a segment of society 
unable to rally the middle and lower classes to its causes or have a strong voice 
in the deciding of Russia’s future.26
We tend to view the bourgeoisie as the essence of middle classness the 
way that it appears in much of Europe at this time. In Russia, however, a rap-
idly growing lower middle class challenged the idea of a bourgeois monopoly 
on public culture and civil society, lending its own distinct personality to the 
urban scene. The meshchanstvo - consisting predominately of those employed 
in “semi-professional and lower white collar positions”- took advantage of the 
rise in social mobility to enjoy some of the trappings of bourgeois and intel-
ligentsia culture, yet still struggled to achieve the respectability that marked 
their wealthier, more refined counterparts.27 
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On the one hand, the meshchanstvo seems to form the backbone of the 
urban public to a much greater extent than the bourgeoisie, dictating many 
of the trends and behaviors of city life.28 Popular entertainments and moral 
admonishments alike focused their attention on the pleasure and enlighten-
ment of the meshchanstvo crowd, while the consumer identity portrayed in 
most advertising geared itself directly toward this same audience, selling the 
“well-being, culture, and comfort” to which it aspired.29 This meshchanskii desire 
for such markers of refinement becomes most apparent in “The Little Family,” 
an Odessan satire of Jewish meshchanstvo culture published in 1912.30 Rachel, 
the mother of the family, laments the state of her furniture as lacking in opu-
lence, testifying to a general desire for material wealth as well as the idea that 
one’s possessions defined one’s place in society.31 Meanwhile the search for a 
wealthy, well-established husband for Mathilda, the oldest daughter, highlights 
the meshchanstvo appetite for upward mobility. Clearly, her parents hope to 
achieve bourgeois respectability for the entire family through their daughter’s 
marriage.32 This play’s publication to a lower middle class audience reveals the 
author’s desire to both censure and uplift the meshchanstvo by pointing out a 
few of the crass idiosyncrasies that prevent it from rising to a truly cultured 
status.33 This trend of moralizing literature filled the periodicals of the day, but 
always alongside tales meant for sensationalized meshchanstvo entertainment.34 
By aiming as much to fulfill lower middle class demands as to shape what those 
demands look like, these works indicate a modern society heavily geared towards 
both meshchanstvo criticism and consumption.
The meshchanstvo struggle for both the material benefits and moral stand-
ing of middle class culture also served as a staging ground for many questions 
about the nature of Russian society and its future. Though now enjoying many 
of the privileges of education and culture, the lower rungs of middle class so-
ciety and really the entirety of the middle classes, faced continuous challenges 
the forum
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to the culture they sought to attain or preserve. Radical individualism often 
undermined social standards of behavior, both public and private, that the 
meshchanstvo at least idealized, if not actually followed.35 This new creed of the 
individual typically arose in the shocking new literature of the period, which 
sparked outrage in all levels of middling society for its vivid, vulgar descriptions 
and amoral attitudes. Artsybashev’s descriptions in Sanin of the seduction of 
Lida, with all her thrills and “tremors” and Sarudin’s violent fantasies, embody 
these individualistic urges to live a life of pleasure and “spontaneous impulse.”36 
Instead of advocating for the fulfillment of civic duties and social reforms, 
Artsybashev and his contemporaries touted a reckless embrace of natural impulse 
regardless of outcome.37 Indeed, his vivid descriptions of carnal passion, even 
when only imagined by his characters rather than performed, bear a frightful 
correspondence to many of the sexually violent crimes publicized in Odessan 
journals and newspapers.38 Instead of using these tales to warn, admonish, and 
reform, as Odessan journalists did, the authors of this literature glorified their 
characters’ bold attacks on the middle class status-quo. They rejected middle 
class morality and ideas of responsibility, choosing to live for the self and its 
desires, however contrary to the norm they might be.  Thus the meshchanstvo 
found itself and the bourgeois life it sought dismissed as stifling and aimless, 
hinting that not all might be well in the shining parlors of the bourgeois, and 
directly challenging all the things they strove to gain in their pursuit of wealth 
and a better way of life. 
In the face of all this questioning – intellectual critique, hooliganism, and 
risqué literature – Russia’s middle classes strove to present a united front toward 
their antagonists that they would never admit to amongst themselves. The intel-
ligentsia, bourgeois, and meshchanstvo clashed constantly over the standards of 
culture and enlightenment to which they all laid claim.39 Moreover these three 
layers of middle society were complicated by their similarities of appearance 
and the rapidity with which fortunes rose and fell in this volatile period. No 
guaranteed means to discern between the petty businessman, well-to-do banker, 
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and scholarly intellectual existed in the bustling cities of modern Russia. While 
one might hazard a guess based on specific attributes or places frequented, 
one never possessed any certainty of with whom one dealt.40 Combined with 
a reality of fortunes lost and fortunes gained practically overnight, one never 
knew if a resident of a lower end meshchanstvo neighborhood “belonged,” or 
if they might be a learned intellectual fallen on hard times. In light of this 
ambiguity, it becomes problematic to speak of a single middle class, or even 
of three distinct middle classes. Due to the blurring of social boundaries and 
widespread class conflicts, the middling classes found themselves ill-equipped 
to combat the challenges inherent to a modern Russian state and significantly 
less able to influence politics within an autocratic Russia struggling to translate 
its relevance to the modern world. While clearly shaped by Russia’s particu-
lar historical context, these developments perhaps complicate American and 
European understandings of middle class-ness, calling into question founda-
tional assumptions concerning the nature and influence of the middle class 
within the modern world. 
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BETWEEN DOMESTICITY AND REVOLUTION: INHERENT 
CONTRADICTIONS IN THE EARLY WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT
Laura Neylan
In 1848, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucretia Mott, and other notable women’s 
rights activists created the Declaration of Rights and Sentiments at the Seneca 
Falls Convention. These women pushed for equal rights in antebellum America, 
yet these rights would not be recognized until the twentieth century. The 
prevalence of the cult of domesticity ideology helps to explain this discrepancy. 
According to historian Catherine Clinton, “the creation of the cult of domesticity, 
the redefinition of the home as women’s domain, was a delicate process designed 
to channel women’s contributions into a proper course.”1 While some women of 
the mid-nineteenth century wanted to assert their independence, many women 
and especially men endeavored to keep women in the domestic sphere.2 They 
also defined the ideal woman as virtuous.3 Ultimately, these competing ideas 
made antebellum America a transitional period for women’s rights. 
1 Catherine Clinton, The Other Civil War (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1984), 40. 
2 Natasha Kristen Kraus, A New Type of Womanhood (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). 
3 Ibid. 
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One book, A Domestic History of the American Revolution written by 
Elizabeth Fries Ellet in 1850, exemplifies the transitional nature of women’s 
rights in this period.  This history focuses on the roles of women in the American 
Revolution. I argue that A Domestic History of the American Revolution reflects 
the transitional period of antebellum America in that the author both empha-
sizes the stereotypical virtuousness of women and audaciously conveys their 
abilities to exist outside their stereotypical realm. I will assess the way that the 
author portrays Revolutionary era women in her book and secondly consider 
the example that the author herself presents. Although she associates domes-
ticity with femininity, she challenges male dominance not only by writing a 
history, but also by writing one that focuses so heavily on the experiences of 
women during this period. 
Historians have argued that a “cult of true womanhood,” or “a belief sys-
tem that prescribed and proscribed respectable femaleness during the antebellum 
and postbellum periods,” initiated and perpetuated the necessity of portraying 
women as virtuous.4 Historian Natasha Kristen Kraus emphasizes that this cult 
of true womanhood cultivated “four cardinal virtues—piety, purity, submis-
siveness, and domesticity.”5 In her Domestic History of the American Revolution, 
Ellet conveys each of these stereotypical female virtues. For my purposes, I 
will focus on piety and domesticity. Interestingly, in the same passages that 
illustrate these virtues, Ellet simultaneously demonstrates the independent 
capabilities of women.
Ellet portrays the stereotypical piety of women but also portrays women’s 
abilities to act outside of their prescribed gender sphere. A story about women 
on the home front of Wyoming perfectly illustrates this contradiction.  The 
British troops and their Native American allies set fire to a house in which 
women hid from the soldiers.6 Ellet describes the women loading guns with 
gunpowder and spitting liquids onto the fire to defend this home.7 Eventually, 
when all hope seemed to be lost and “death appeared inevitable, the prayers of 
the pious mother seemed to be answered by direct interposition from Heaven.”8 
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The British troops turned back from the house just in time.9 This anecdote em-
phasizes the piety of one of the women of the house, as her faith alone rescued 
her from near death. God answered the woman’s prayers directly, implying that 
she maintained a very close relationship with God, as well as demonstrating 
Ellet’s stereotypical portrayal of women as devout. 
The same passage, however, depicts women loading guns and putting out 
the fire in order to protect themselves and their home—a responsibility usually 
given to men.10 The fact that the woman in the passage chose to defend her home 
may merely reflect the fact that her husband was not there to complete this task 
himself. Yet regardless of her husband’s presence, this woman capably defended 
her home both through stereotypically female means and stereotypically male 
means. Additionally, the reader should note the inherent contradiction in this 
passage: a woman acted outside of the virtues of true womanhood in order to 
defend one of these said virtues—domesticity. 
While in the previous passage Ellet inadvertently refers to domesticity, 
in other parts of the book she blatantly employs the stereotypical portrayal 
of women as domestic creatures. Yet even as she conveys women as domestic, 
she also demonstrates their importance to the political patriotic cause. In the 
following passage, Ellet utilizes a metaphor that characterizes women as do-
mestic while simultaneously discussing women’s vast political contribution to 
the Revolutionary War: 
It is almost impossible now to appreciate the vast influence of 
women’s patriotism upon the destinies of the infant republic. 
We have no means of showing the important part she bore in 
maintaining the struggle, and in laying the foundations on which 
so mighty and majestic a structure has arisen. We can only dwell 
upon individual instances of magnanimity, fortitude, self-sacrifice 
and heroism, bearing the impress of the feeling of Revolutionary 
days, indicative of the spirit which animated all, and to which, in 
its various and multiform exhibitions, we are not less indebted for 
national freedom, than to the swords of the patriots who poured 
out their blood.11
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Ellet first identifies America as the “infant republic,” implying not only 
that the country is new, but also that someone had to give birth to it.12 Because 
women carry children and give birth, women metaphorically gave birth to this 
“infant republic.”13 Therein, this passage portrays the stereotypical domestic role 
of women. The author tries to convey the integral, often underestimated, role 
that women played in the Revolution but she illustrates this message with the 
use of a metaphor that contradictorily reaffirms the stereotypical domesticity 
of women. Ellet’s verb choice also illuminates this contradiction, as she demon-
strates the burdens that women “bore” in the conflict and discusses that women 
were “bearing” the revolutionary spirit.14 This particular verb again evokes the 
notion of women giving birth to the new nation. Ultimately, although Ellet 
attempts to portray that women contributed equally as much as men to the 
Revolutionary War—a revolutionary concept in itself—the language that she 
utilizes to portray this message actually reasserts the stereotypical female value 
of domesticity. 
Ellet knowingly portrays women as both pious and domestic, two of the 
most important characteristics cultivated by the “cult of true womanhood” as 
determined by historian Natasha Kraus.15 However, it seems that the inherent 
contradictions found within these passages do not trouble Ellet. In the first 
instance, Ellet stereotypically depicts one particular woman as pious but also 
concedes that this woman can operate successfully outside of her prescribed 
sphere—the home. In the second excerpt, the author intends to draw the reader’s 
attention to the part that women played in the Revolution, yet she articulates 
this point by employing a stereotypical metaphor. It seems that what appear to 
be blatant contradictions to modern readers were fully logical to the author in 
antebellum America. These contradictions ultimately manifest the transitional 
period of women’s rights in which they were written. 
Just as Ellet’s portrayal of stereotypical, virtuous women becomes convo-
luted with instances of women’s abilities to act outside of their gender sphere, 
Ellet’s depictions of women’s initiatives outside their female realm are marked 
by virtuousness. In one example, a British officer revealed to a local woman 
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that his troops planned to surprise General Washington’s army.16 The woman 
then decided to trek to the location of Washington’s army to give him advance 
warning.17 This woman clearly acted outside of her gender sphere and made 
decisions without her husband’s counsel: “again she returned to her chamber; 
but her mind was more disquieted than ever, for she thought of the danger that 
threatened the lives of thousands of her countrymen. Her resolution at length 
was formed, and at dawn of day she waked her husband, and informed him 
flour was wanted for the use of the household, and that it was necessary she 
should go to Frankford to procure it.”18 Though she claimed to be walking to 
Frankford for flour, she actually made the journey to alert General Washington.19 
Ellet emphasizes that the decision was “her resolution”—not the prerogative of 
her husband.20 Furthermore, she woke her husband to tell him she was going, 
not to ask for permission.21 This woman endeavored to enter a stereotypically 
male sphere of action, and she did not ask for permission. The woman was 
ultimately successful; the British troops arrived at Washington’s camp only to 
see his army already on the march.22 
While this anecdote illustrates women’s capability to navigate outside the 
home, it also subverts this message by reaffirming women’s ties to the home. The 
woman cannot just decide to act and then follow through. She must provide 
an excuse to her husband. Although independent-minded, her submissiveness 
can be seen through her responsibility to inform her husband where she was 
going and why. Furthermore, the excuse that the woman made—that the 
house required additional flour—affirms her ties to her stereotypical gender 
sphere.23 Therefore, even when Ellet depicts women functioning outside of their 
stereotypical gender sphere, she simultaneously affirms women’s relationship 
to this sphere. 
The author’s contradictory portrayal of the history of women during the 
Revolution clearly reflects the transitional period of the mid-nineteenth century, 
but the author’s inferred ideas and potential motivation to write this book also 
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reveal much about this complex era of women’s rights. Ellet’s chosen title for 
her book, A Domestic History of the American Revolution, perfectly illuminates 
the inherent contradictions of this period. The term domestic refers both to 
the nation as well as to the home and, as previously stated, historians define 
the cult of domesticity as a redefinition of the home as a woman’s sphere.24 
However, Ellet’s use of the term in her title arguably reflects a different defini-
tion. If domestic here simply referred to the home, the reader would expect to 
find anecdotes of only the home front. Ellet includes many stories about the 
home front during the war, but she also incorporates many narratives that are 
not located in a home.25 The main continuity between the stories that occur at 
home and the anecdotes that unfold elsewhere is that they both focus primarily 
on women. Ellet depicts women that followed behind their soldier-husbands in 
wagons, women kidnapped by Native Americans, and women that positioned 
themselves as spies for the British or American armies.26 Although Ellet portrays 
women as domestic under the home definition, the variety of locations found 
in Ellet’s stories suggests that Ellet associates domesticity with femininity more 
so than with the home front. Ellet’s association of femininity with domestic-
ity conveys the strength of the concept of the virtuous woman. Regardless of 
where a woman goes, she is domestic by Ellet’s definition. Thus, Ellet can be 
classified as a proponent of the cult of domesticity. 
This identification alone, however, would be too simple. The author, like 
others of the period, both promoted the stereotypical depiction of women but 
also challenged it. According to Clinton, “many of the advocates of domesticity 
developed attitudes antithetical to those promoted by men. The emphasis on 
female values and female culture posed a serious challenge to male hegemony.”27 
Regardless of how Ellet portrayed women, the fact that she mentioned them at 
all was revolutionary for this era. The presence of a history focused primarily 
on the role of women in the revolution threatened the gender hierarchy of the 
mid-nineteenth century. 
Ellet’s decision to write this book, too, demonstrates an attempt to ex-
pand the acceptable role of women in society. As noted by Clinton, “women 
24 Clinton, 40.
25 Ellet. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Clinton, 47.
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pioneered by incorporating new interests into their realm: religion, literature, 
and art, to name a few. Most women may have been confined to domesticity, 
but the ways in which they challenged their imprisonment were diverse and 
fascinating.”28 A Domestic History of the American Revolution, then, exempli-
fies Ellet’s efforts to “challenge” the female sex’s “imprisonment.”29  Clinton 
accurately characterizes the challenges to female inferiority as fascinating; the 
contradictions of Ellet’s work exemplify the complex forces at work in society 
in antebellum America. 
In conclusion, the female-focused anecdotes of A Domestic History of the 
American Revolution reflect the transitional period of the mid-nineteenth century 
because they both uphold the standard of the virtuous women and convey that 
women could successfully navigate the world outside of their prescribed gender 
sphere. The author, too, exemplifies this era of transition as her writing both 
identifies domesticity and femininity as nearly synonymous and represents an 
attempt to break free of her gender sphere. A Domestic History of the American 
Revolution, then, can be seen as a vestige of the transitional early women’s rights 
movement; a movement not fully realized until the twentieth century. The 
standard of the virtuous women and convey that women could successfully 
navigate the world outside of their prescribed gender sphere. The author, too, 
exemplifies this era of transition as her writing both identifies domesticity and 
femininity as nearly synonymous and represents an attempt to break free of 
her gender sphere. A Domestic History of the American Revolution, then, can be 
seen as a vestige of the transitional early women’s rights movement; a movement 
not fully realized until the twentieth century. 
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FROM THE DARKNESS TO THE FAMILY: EVOLVING 
ORIENTALIST REPRESENTATIONS OF THE KATIPUNAN IN 
EURO-AMERICAN TRAVEL LITERATURE, 1899-1917
Andrew Pagan
Introduction
On July 7, 1892, news of the deportation of Philippine patriot Jose Rizal to 
the southern city of Dapitan motivated a group of lower class individuals to 
create the Katipunan.  Although primarily political, this revolutionary society 
embraced Catholicism, attracting members from the lower classes. The for-
mation of the group marked a shift in Philippine revolutionary politics.  No 
longer would the wealthy and educated Ilustrado class petition for political 
and economic reform from Spain. Rather, the Katipunan called on persons 
from all socio-economic strata to participate in an uprising against Spanish 
colonial rule. In the Philippines, many revere the Katipunan, but outside of 
the region, more varied views of the organization exist. In the early twentieth 
century, European and American travelers penned firsthand accounts of the 
Philippines, describing various aspects of Filipino life, culture, and history. 
Strangely enough, travelogue portrayals of the organization changed between 
1899 and 1917. Early unsympathetic characterizations of the Katipunan as a 
secretive and shadowy group eventually gave way to descriptions of the soci-
ety’s trials under the Spanish. This essay explores the reasons behind varying 
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characterizations of the Katipunan in this time period. I suggest that American 
and European portrayals of the Katipunan from 1899-1917 evolved over time 
to justify changing American colonial policies in the Philippines; early twentieth 
century descriptions of the group as shadowy or menacing validated American 
conduct during the Philippine-American War, while later representations of the 
organization as a victim of Spanish cruelty legitimized supposedly benevolent 
U.S. governance in the region.  
This paper examines European and American travelogues written between 
1899 and 1917. Depending exclusively on these documents has advantages 
and disadvantages. Written by foreign travelers, these accounts provide first-
hand descriptions of cultural practices that governmental organizations or 
Southeast Asians may not have considered worth adding to the historical 
record. Unfortunately, travelogue writings only contain “Western” perceptions 
of Southeast Asia, which suffer from biases against Asian individuals and cultural 
practices. Consequently, these accounts bear little value in the construction of 
a balanced history of Southeast Asia. This noted, by dissecting the biases of 
Euro-American travelogues, this paper reveals Euro-American prejudices towards 
the Philippines, and how their perceptions shaped and legitimated colonial 
practices, thereby transcending the limitations of such accounts.
In its analysis of European and American travelogues, this paper draws 
its theoretical direction from the contributions of various scholars, many of 
whom write within the field of postcolonial theory.  For instance, it borrows 
of Marc Bloch’s idea that consistent half-truths within historical documents 
function as a “mirror of the collective consciousness.”1 Additionally, this 
essay inherits much of its theoretical direction from Edward Said, who argues 
that Euro-American discourses focusing on the Orient define foreign cultures 
in Western terms, ultimately functioning to exoticize “the other” and justify 
Occidental imperialism in the East.2 Mary Louise Pratt contends that travel and 
exploration writing produced European perception of “the rest of the world,” 
in the process encoding and legitimating imperialist enterprises.3 Extending on 
Pratt and Said’s argument, Han Mui Ling claims that European travel writing 
concerning Singapore proved instrumental in the European characterization of 
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the Asian nation, and that both description and definition of the region served 
to substantiate British colonial governance.4 This work also draws upon Homi 
K. Bhabha’s theory that representations of colonized peoples must undergo 
constant modification, since they usually stem from the transforming needs 
and desires of the West.5 Finally, this article owes much to Julie A. Tuason’s 
suggestion that changes in National Geographic reporting on the Philippines 
from 1898-1908 reflect the evolution of American rationalizations for colonial 
rule in the region.6
The existing historiography of the Katipunan focuses on the group’s 
relationship with the Philippine people. This essay relies on the work of the 
Filipino historian Teodoro Agoncillo, who challenges historians whom label 
the Katipunan an elitist or marginalized organization, contending that the 
group’s leaders originated from the middle and lower classes, representing the 
will of many of the Philippine people.7 Additionally, this paper draws from the 
historical writing of Reynaldo Clemena Ileto, who suggests that folk religious 
traditions and cultural values underscored and motivated popular revolutionary 
movements in the Philippines.8 Ileto argues that the Katipunan succeeded in 
large part not because of the spread of Western values or Ilustrado literature in 
the Philippines, but due to their tendency to relate their political struggle to 
religious ideals embraced by the masses.9 My thesis departs from the strategies 
of the dominant Katipunan historiography. Instead of analyzing the perspective 
of the populace towards the Katipunan, I examine European and American 
perceptions towards the group in order to understand how such viewpoints 
contributed to colonial rule in the Philippines.
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European Conquest and Impact in Southeast Asia and the Philippines
European imperialism in sixteenth-century Southeast Asia marked the beginning 
of a period of increased Western influence in the region.  From the fifteenth to 
the seventeenth century, the world experienced what historian Anthony Reid 
termed “The Age of Commerce,” which included a period of trade and political 
centralization along the Southeast Asian mainland.10  In the fifteenth century 
European financial interest in Southeast Asia led to the eastern region’s transfor-
mation into a highly successful zone of trade.11 Additionally, the possibility of 
converting foreign peoples to Christianity and nationalist sentiments contributed 
to a Western presence within Southeast Asia.12 In 1511, seeking greater financial 
gain and tiring of the limitations of trade, the Portuguese obtained control of 
the port of Malacca, thereby committing the first act of European imperialism 
in Southeast Asia.  In the nineteenth century, a combination of demands for 
new raw materials (such as rubber and tin), centralization among the mainland 
Southeast Asian kingdoms, and the development of more efficient modes of 
transportation led to the colonization of almost all of mainland Southeast Asia.13
In 1571, the Spanish established their colonial headquarters for the 
Philippines at Manila.14  Spanish control over the islands grew slowly and 
never covered the whole region; both the country’s highland sections and south-
ern Muslim areas never came under Spanish rule.15  Despite this, Spanish 
colonization of the Philippines did create an organized nation where only a 
group of disunited islands had previously existed.16  Additionally, contact with 
Europeans led many of the residents of the Philippines to adopt a form of 
Catholicism that blended Christian beliefs with animist indigenous traditions.17 
Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, native dissatisfaction 
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with the economic and social policies of the colonial Spanish government spread 
throughout the Philippines, leading to a revolution against the imperial power 
in 1896.18 Many Americans took notice of this, and their desire to expand the 
U.S. frontier coupled with a thirst for wealth led the Western power to initiate 
the Spanish-American War.19 At the conclusion of the war in 1898, the United 
States entered into a colonial relationship with the Philippines that would not 
cease until after WWII.20
The Highest and Most Respectable Society: History, Composition, Religion
Meaningful examination of European perceptions of the Katipunan requires a 
sufficient understanding of the movement.  For this reason, this paper now turns 
to a brief overview of the organization. As previously mentioned, on July 7, 1892, 
a handful of lower class Filipinos, including the workers Andres Bonifacio and 
Deodato Arellano, founded the Katipunan in response to increasing Spanish 
repression and the exile of Jose Rizal to the southern Philippines.  The society, 
more formally known as Kataastaasan Kagalang-galang na Katipunan ng mga 
Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Respectable Society of the Sons of the 
People), vowed to establish an independent Philippines, defend the poor and 
repressed, and unite all Filipinos.21  On August 26, 1896, fighting broke out 
between the Spanish government and the Katipunan.22  As the armed struggle 
against the Spanish continued, the Katipunan split into two opposing groups: 
the Magdiwan, who supported Bonifacio, and the Magdalo, who backed the 
popular general Emilio Aguinaldo.23 Conflict between the two factions resulted 
in the death of Bonifacio, after which Aguinaldo sided with the American 
government in their attempt to colonize and control the Philippine Islands.24
The composition and religion of the Katipunan prove crucial to the ex-
amination of its representation in Euro-American travelogues.  The Katipunan 
drew both its leadership and membership from the middle and lower classes; 
Andres Bonifacio himself worked as a laborer.25 By the beginning of 1897, 
18 18 Owen, The Emergence of Modern 150-156.
19 Stuart Creighton Miller, “Compadre Colonialism,” The Wilson Quarterly 10, no. 3 (1976): 93.
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the organization lay claim to anywhere between 190,000 and 400,000 mem-
bers, most of whom did not come from positions of wealth or power.26 The 
Katipunan’s mass appeal stemmed not only from their political objectives, 
but also from their ability to articulate their values to the Philippine populace 
through references to folk cultural values and religious practices.27 For the com-
mon Filipino, the experience of Holy Week shaped the style of brotherhood and 
strategies of organization during the late Spanish and early American colonial 
periods.  The Pasyon, a narration of Christ’s death and resurrection, provided 
peasants with a meaningful model to follow when envisioning the transition 
from colonial oppression to revolutionary independence.28 Katipunan initia-
tion rituals discussed in Euro-American travelogues borrow symbolism from 
the Pasyon.  A Katipunan recruit’s passage from the first stage of the initiation 
ritual, which occurred while wearing a blindfold (a phase of darkness), to the 
next, in which he encountered a single oil lamp (a phase of light), references 
Christ’s death and resurrection.29 The final act of an individual’s induction into 
the Katipunan, the blood oath, represented the mixing together of the society 
member’s inner character, or “loob,” in order to establish a state of moral and 
spiritual unity.30  
Imagining the Katipunan: Violence from the Shadows, 1899-1901
During the first few years of American rule in the Philippines, from ap-
proximately 1899-1901, representation of the Katipunan in Euro-American 
travel accounts ranged from the mildly unfriendly to the blatantly pejorative. 
Additionally, many of these works stressed the mysterious and secretive nature 
of the society, and oftentimes accused the group’s leaders of misleading their 
followers.  Whether condemning the Katipunan as a vast organization of evil 
power or merely noting its shadowy character, European and American trav-
elogues from this period ultimately functioned to frame the organization as 
distinctly separate from and unrepresentative of the majority of the Philippine 
people.  In its historical context, this perspective validated false American 
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perceptions of pro-independence freedom fighters during the official years of 
the Philippine-American War.  
In the early period of American rule in the Philippines, European and 
American travel writings used language and descriptions of Katipunan initiation 
rituals to highlight the secret nature of the Katipunan.  While this focus does not 
contradict fact, its prominence and the scant attention paid to the revolution-
ary, patriotic, or religious qualities of the group warrant examination.  Ramon 
Reyes Lala, in his 1899 account of the Philippines, refers to the Katipunan 
as “secret,”31 while a travelogue by Joseph Earle Stevens, also written in 1899, 
typecasts the group as “mysterious.”32  A 1902 account by Henry Codman 
Potter characterizes the group as a “secret society,”33 while an academic article 
from 1901 refers to the Katipunan as “a secret organization appealing to native 
ignorance and prejudice.”34  Michael Shoemaker describes the “blood brother-
hood” mark of the Katipunan extensively, making the organization seem both 
bizarre and barbarous.35   L.W.V. Kennon provides even more detail regarding 
Katipunan rituals. He calls the Katipunan initiation “solemn and terrifying,” 
mentioning the presence of a human skull, a loaded revolver, and a short sword 
in a dimly lit room.36  
These characterizations of the Katipunan did not simply arise out of 
European or American fascinations with the enigmatic, but out of a need to 
see the society as such to justify American policy in the region.  From 1899 
to 1902, the United States officially waged war against Philippine forces seek-
ing independence in what the American government termed “The Philippine 
Insurrection.”37  The term “insurrection” implied that anti-American forces 
consisted of “rebels rebelling against legitimate authority” who “enjoyed little 
31 Ramon Reyes Lala, The Philippine Islands (New York: Continental Publishing Company, 
1899), 170.
32 Joseph Earle Stevens, Yesterdays in the Philippines (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1899), 19.
33Henry Codman Potter, The East of To-day and To-morrow (New York: The Century Co., 
1902), 61.
34 L.W.V. Kennon, “The Katipunan of the Philippines,” The North American Review 173, No. 
537 (1901): 208.  
35 Michael M. Shoemaker, Quaint Corners of Ancient Empires (New York: Putnam, 1899), 169.
36 L.W.V. Kennon, “The Katipunan of the Philippines,” 210.
37 Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines (New York: Random 
House, 1989), 140.  
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popular support.”38  Justification of U.S. presence in the Philippines hinged 
upon the notion that the common Filipino gladly welcomed American rule, and 
any dissenters came from a small and aberrant portion of the population.39  In 
reality, the Philippine-American War engaged a huge portion of the Philippine 
population, resulting in 200,000 deaths, most of them Filipino civilians.40 
European and American travelogue writers ignored the religious significance of 
Katipunan initiation rites, interpreting their rituals as a sign of mysteriousness. 
By subverting the Katipunan’s symbolic references to the Pasyon of Christ into 
displays of secrecy, travelogues marginalized the organization, suggesting that 
the majority of Filipinos do not share its revolutionary goals.  In this manner, 
Euro-American travel accounts supported wartime justifications of the American 
colonial government.  
Euro-American travelogues did not only contain strange emphases, but 
also outright errors, particularly in regard to the Katipunan’s leadership.  Kennon 
refers to the Katipunan as a group “appealing to native ignorance and racial 
prejudice.”41  Even more inaccurately, Michael Shoemaker argues that “the 
richest and most educated Filipinos” along with “a few native priests” led the 
patriotic organization.42  The scholarship of Teodoro Agoncillo disproves such 
notions; the majority of the Katipunan’s membership emerged from the lower 
classes.43  These inaccuracies deserve not merely acknowledgement, but also 
further study, as they can act as a “mirror” of Western biases and ideologies.44 
Rationalizing American imperialism in the Philippines depended upon a view 
of the average Filipino as receptive to U.S. rule.  By falsely typecasting the 
pro-independence leaders of the Katipunan as elitist or deceptive, travelogue 
38 Kenton J. Clymer, “Protestant Missionaries and American Colonialism in the Philippines, 
1899-1916: Attitudes, Perceptions, Involvement,” in Reappraising an Empire: New Perspectives 
on Philippine-American History, ed. Peter W. Stanley (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1984), 126. 
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40 For a particularly compelling discussion of the  American colonial government’s treatment 
of the Filipino dead, as well as how the creation of categories such as “insurgent” led to the erasure 
of wartime violence and the promotion of imperial rule based upon “benevolent assimilation” 
see Vicente Rafael, White Love and Other Events in Filipino History (Durham: Duke University 
Press), 19-51.
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writers imagined them as entirely separate from the majority of the Filipino 
population.  This act parallels American wartime rhetoric describing a Filipino 
people friendly towards U.S. dominion, validating colonialism and repression 
of anti-American forces during the Philippine-American War.  
A few travelogue writers go further than picturing the Katipunan as secre-
tive, bizarre, or led by elites; they present the society as a violent and menacing 
organization.  For instance, Shoemaker accuses the Katipunan of attempting to 
“slaughter all Spaniards” and “massacre all Americans.”45 He then goes so far as 
to refer to the group as the “Brotherhood of Human Bloodhounds,” assigning 
an almost bestial quality to its members.46  In another text, Frederic Henry Read 
calls the Katipunan “a terrible secret society” even suggesting that they borrowed 
their name (abbreviated as K.K.K.) “from the murderous brotherhood of the 
Klu-Klux-Klan.”47  Perhaps the most telling representation of the Katipunan 
as violent exists in Kennon’s article, where the author provides anecdotes (of 
questionable reliability) featuring Katipunan members burying a man alive, 
shooting an Ilocano and seven of his friends, and cutting up three women and 
an old man with swords.48 
Harsh characterizations of the Katipunan justified America’s colonial pres-
ence in the Philippines.  During the Philippine-American War, many Americans 
thought Filipino forces consisted mainly of cruel bandits and thieves who sought 
not political independence and civil rights, but power and wealth.49  Picturing 
the Katipunan as a violent society connected to both bloodhounds and the Klu-
Klux-Klan legitimates this perspective.  By supposing that pro-independence 
organizations like the Katipunan held responsibility for acts of violence not only 
against Spaniards and Americans, but also against their own people, travelogues 
created a moral imperative for U.S. opposition to Filipino revolutionary forces. 
Together, travelogue portrayals of the Katipunan as secretive, elitist, or violent 
confirmed American opinions towards the Philippine-American war, ultimately 
sanctioning U.S. rule in the region.  
45 Shoemaker, Quaint Corners of Ancient Empires, 169.  
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The Brotherhood Joins the Family: 1902-1917
Travel accounts written after the official end of the Spanish-American War in 
1902 illustrate a substantial shift in Euro-American perception of the Katipunan. 
These accounts no longer characterize the society in a negative light.  Rather, 
they take a sympathetic view of the organization, characterizing it as one that 
suffered under the cruelty of Spanish rule. Oftentimes, European and American 
descriptions of the Oriental “other” seem ambivalent since they must constantly 
revise themselves in order to adapt to the changing political and economic needs 
of the West.50 Changes in travelogue depiction of the Katipunan highlight the 
need to aid America’s “little brown brothers” in the Philippines, a concept that 
dominated rhetoric justifying American rule in the region. Instead of actually 
describing the Katipunan, travel account discourse from 1902-1917 emphasized 
the cruelty of Spanish rule in the region, and the ensuing need of all Filipinos 
for American aid and direction.  
A 1904 travelogue written by Homer C. Stuntz provides a moving ex-
ample of a new way of viewing the Katipunan.  Stuntz recalls the torture of 
a suspected member of the Katipunan by a Spanish priest, and subsequently 
points out that thousands underwent similar treatment.51  In his account, a 
Spanish Friar tricks a young Filipino man into coming to his house and has him 
flogged until he faints from blood loss.  Upon awakening, the Friar orders him 
hung from the building’s rafters by his thumbs.  The Filipino prisoner does not 
escape until he feigns death, leaping from a second story window and fleeing 
to a nearby village in the mountains. Both before and after this story, Stuntz 
reminds readers that tragedies like this took place without any sort of trial.52 
Another anecdote, contained in four of the travelogues this article ex-
amines, further illustrates changing European and American perceptions of 
Spanish rule.  In one version of this story, Spanish soldiers captured over a 
hundred men and imprisoned them within Fort Santiago. In order to keep river 
water outside of the prison, a Spanish sergeant threw a rug over the building’s 
one ventilating shaft, leading over 70 of the men within the prison to die of 
50 Bhabha, Nation and Narration, 294.
51 Homer Clyde Stuntz, The Philippines and the Far East (New York: Jennings and Pye; Eaton 
and Mains, 1904), 124-125.
52 Ibid,. 125.
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Rule, With and Account of the Succeeding American Insular Government (New York: C. Scribner’s 
Sons, 1906), 366. 
54 James A. LeRoy, Philippine Life in Town and Country (New York: Putnam, 1905), 158.  
55 Austin Craig, The Former Philippines Thru Foreign Eyes (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 
1917), 351.
56 Campbell Dauncey, An Englishwoman in the Philippines (London: Murray, 1906), 26.  
57 Foreman, The Philippine Islands, 364.
58 George Waldo Brown, The Pearl of the Orient: The Philippine Islands (Boston: D. Estes and 
Co, 1900), 129.  
59 Tuason, “The Ideology of Empire,” 45.
suffocation.53  The particulars of this story vary in different travelogues, but 
its main themes: the neglect and uncaring of the Spaniards coupled with the 
chance deaths of numerous Filipinos, stay constant. The prevalence of this 
tale in American travelogues points to colonial government’s perception of the 
Spanish as irresponsible and even violent rulers.
Post Philippine-American War travel accounts often juxtapose the bravery 
of the Katipunan with shortcomings of the Spanish, a strong contrast with earlier 
Euro-American travelogues.  One 1905 document calls the Spanish ignorant 
for characterizing the Katipunan as Masonic.54 A 1917 work goes even further, 
referring to the Spanish as “stupid” in their perception of the Katipunan as a 
“danger to all Europeans.”55 A text from 1906, composed by the Englishwoman 
Campbell Dauncey, praises the Katipunan, noting that they fought to honor 
Jose Rizal’s memory, completing his work by turning the “Spaniards and their 
dreadful priests out of the island.”56 In another 1906 travelogue, John Foreman 
credits the Katipunan with allowing the Philippine masses to express their 
discontent towards the Spanish Church and government.57 Later, in 1907, a 
travelogue writer speaks of the Katipunan and Emilio Aguinaldo in heroic terms, 
praising their bravery and patriotism in a battle against cruel Spanish troops.58
Nineteenth century transformations in travelogue treatment of the 
Katipunan supported U.S. presence in the Philippines. Around 1905, official 
U.S. government rhetoric justifying colonialism in Asia had eschewed focus on 
economic opportunity in order to focus solely upon the moral responsibility of 
the United States to care for their “little brown brothers” in the Philippines.59 
Travel accounts framing the Katipunan as both victims and brave opponents of 
the Spanish, instead of as secretive and upper class murderers, support claims 
of “benevolent assimilation” by painting Americans as either the liberator of 
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the Filipino people from Spanish cruelty, or partners in a war against a com-
mon foe. The American colonial government in the Philippines consistently 
promoted such portrayals.60 In using Katipunan centered narratives to describe 
the cruelty of the Spanish government, European and American travel writers do 
not simply use portrayals of the Philippines (the Orient) to establish Occidental 
superiority.61  Rather, Euro-American travelogues define the Katipunan as vic-
tims, thereby defining the Spanish as irresponsible rulers, and in turn defining 
the Americans as capable and benevolent colonial masters. In doing so, these 
travel accounts established American’s supposed moral responsibility to control 
the Philippines.  
Conclusion
From 1899-1917, Euro-American travelogue representation of the Katipunan 
transformed to justify changing American colonial policies in the Philippines. 
From 1899-1901, during the years of the Philippine-American War, European 
and American travelogue writers consistently framed the group as mysterious, 
led by the elite, or violent in order to support negative American perceptions of 
Filipino freedom fighters. Later, after the war ended and the U.S. government 
promoted a policy of “benevolent assimilation” in the Philippines, travel account 
depictions of the Katipunan had little to do with actually describing the organi-
zation; rather, they vilified Spanish colonialism and expressed the need for U.S. 
aid in the Philippines. Regardless of their specificities, Euro-American portray-
als of the Katipunan always served to justify American rule in the Philippines, 
revealing the flexibility and utility of imperialist attitudes towards their colonial 
possessions. As observed in the case of U.S.-Philippine relations, Orientalist 
imaginings of foreign peoples rarely represent a homogenous and unchanging 
style of thought, but an ideology adaptable to various situations. 
60 Ileto, “Philippine Wars and the Politics of Memory,” Positions: East Asian Cultures Critique 
13, No. 1(2005): 222. 
61 Said, Orientalism, 3.
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A NEW ERA IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: JIMMY CARTER, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND IRAN
Elena Reynolds
It is a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy …
We have reaffirmed America’s commitment to human rights as a 
fundamental tenet of our foreign policy.1
— Jimmy Carter, Address on Human Rights and Foreign Policy, 
University of Notre Dame, May 22, 1977
Few presidents have expressed such passion for human rights, as has Jimmy 
Carter. In both his 1977 inaugural address and a commencement speech given 
at the University of Notre Dame later that year, Carter shared his vision for a 
new era in American foreign policy—one based on the democratic idealism 
of Woodrow Wilson, which championed freedom, peace, and human rights.2 
He clung to this Wilsonian worldview, believing that “the demonstration of 
1 Jimmy Carter, “Human Rights and Foreign Policy” (commencement speech, Notre Dame 
University, South Bend, IN, May 22, 1977). The Miller Center, ttp://millercenter.org/president/
speeches/detail/3399 (accessed October 28, 2011).
2 Erwin C. Hargrove, Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of Public Good 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 112. Peter G. Bourne, Jimmy Carter: A 
Comprehensive Biography from Plains to Postpresidency (New York: Scribner, 1997), 384. 
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3 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 142-143.
4 Robert A. Strong, Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign 
Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 261.
5 Michael Ledeen and William Lewis, Debacle: The American Failure in Iran, 1st ed. (New 
York, Knopf, 1981), 68-69. 
6 James A. Bill, The Lion and the Eagle: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1988), 4-5.
American idealism was a practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs.”3 
Like Wilson, Carter felt that he did not have to choose between idealism and 
realism. As a result, he struggled to find balance between his idealist bent and 
the realism that confronted him as president.
Despite coming to office with little experience in foreign affairs, Carter 
gave careful thought to his international agenda, placing human rights at the 
top of his list.4 He believed that America should keep its allies and adversaries 
accountable for their human rights records, regardless of the risks involved. 
To accomplish this, he set consequences for nations violating human rights, 
using American humanitarian aid and financial assistance as leverage to force 
countries into compliance with his policies.5 He would use such methods in 
Iran. However, inexperience, political gaffes, conflicting advice from his advisors, 
and a series of disastrous events outside his control would ultimately undermine 
his ambitions, efforts, and achievements as president. 
Carter is often blamed for the disintegration of U.S.-Iran relations, yet 
he was not the first or last president to make mistakes there. Nearly every 
president, from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Gerald Ford, blundered when it 
came to Iran, but Carter’s miscalculations were perhaps the most glaring. To 
critically evaluate Carter’s human rights policies in Iran, it is vital to look at 
presidential decisions made there prior to his presidency. Gaining this context 
makes it easier to understand the obstacles he faced coming into office. Once 
this is understood, the following questions can be answered: How did Carter’s 
fundamental tenet shape his policies in Iran? Were Carter’s human rights poli-
cies to blame for the Islamic Revolution and subsequent Islamization of Iran? 
Did Carter’s human rights policies fail in Iran?
For more than a century, the United States enjoyed a healthy relationship 
with Iran. James Bill, historian, Iranian expert, and former State Department 
diplomat, states, “Few international relationships have had a more positive 
beginning then that which characterized Iranian-American contacts.”6 Despite 
the forum
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stirring up anti-American sentiments, protesting United States support for monarchical authori-
tarianism after the shah received, at his request, $10 million in military aid. Bill, 50.
11 Ibid., 4-5.
12 Ibid., 86.
promising beginnings, signs of tension were evident prior to World War II and 
continued into the postwar period. In 1925, when Reza Shah Pahlavi staged 
a successful coup overthrowing the Qajar dynasty, his goal was to unify his 
nation and stop foreign influence in its internal affairs. However, his rumored 
ties with Nazi Germany led to an Anglo-Soviet takeover in 1941.7 This event 
fueled Iranian resentment toward foreign interventionism. The staged coup 
placed Pahlavi’s oldest son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, in control as a 
constitutional monarch. During World War II, United States troops stationed 
in Iran received extraterritorial rights, including exemption from punishment 
under Iranian law. Iran viewed this as an infringement of its sovereignty and 
vehemently objected. President Franklin D. Roosevelt ignored the problem, 
upholding United States civil and criminal codes.8 Things were further com-
plicated at the Tehran Conference in 1943, when Roosevelt refused to meet 
with the shah. Iranians saw Roosevelt’s behavior as an insult and a symbol of 
American arrogance and ignorance of their country.9 
Despite becoming a constitutional monarch following the 1940s coup, 
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi did not gain full control until after another coup 
in 1953, backed by the United States and Great Britain. This coup deposed 
democratically elected nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. 
Outraged and visibly disillusioned, nationalists viewed the coup as a symbol 
of American imperialist designs.10 Iranians’ image of America as a liberator and 
protector from Soviet, British, German, and French aggression was tarnished 
by this incident.11 To make matters worse, the shah used the coup to consoli-
date power, leaving his people further embittered toward the United States. 
According to Bill, “this direct covert operation left a running wound that bled 
for twenty-five years and contaminated America’s relations with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran following the revolution of 1978-79.”12 
The relationship was strained further under President Lyndon B. Johnson. 
Despite considerable interaction with Iran as vice president, like leaders before 
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and after him, he overlooked how the shah’s human rights violations combined 
with unwanted United States military occupation could become a breeding 
ground for resentment.13 In 1963, the shah launched his White Revolution, 
an attempt to modernize his country economically, structurally, and politically. 
Like John F. Kennedy, Johnson enthusiastically supported the program and the 
shah’s subsequent crackdown on those protesting the changes.14 The United 
States would continue its support for Iran, viewing the shah as a valuable ally 
for his attempts at westernization, support for Israel and United States policies 
in the Middle East, and condemnation of Egyptian president Abdul Nasser’s 
perceived radicalism.
During the Nixon and Ford administrations ties strengthened between 
the two countries.15 Both Nixon and Ford gave generous military assistance 
to the shah, hoping to insure regional stability. Gradually Ford would express 
his concern about arms sales, especially after the shah began to crack down on 
political dissidents. To combat these problems, Congress enacted legislation 
restricting the amount of American military aid and economic assistance given 
to countries violating human rights.16 Despite the legislation and concerns 
about the shah’s aggressive behavior, the United States maintained its positive 
relationship with the shah and his political elites, while ignoring the dissatisfac-
tion of the Iranian masses.17
When assessing Carter’s relationship with Iran, it is important to examine 
how his fundamental tenet shaped his policies there. While Carter contin-
ued many policies established under the Nixon and Ford administrations, his 
Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, noted, “there would be marked differences in 
the way in which we conducted our bilateral relations, particularly as regards 
arms sales and human rights.”18 As part of his human rights agenda, Carter 
criticized and questioned the wisdom of selling large amounts of armaments 
to Iran, a newly developing country with a poor track record on human rights. 
Fearing the relationship could be permanently damaged, the State Department 
urged Carter not to speak publicly about the shah’s human rights violations 
the forum
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during the first few months of his presidency. Instead, Carter let actions speak 
louder than words. He began with strict enforcement of his human rights poli-
cies, leaving vacant the ambassadorship to Tehran for six months.19 Carter also 
cancelled the sale of 250 F-16 fighter planes and suspended tear gas shipments. 
Carter’s goal was to force the shah to change his ways in order to obtain the 
supplies he requested. Initially Carter’s policies succeeded, as historian Donald S. 
Spencer notes, “for no national leader on Earth submitted with greater alacrity 
to U.S. human rights pressure.”20 
To appease the United States, the shah took bold steps toward liberaliza-
tion, making changes in Iranian law, policy, and personnel. He reorganized his 
cabinet and released hundreds of political prisoners. In addition, he pledged 
to end the torture of inmates, grant more freedom to the press and political 
opposition groups, and expand individual access to due process. The shah also 
permitted the International Red Cross to inspect prisons and assess human 
rights issues within the country.21 Despite improvements, the shah’s reforms 
were simply for show. He was eager to gain approval and therefore willing to 
kowtow to the United States to get what he wanted.
While Carter tried to play tough, some of his advisors expressed concerns 
that doing so would permanently jeopardize the relationship between the two 
countries. As a result, the administration chose to approach human rights is-
sues more cautiously during Secretary Vance’s May 1977 trip to Tehran. While 
there, Vance invited the shah to the White House that November, an invitation 
the shah gladly accepted. This extension of friendship was one way through 
which Carter hoped to maintain positive relations. Vance spoke briefly to the 
shah about human rights, explaining that these policies were not new, but 
rather important American traditions that the United States pledged to uphold. 
The shah defended his country’s human rights record and need to restrain 
Communists and other groups trying to undermine his leadership. He made 
it clear that he did not oppose United States human rights policies so long as 
they did not single out his country, threaten his leadership, or compromise 
national security.22 Following these issues, the two men discussed arms sales. 
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Vance informed the shah that Carter would honor a promise made under the 
Ford Administration for a sale of 160 F-16 fighter planes. The shah had also 
requested highly sophisticated radar-equipped aircraft (AWACS) with state-of-
the-art electronic surveillance and communication devices, but Vance made it 
clear that these would only be given pending congressional approval.23
The shah had originally requested ten AWACS, but Carter reduced the 
number to seven in the proposal sent to Congress. Congress rejected the plan 
“on the grounds that the security of advanced electronic devices could not be 
assured in Iran.”24 Although Carter intended to submit a revised proposal at a 
later date, the shah was infuriated by the delay or worse, the complete rejection 
of the sale. To express his dissatisfaction, the shah sent Carter an angry letter 
threatening to cancel the order.25 Carter was troubled by his predicament and 
recalls in his memoir that, “I was attempting to reduce the sale of offensive 
weapons throughout the world, but it was not possible to make excessively 
abrupt changes in current practices, because of contracts already in existence.”26 
Carter saw the decision to sell more arms as a double standard, yet he knew 
that the United States could not afford to lose Iranian oil or its surveillance 
stations along the Iran boarder, which were vital to monitoring Soviet mis-
sile activity. The United States had formed a valuable alliance, which was not 
worth losing for the sake of human rights. Since alienating Iran could prove 
disastrous, a situation Carter readily acknowledged, he was forced to part with 
his fundamental tenet. 
In the fall of 1977, Congress finally approved the AWACS sale, but only 
after the insertion of safeguard provisions. The incident, which evidenced dis-
trust of the shah’s regime, was a major embarrassment to U.S.-Iran relations and 
tarnished Carter’s image as a president committed to reducing arms sales. For 
Carter, the ordeal exposed his internal conflict between idealism and realism. 
For the shah, it raised concerns about Carter’s trustworthiness.
The shah’s November visit to Washington was an opportunity to ease 
tensions created by the AWACS debacle. During the visit, the two had time to 
discuss the AWACS sale. The shah told Carter that he understood the situation 
23 Ibid., 316.
24 Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New 
York: Hill and Wong, 1986), 183-184.
25 Strong, 49-50.
26 Carter, 434-435.
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and agreed to provide a detailed list of future military needs in order to prevent 
a repeat of the incident. The shah’s statements revealed his expectation that 
the United States would continue to supply the military needs of his country 
and it appears that Carter agreed to do so. In addition to the AWACS fiasco, 
the two leaders discussed oil, weapons deals, and economic issues. The shah’s 
human rights practices were briefly addressed, but Carter did not pursue the 
topic. Both leaders seemed pleased that human rights had not interfered with 
issues like oil prices. However, the agenda proved contrary to Carter’s claim 
that human rights were a primary foreign policy objective. Whatever progress 
was made during the visit, it is clear that Carter caved to political pressure and 
was willing to forgo his fundamental tenet in this instance and many others 
throughout his presidency.
Six weeks after the shah’s visit, Carter traveled to Tehran on New Year’s 
Eve. He had not planned to visit Iran during his nine-day overseas trip, but the 
country was a convenient stopping point on his way from Poland to India. Prior 
to his arrival, Carter’s Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, issued 
a memo outlining five foreign policy issues that needed to be addressed with 
the shah. These included energy and oil concerns, nuclear cooperation, and 
Middle East stability. Human rights were placed at the bottom of the list and 
Christopher urged Carter only to address maintaining Iranian law and order. 
Human rights were yet again an afterthought.
Perhaps the most visible sign of Carter’s parting with his fundamental tenet 
came during a speech he delivered at the shah’s New Year’s Eve dinner party in 
which he stated, “Iran under the leadership of the Shah is an island of stability 
in one of the more troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, 
Your Majesty, and to your leadership, and to the respect, and admiration and 
love which your people give to you.”27 While Carter’s well-intentioned speech 
might have been customary to reiterate strong relations between the two coun-
tries, it might also have been viewed as a manifestation of his ignorance about 
Iranian dissatisfaction with the shah. However, earlier events showed this not to 
be the case. Carter admitted that he saw no visible signs of popular discontent 
in his short time in Iran, but acknowledged that he was aware of the brutality 
of Iran’s secret police (SAVAK). However, he was willing to put strategic and 
economic concerns above human rights as evidenced in the AWACS sale.28 He 
27  Bill, 233.
28  Carter, 437.
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did not want to compromise in this regard, but political pressure dictated his 
course. Secretary Vance once commented that, “Carter did what he thought 
American values and interests demanded, even though he was keenly aware of 
the political risks.”29 But perhaps the greatest political risk was putting American 
needs above those of the Iranian people. In the years to come, that speech would 
come back to haunt him as Iran degenerated, presenting the greatest challenge 
his administration would face.
One week after Carter’s visit, riots broke out in Iran. The island of stability 
was no more. By mid-1978, opposition to the shah had grown into a full-
fledged Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini, a well-known political 
and religious figure recently returned from exile. Carter was now faced with the 
difficult task of figuring out what to do. Throughout the revolution, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Advisor, and Cyrus Vance fought over 
what actions should be taken. Brzezinski and Vance were both experienced in 
foreign policy, but held vastly different positions on a number of key issues. 
While Vance was a cautious, steady diplomat, Brzezinski was a more impatient 
hard-liner. As a result, they clashed over human rights and foreign policy issues 
on a regular basis.30 
Brzezinski, saw the larger geopolitical implications of Iran’s move toward 
an Islamic government. He realized the danger this posed not only to U.S.-Iran 
relations, but also to America’s future in the Middle East and saw steadfast sup-
port for the shah and military force as the only way to stop the revolution. Even 
though he knew Carter was opposed to force, Brzezinski continued to press for 
it. Vance, along with several cabinet members, favored reforms and a centrist 
government, believing this to be the only way the shah could save himself. 
At the urging of Washington, the shah attempted to suppress unrest 
through reforms (liberalization). He freed nearly 1,500 political prisoners and 
promised to hold parliamentary elections in 1979.31 He also established a centrist 
coalition government, which failed due to the deterioration of his power. The 
shah’s governmental reforms had come too late to solve the country’s problems. 
29 Spencer, 65.
30 Strong, Robert A., consulting ed., “Essays on Jimmy Carter and His Administration: Foreign 
Affairs,” The Miller Center, http://millercenter.org/president/carter/essays/biography/5 (accessed 
November 5, 2011).
31 Spencer, 189.
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The shah’s attempt to curb violence through military force also failed, because 
his soldiers no longer followed his instructions.
Throughout the ordeal, Carter’s advisors were in gridlock. Brzezinski, 
thoroughly exacerbated by disagreements and indecision, took matters into 
his own hands. He used his status as chairman of the Special Coordinating 
Committee to undermine the State Department’s ability to collect and analyze 
information. This allowed him to shape policy decisions while claiming that 
the State Department was receiving all necessary information. Brzezinski also 
made secret contacts with the shah through the Iranian ambassador, Ardeshir 
Zahedi. By this time Brzezinski felt the only thing the shah could do was exer-
cise “unwavering and confident force” to hold his regime together.32 He tried 
to push the shah in this direction, but after receiving conflicting advice from 
Brzezinski and Vance, the shah cut off his ties with Brzezinski. 
Conflicts continued throughout the administration with Assistant 
Secretary Patricia Derian insisting that the shah implement more reforms, 
while Ambassador William H. Sullivan in Teheran disagreed with Brzezinski’s 
proposal to use force, expressing his doubts that the shah “retained sufficient 
support to use force effectively.”33 As the shah’s power continued to decline, 
disagreements arose between Brzezinski and Vance again over whether or not 
the United States should move toward discussions with Ayatollah Khomeini. 
This infighting, which continued throughout the entire crisis, confused Carter 
at a time when he needed clarity most. In the end it seems that Carter’s team 
spent more time working against each other than for their president.34 
But Carter’s story does not end here. After his government was overthrown, 
the shah was forced into exile. Eventually his declining health prompted him 
to request treatment in the United States. Despite reservations, the Carter 
administration granted him entry because he had been a long-time ally. This 
decision proved disastrous. As a result, the United States embassy in Tehran was 
seized and fifty-two hostages were taken and held for 444 days. Initially Carter 
deemed military options too risky, fearing the hostages might be killed. When 
Carter realized that he could no longer depend on diplomacy, he organized a 
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Alexander Moens, “President Carter’s Advisors and the Fall of the Shah,” Political Science 
Quarterly 106, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 211-237.
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rescue operation that failed miserably. He took full responsibility for the incident, 
but the damage done to U.S.-Iran relations was now irreparable.
Were Carter’s human rights policies to blame for the Islamic Revolution 
and subsequent Islamization of Iran? Carter’s speech, in which he proclaimed 
Iran an “island of stability,” certainly fueled anti-shah sentiments, but to say 
that his policies were responsible for the revolution and subsequent Islamization 
might be unfair. Historian Gaddis Smith believes that Carter’s human rights 
policies were not to blame for the revolution. He suggests that there was little 
Carter could have done to prevent or suppress the violence short of military 
force. Smith indicates that Carter’s unwillingness to do so did not derive from 
his human rights policies, but rather his belief that force would not save the 
situation.35 
Others like Historian Donald S. Spencer believe Carter’s “extreme” and 
aggressive human rights policies, which demanded immediate change, were 
responsible for the acceleration of the revolution and Iran’s shift toward a 
fourteenth-century theocracy. He argues that Carter’s human rights agenda 
demanded the impossible and pressed too hard for “complete and immediate 
capitulation by the Shah to their own perception of what Iran should become.”36 
Spencer observes that Carter’s human rights policies failed because he urged 
the shah to westernize his country, in spite of strong opposition by the Iranian 
people. He also condemns Carter for censuring the government for failing to 
make drastic changes quickly enough and then abandoning the shah, who 
continued to follow previously given instructions from Washington. In doing 
this, Spencer argues that Carter successfully subverted a major strategic and 
political ally.37
Perhaps the most important question to ask when assessing Carter’s 
presidency is whether his human rights policies failed in Iran. Historian Frank 
Ninkovich views Carter’s human rights policies as unsuccessful due to his refusal 
to relinquish support for the shah. Ninkovich portrays Carter as afraid of failure, 
which derived from his strong Wilsonian ideals. He argues that Carter could not 
get past his crusade for human rights and deal with real world problems outside 
of that context. In an attempt to avoid catastrophe, he brought it upon himself. 
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Ninkovich believes that had Carter severed ties with the shah and recognized 
Khomeini, the United States may have saved its relationship with Iran.38
Like Ninkovich, Gary Sick, a member of the National Security Council 
during the Iran hostage crisis, acknowledges that Carter was “instinctively a 
peacemaker and reformer,” which left him uncomfortable with using military 
force.39 However, he does believe that, “The assertion that the shah was para-
lyzed into inaction by the human rights policies of the Carter administration 
simply is not supported by the evidence or the shah’s own testimony in dozens 
of conversations during the crisis.”40 Sick adds that like Carter, the shah could 
not decide whether to launch radical reforms or a bloodbath due to “self-interest 
and internal political realities, not on fear of offending Washington.”41 Sick 
suggests that Carter’s human rights policies in Iran were not a failure, but due 
rather to the indecision on both sides, which prevented a viable solution from 
being reached.
Like Ninkovich and Sick, historian James Bill asserts that, “The central 
contradiction in America’s general goals in Iran was that the United States had 
both real political and economic interests as well as a genuine commitment to 
democratic principles.”42 Bill believes that Carter’s human rights policies failed 
because he wanted the best of both worlds, which was impossible given the 
complex nature of international relations.
Overall, Carter’s human rights record was inconsistent. Initially both 
he and his advisors denounced human rights violations in the Soviet Union, 
Iran, South Korea, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Uganda, and numerous 
other countries. While they suspended military and economic aid to South 
American and African countries, they refused to do so permanently in Iran. 
Fearful of losing a valuable alliance, Carter also ceased criticism of the shah’s 
human rights record. He also shied away from denouncing the Soviet Union’s 
policies after Leonid Brezhnev threatened to halt arms control negotiations.43 
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In addition, he turned a blind eye to human rights violations in China and 
the Philippines and did nothing to prevent Pol Pot’s regime in Cambodia from 
carrying out genocide.44 
Even though his human rights policies may have been plagued by con-
tradictions, it is important to note that Carter did enjoy some diplomatic 
successes, such as mediating a historic peace agreement, known as the Camp 
David Accords (1978), between Israel’s Menachem Begin and Egypt’s Anwar 
Sadat. This tremendous achievement “revived a long-dormant practice of presi-
dential peacemaking, something every succeeding chief executive has emulated 
to varying degrees.”45 Many historians applaud Carter’s attempts at diplomacy 
throughout the world, and even in Iran, but acknowledge that his failure was 
giving in to the shah’s requests for arms, rather than standing firm on his com-
mitment to human rights. 
Jimmy Carter, more than any other president, incorporated human rights 
into his foreign policies. Despite unexpected struggles and setbacks, he con-
stantly reminded Americans that they could not remain indifferent to the fate 
of freedom elsewhere. In doing so, he improved the global image of the United 
States, lent international credibility to human rights issues, and helped set the 
tone for world politics in the following decades.46 Carter’s vision for a new era 
in American foreign policy was certainly commendable, but perhaps America 
was not yet ready to take the step.
44 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (Oxford 
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BRITISH AND DUTCH PERCEPTIONS OF CANNIBALISM IN 
BORNEO, 1882-1964
Adrienne Smith
During Europe’s quest for direct control of Borneo from 1882-1964, British 
and Dutch explorers penetrated Borneo’s interior to establish colonies. Ex-
plorers witnessed elaborate cannibalistic ceremonies. Some Europeans where 
excited by the existence of cannibals, others used the indigenous tribes’ canni-
balistic customs to dehumanize them. This paper asks how British and Dutch 
travelers viewed cannibalism in Borneo, and why? I will argue that from 1882-
1964 British and Dutch perceptions of cannibalism in Borneo generated ex-
ploration, while creating a stigma toward the indigenous people.
My research required the use of travelogues in order to reach a better un-
derstanding of the European perception of Southeast Asia. Travelogues provide 
a first-hand account of what colonizers experienced during their attempts to 
establish colonial rule over the East. The benefit of using travelogues is their 
representation of European knowledge as a whole during imperialism. The 
disadvantage of using travelogues, however, is they only focus on European 
interpretation. 
The examination of multiple historical approaches gives a better under-
standing of Europe’s perceptions of Southeast Asian culture. Clifford Geertz 
argues the need to examine a historical event through the understanding of 
the forum
120
its place and time of occurrence.1 Whereas Edward W. Said explains that the 
West’s knowledge about the Orient was generated from preconceived notions of 
what the East was not.2 S.N. Balagangadhara focuses on Europeans’ intellectual 
limits in understanding the “phenomenon of Orientalism.”3 While Marry Luis 
Pratt explains that travelogues show how Europe saw itself in relation to “the 
rest of the world” and the need for direct control of the Orient.4 Han Mui Ling 
uses the development of a “place” and how it embodied “imperial manhood” 
through travelogues.5 Finally, Catalin Avramescu argues travel literature was 
written with a “critical intention” to put down those they came in contact with, 
while bolstering themselves.6  
Historians’ research on cannibalism in Borneo attempts to prove the ac-
curacy of the accounts witnessed by Europeans. J.H. Hutton uses travelogues 
to examine the “diverse causes” of cannibalism and its existence pattern.7 Peter 
Metcal challenges reports of cannibalism, calling them “malicious slurs” and the 
product of lazy anthropologists’ “gullibility.”8 John Crawford argues even with 
an “adequate food supply” cannibalism was practiced and masked by religion.9 
The rise in competition between European powers for trade in Southeast 
Asia triggered a shift in imperialism that focused on colonial control of nu-
merous territories. The Netherlands’ need to colonize was a reaction towards 
British efforts to expand their sphere of influence in Indonesia.10 In an attempt 
1 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected essays, (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 19.
2 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 12.
3 S.N. Balagangadhara, “The Future of the Present: Thinking through Orientalism,” Cultural 
Dynamics 10, no. 2 (1998): 101-121.
4 Mary Luis Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation,  (London: Routledge, 
1992),  5.
5 Han Mui Ling, “From Travelogues to Guidebooks: Imagining Colonial Singapore, 1819-1940,” 
SOJOURN 18, no. 2 (2003):  258, 261.
6 Catalin Avramescu, An Intellectual History of Cannibalism, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2009), 13.
7 J. H. Hutton, “Presidential Address: The Cannibal Complex,” Folklore, 54, no. 2 (1943): 
274-286.
8 Peter Metcalf, “Wine of the Corpse: Endocannibalism and the Great Feast of the Dead in 
Borneo,” Representations no. 17 (1987), 96-10p.
9 John Crawfurd, “On Cannibalism in Relation to Ethnology,” Transactions of the Ethnological 
Society of London, 4 (1866): 105-124.
10 Paul H. Kratoska, South East Asia, Colonial History: Empire-building in the Nineteenth Century, 
(London: Routledge, 2001), 56.
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to keep up with the Dutch, the British occupied Burma, Malaya and Borneo 
ruling their territories as separate governing districts of the empire.11 In 1887, 
the French “secured control over South Vietnam’s” government, coming in 
direct control of Indochina.12 
As a result of European imperialism, Southeast Asia was divided by politi-
cal borders and took on a new shape under the direct rule of European Powers. 
The advertised goal of Imperialism was to bring “modernity” to “backwards” 
parts of the world.13 For example, the Dutch colonized Indonesia for over 
three centuries, and through government united the population toward a com-
mon interest and national identity.14 Unjust Spanish rule over the Philippines 
prompted a political and national revolution by Filipinos in 1896-1898.15 When 
Imperial powers departed, they attempted to leave behind an administration 
that would benefit their interest in Southeast Asia.16
Until the early nineteenth century, North Borneo was a “loose suzerainty,” 
with its international affairs controlled by the Sultanate of Brunei.17 The Anglo-
Dutch Treaty in 1824 divided Borneo trade rights, in an attempt to protect 
British and Dutch trade interests.18 Borneo was divided territorially between 
the British who controlled the North, and the Dutch in the South.19 In 1841, 
Englishman James Brook, was granted control over the western part of the 
island, beginning the Raja Dynasty.20 In 1881, North Borneo was governed 
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by a council located in London, known as the British North Borneo Chartered 
Company.21 North Borneo was declared a British protectorate in 1888 and the 
rest of Borneo became a protectorate of the Dutch in 1891.
Cannibalism in Borneo
Cannibalism had been practiced throughout Southeast Asia for centuries before 
Europeans arrived. In the islands of New Britain, especially Borneo, the natives 
were “great cannibals” and killed many whites.22  The British and Dutch settled 
along the coast of Borneo. In the “heart of the island” lived the most “savage, 
primitive and wild” people.23 Numerous tribes inhabited the island, but mainly 
the Kayan, Ibaan, Milano, Iheir and Dyak tribe practiced head hunting and 
cannibalism. According to Friedrich Ratzel, the practice of cannibalism in 
Borneo stemmed from a “religious concentration.”24 Duarte Barbosa explains, 
cannibals “eat human flesh” with the belief they are “perpetuating the man 
eaten” by “incorporating him in their own living bodies”.25
Cannibal Ceremonies and Beliefs
Europeans’ fear and intrigue of cannibals in Borneo came from first-hand 
accounts experienced by explorers. Travelers were shocked by skulls and hu-
man remains ornamenting villages. “The skulls of deceased foemen” littered a 
cannibal village to such an extent the “children play with them as with toys.”26 
Europeans witnessed women and children joyfully “partake of the flesh.”27 
The Dyaks of Borneo were cannibals who participated in “human sacrifice” 
and seemed “greatly addicted to it.”28  Women especially loved devouring the 
Adrienne Smith
123
“breast” of those being sacrificed according to Henry Ling Roth.29 Wealthy 
members of a tribe would donate slaves for the main course of a death feast. 
“Rich members” of the tribe would give a number of slaves to sacrifice and take 
full enjoyment of watching them experience “slow torture and then eaten.”30 
The owner of the slaves would take great joy in preparing them for a feast.  The 
rich tribe members of the Ibans often participated in “imbruing his hands in a 
fellow creature’s blood,” and ornamented their houses with “skulls and teeth.”31 
 Head-hunting expeditions provided the human flesh needed for a feast. 
The indigenous tribes of Borneo frequently “organized man-hunting expedi-
tions.”32 Explorers were terrified by the thought of hunting a man like he was 
an animal. According to Carl Bock, there was nothing more horrifying than 
“head-hunting expeditions,” and the “tortures of the “death-feasts,” on the 
return of the victorious parties.33 Head-hunting was not practiced as a sport 
among cannibal tribes. “Head-hunting” was practiced as a “religious rite” by the 
Dyak tribes.34 By taking a man’s head, a tribe member was bringing good spirits 
upon his village. “Human flesh” was mainly devoured at a feast that followed a 
“successful head-hunting expedition.”35 A victim’s flesh was thoroughly cleaned 
and prepared in a way that brought out the most flavors. When a “man was 
killed and eaten,” his flesh was “wrapped in leaves,” and eaten as a “delicacy.”36 
Cannibals would also take parts of their victim’s body as trinkets. Rev. James 
Chalmers was invited to a cannibal feast where he witnessed guests “with pieces 
of human flesh dangling from their neck and arms.”37 
Head-hunting raids were vital to cannibal ceremonies among Borneo’s 
tribes. A victorious battle supplied many men for a cannibal feast. Many of 
the battles were fought between differing tribes on the island of Borneo. After 
attacking a small Malay village, the Iheir and Kayan tribes “sliced off the flesh” 
29 Mackellar, 135.
30 “The Head–Hunters of Borneo,” Science Magazine, (1883): 189. 
31 Roth, 217. 
32 Mackellar, 135.
33 Carl Bock, Temples and elephants: narrative of a journey of exploration through upper Siam and 
Lao, (London: S. Low, 1884), 438A. 
34 “The Head –Hunters of Borneo,” 189. 
35 Ibid., 189. 
36 Mackellar, 135.
37 A. H. (Augustus Henry) Keane, A geography of the Malay Peninsula, Indo-China, the Eastern 
Archipelago, the Philippines, and New Guinea, (London: E. Stanford, 1892), 187.
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of one their enemies.38 When a raid party returned home the tribe members 
brought out the human flesh and “roasted and ate it” during a celebration. 39 
There was a different respect applied when eating a warrior who had lost his 
life in battle. By eating a dead warrior “his strength and wisdom enters into 
them.”40 Cannibals believed that by “eating the heart of a brave enemy” they 
would become “endued with the bravery of the victim.”41 There was an even 
deeper spiritual meaning in eating those who had been killed during war. 
Among Dyak and Milano tribes, it was the practice to “cut up and consume 
the raw heart” of a warrior killed in battle in the hopes that those partaking 
would become “braver.”42 
Cannibal Tours
The written accounts of head-hunting expeditions and ritualistic ceremonies 
sparked a new type of European exploration. The boom in cannibal tours 
came after the settlements and relations with the Dyak tribes were established. 
Borneo was a place where tourists could take “unusual pictures” of “cannibals, 
war-dances, weird ceremonies, and customs.”43 Travelogues sparked tourists’ 
enthusiasm about seeing a cannibal feast. Both tourists and cannibals profited 
from the new tourism industry.  The interaction between tourists and the inte-
rior tribes educated both groups about one another. Tourists would often hire 
cannibals to hunt sharks, just to watch them work.44 A form of trade between 
the tribes and tourists was established, allowing Europeans to leave Borneo 
with souvenirs and trinkets. The tours became less about seeing cannibals and 
more about “tourists cannibalizing the exotic.”45
 Cannibal tours offered an opportunity for Europeans to experience what 
they read from travelogues. Cannibalism was no longer a piece of fiction, but a 
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tangible practice that could be seen by all Europeans. They no longer had to read 
about cannibals; they could experience them first hand. Tourists would experi-
ence the change of atmosphere while entering the interior jungle. Where they 
were able to see how close cannibals and the “civilized” man lived. “Cannibal 
tours” in Borneo were an experience of nature as a “wild/tame dualism,” which 
attracted tourists from all over the world.46 
The reality of cannibalism lured European tourists to Borneo. Tourists 
wanted to “experience the primitive” and observe those who had “eaten human 
flesh according to Edward Bruner.”47 Most tourists’ experience with cannibal 
tribes was superficial. Cannibal tribes acted out human sacrifices and cannibal 
feasts to attract tourists for trade and viewing fees. Tourists’ preconception of 
cannibalism was supported by these theatrical reenactments. Adrian Franklin 
and Mike Crang explain how cannibal tours provided a “dramatic contrast 
between visitor and locals.”48 Tourists witnessed primitive people so barbaric 
they partook in human flesh happily. Europeans couldn’t fathom the idea of 
eating a human being unless in dire desperation. To see people at such a low 
level of civilization was almost incomprehensible. 
European Perception
European colonizers used cannibalism in Borneo to degrade the native people. 
Cannibalism in its most “repulsive form was universally practiced” and those 
who participated were regarded as “savages at the very lowest stage of human 
culture.”49 Europeans were disgusted by members of cannibal tribes and referred 
to them as grotesque and child-like. The Dyak people of Borneo were seen as 
“ugly looking people” with “little hair” upon their bodies.50 Their primitive 
lifestyle and easily aroused excitement made cannibals no better than little 
children in the Europeans’ eyes. Members of cannibalistic tribes were referred 
46 Stephen Page,”Towards a Regional Analysis of Tourism in Southeast Asia,” In Interconnected 
Worlds:Tourism in Southeast Asia, ed. by Peggy Teo, T. C. Chang, and K. C. Hopp, (Oxford: 
Elsevier Science, 2001): 27-43.
47 Edward Bruner, “Of Cannibals, Tourists, and Ethnographers,” Cultural Anthropology 4, no. 
4 (1989): 438-44.
48 Franklin and Crang, 5-22.
49 Keane, 187.
50 Richard S. Fisher, Book of the World: Being An Account of All Republics, Empires, and Nations, 
(New York: JH Colton 2, 1849), 682.
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to as “savage” and often compared to “school boys” with their immature na-
ture.51 Explorers mocked the significance of the head-hunts for cannibal tribes.
The constant fear of falling victim to cannibalism haunted explorers and 
their families reading about their experiences. According to traveler Edward 
Powell, “Heads are to a Dyak as money is to a man in civilized countries.”52 
On a nightly basis traveler John Thompson found himself dreaming of “savage 
tribes” eating him while still alive or “being cooked one limb at a time.”53 This 
same fear was in the minds of the families left behind in Europe by explorers. 
A boy who had just read about cannibals in “Look and Learn Magazine” feared 
for his father’s safety in Borneo, imagining cannibals had “stuck him with a 
poison dart and ate his brains.”54
 It was hard for Europeans to understand why Borneo’s tribes practiced 
cannibalism. Malays were represented as “barbarous,” and “men who eat human 
flesh from choice.”55 Cannibals were described as a “cruelly disposed people” 
who enjoyed killing their enemies with “horrible and barbarous tortures.”56 
Explorers couldn’t stand the thought of a human eating another human. Travelers 
wrote about interior tribes who “ate human flesh” and how it made them “sick 
to see them,” and they were “afraid and horrified.”57 Cannibalism was an “at-
tested practice” and in its “most odious forms,” “horrible to the imagination 
of civilized nations.”58 Colonizers felt by being in Borneo they were in turn 
helping the interior tribes become more humane. Explorer J.H. Moor stated, 
“It is simply wonderful what civilization will do for the hungry cannibals.”59 
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European ignorance, discrimination, and sense of entitlement portrayed can-
nibals as barbaric and in need of civilization.
Conclusion
European imperialism during the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries de-
fined European power in Southeast Asia. These countries were ruled as political 
extensions of their mother countries. The territories colonized by Europeans 
went through political, economic, and national changes while being ruled by 
the West. Southeast Asian countries had closer ties with “European metropo-
les” than each other.60 The countries established by European intervention in 
Southeast Asia progressed through imperialism and created a strong sense of 
nationalism among its Southeast Asian citizens. The island of Borneo was seen 
as the center of maritime trading between all Southeast Asian countries. British 
and Dutch powers invested a lot of time in establishing colonies and trading 
control in Borneo. 
Between the years of 1882-1964, Europeans attempted to discover the 
unknown of Borneo’s interior, and observed the indigenous people engage in 
cannibal acts. Travelers witnessed cannibal tribes participate in barbaric head-
hunting raids. Some Europeans were invited as guests to elaborate cannibal feasts. 
The accounts of cannibalism inspired those living in Europe to participate in 
Imperialism by being a part of cannibal tours on the island. Explorers perceived 
cannibalism as an abomination practiced by backwards people. Europeans’ 
perception of cannibalism came from fear of anything different than what they 
considered civilized. The portrayal of cannibalism by British and Dutch explor-
ers created intrigue for other travelers, while depicting cannibals as primitive 
and savage. Europe’s occupation of Southeast Asia forever intertwined these 
two cultures, influencing their perceptions of one another and what it means 
to be “civilized.”
60 Peter A. Coclanis and Tilak Doshi, “Globalization in Southeast Asia,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 570 (2000): 49-64.
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FASHION AND FEMINISM: THE MASS MOCKERY OF 
TWENTIETH CENTURY SUFFRAGETTES
Nicola Williams
“The woman shall not wear that which pertaineth unto a man, 
neither shall a man put on a woman’s garment: for all that do so 
are abomination unto the Lord thy God.” 
– Deuteronomy 22:5.1 
In the book The Ladies of Seneca Falls, author Miriam Gurko refers to this quote 
to help show the forms of continuous mockery that early feminists bravely 
faced in response to their revolutionary ideas and clothing – specifically in 
this case, bloomers.2 Women of the early suffragette movement such as Susan 
B. Anthony and Lucretia Mott were known to adorn these pantaloons, which 
were far more practical than the fashionable dresses of the day, some of which 
could weigh up to twelve pounds. The stories of these women are common 
across the historical record. They helped to lead the political propagation of 
the suffragette cause despite harsh opposition. State by state they achieved the 
right for women to vote. Near the turn of the century, however, the suffragettes 
decided to fight for the vote on a national level. To do this, they rallied other 
1 Miriam Girko, The Ladies of Seneca Falls: The Birth of the Woman’s Rights Movement (New 
York: Macmillan Publishers), 141-142.
2 Ibid., 141-142.
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women and became increasingly commercialized, advertising fashion trends 
and women’s clubs to aid their cause. 3 
It is easy to assume, and consequently many historians do, that due to 
the greater number of women involved in the later wave of the movement and 
the immense foundation built for them by earlier feminists, these women faced 
very little opposition. Indeed, a book such as Gurko’s, which focuses solely on 
the struggle of the early suffragettes, cannot be found for the later suffragettes. 
This assumption is a teleological mistake: assuming through the use of hind-
sight that as 1920 and women’s suffrage approached, the women’s fight became 
increasingly easier. There are admittedly, exceptions to this inaccuracy. While 
many historians barely mention the opposition to the suffragette movement, 
several books refer to the public’s anxiety towards the later wave of suffragettes, 
but even these do not account for the scope of ridicule the women faced.4
At the end of the nineteenth century, to the delight of some and the 
scorn of others, the suffragette movement became increasingly visible in North 
America and above all, in New York City through increased commercializa-
tion, and the organization of suffrage parades. As the women’s potential to 
generate change became evident, traditionalists attempted to rally opposition. 
I will argue however that rather than attempting to unite the public behind 
3 One of several books that explain the commercialization of the suffragette movement: Margaret 
Finnegan, Selling Suffrage: Consumer Culture and Votes for Women (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1999).
4 Examples of books that discuss the suffragette movement but do not focus much, if any at-
tention on the opposition to the second wave suffragettes include: Susan Glenn, Female Spectacle: 
The Theatrical Roots of Modern Feminism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).; Francois 
Baudot, Fashion The Twentieth Century (New York: Universe Publishing, 1999).; Margaret Beetham, 
A Magazine of Her Own?: Domesticity and desire in the woman’s magazine, 1800-1914 (New York: 
Routledge, 1996).; Rita Felski, The Gender of Modernity (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
1995).; Lisa Justine Hernandez, Comp., Reading Women’s Lives (Boston: Pearson Custom Publishing, 
2008).; Edited by Marjorie Spruill Wheeler. One Woman, One Vote. (Troutdale: NewSage Press, 
1995).; Aileen S. Kraditor. The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920 (New York: 
W.W Norton and Company, 1981). 
Examples of books that do mention the opposition to the second wave in more detail, though 
not to a satisfactory degree include: Margaret Finnegan, Selling Suffrage: Consumer Culture and Votes 
for Women (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).; Sarah Deutsch, Women and the City: 
Gender Space, and Power in Boston 1870-1940 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).; Eleanor 
Flexner and Ellen Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman’s Rights Movement in the United States 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996).; Lisa Tickner, The Spectacle of 
Women: Imagery of the Suffrage Campaign 1907-14 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
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political argumentation against suffragettes, traditionalists utilized the mockery 
of women’s fashion as a tangible, highly relatable way to express their growing 
fear of the new woman generally and the suffragette as an extreme expression 
of this new phenomenon. 
“The new woman” was a term used to define women who broke away 
from traditional expectations, but finding exactly what this meant to people 
in the early twentieth century is hard to describe and consequently, historians 
have done so in a variety of ways. Elsie Clews Parsons, a feminist anthropolo-
gist from 1916 said that “the new woman means the woman not yet classified, 
perhaps not classifiable, the woman new not only to men, but to herself.”5 In 
short, the new women were about breaking away from the more traditional 
limitations set upon them. Historians describe their fight to “express their sexu-
ality,” demonstrate independence, expand their geographical limitations and to 
overcome previously accepted restrictions.6 In the book New Woman by June 
Sochen, the new woman is described as someone who “left the home for the 
factory, a career and the marketplace.”7 This is a description of the geographical 
alterations described above, and focuses on middle class new women who went 
to work, as opposed to upper class new women who indulged in women’s clubs 
and shopping instead. While not every new woman could be labeled a suffrag-
ette, the most extreme demonstration of these principles could be found in the 
suffragettes, who fought to politically alter their world based on these ideals. 
Traditionalists, on the other hand, valued conventional expectations 
regarding gender stratification and consequently opposed the new women and 
the suffragettes especially. In the historical record thus far, traditionalists have 
not been clearly defined except as a group who strongly disagreed with the new 
women. Traditionalists, for the purpose of this paper, shall be defined as the men 
and women who maintained the conventional opinion that women should be 
men’s “weaker, better half ”.8 Consequently, many of these individuals found 
themselves adamantly involved in anti-suffragette organizations and clubs. The 
5 Susan Glenn, Female Spectacle: The Theatrical Roots of Modern Feminism (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), 5.
6 The geographic changes caused by the suffragette movement are elaborated upon in Sarah 
Deutsch, Women and the City: Gender, Space and Power in Boston, 1870 -1940 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000).
7 June Sochen, The New Woman (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972), 3. 
8 Margaret Beetham, A Magazine of Her Own?: Domesticity and desire in the womans magazine, 
1800-1914 (New York: Routledge, 1996), 64.
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general sentiment behind their actions can be most succinctly put into the 
words of one anti-suffragette editorialist who claimed: “Womanhood can not 
have its cake and eat it. If women want the kind of consideration to which they 
have been accustomed they must live by the conventional standards.”9 Overall, 
the traditionalists found any women striving to break their social boundaries 
highly unrespectable.
The fear that traditionalists felt for the new women was mainly due to 
the juxtaposition of female action in the early twentieth century to the strict 
dogma of the nineteenth century, created under the assumption that women 
were sedate and innocent. Even towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
women were projected as passionless, demure beings, whose sole task was to 
take care of their husbands and children. The world of knowledge and argumen-
tation was considered to be a strictly male domain. Both men’s and women’s 
insistence upon this divide is revealed through many different primary sources. 
Jane Austin herself resolutely stated that, “A woman, especially if she have the 
misfortune of knowing anything, should conceal it as well as she can.”10 Coming 
from a woman, and an intelligent one at that, this quote helps to suggest the 
level to which such an ideal was ingrained into society. In Steppin’ Out: New 
York Nightlife and the Transformation of American Culture, 1890-1930, Lewis 
Erenberg succinctly describes the nineteenth century as one of “gentility, com-
bining a moral fastidiousness and cultural refinement to discipline the will.”11 
Considering that these strict expectations had been in place for the better part 
of the century, it seems logical that the women to challenge these societal tenets 
would have been met with stiff opposition. 
The new women faced serious ridicule due to the extreme diversion from 
their traditional role, which they demonstrated by leaving their homes for the 
first time, dressing in more practical clothing, and altering the previously ac-
cepted political ideology as it pertained to their sex. Unfortunately for them, 
the more conventional members of society refused to accept these adjustments. 
In 1895, in a competition to define the new woman, one competitor wrote: 
“Who cuts her back hair off quite short and puts on clothes she didn’t ought, 
9 Finnegan, 53.
10 Gurko, 5.
11 Lewis Erenberg, Steppin’ Out: New York Nightlife and the Transformation of American Culture, 
1890-1930 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 5.
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and apes a man in word and thought? New Woman. Who rides a cycle round 
the town, in costume making all men frown, and otherwise acts like a clown? 
New Woman.”12 This ridiculing poem clearly shows a feeling of dismay towards 
the new woman. The very fact that a competition to define this new kind of 
woman existed, proves that she was viewed as an entirely new phenomenon. It 
also illustrated that this problem vexed society as a whole, rather than just a few 
fastidious individuals. In fact, Mary Wollstonecraft herself sadly conceded that 
when a woman showed any sign of ambition, she was “hunted out of society.”13 
This does not paint an image of manageable mockery, but harsh and persistent 
ridicule, coming through an array of different media. 
Specific examples of the fears that invoked this ridicule could have been 
found throughout New York City in the twentieth century and especially in 
publications such as the New York Times. It was highly concerning to people 
at the turn of the century that women seemed to be forgetting their roles as 
traditional, stay-at-home mothers, and consequently, were tearing apart the 
ideal American family.14 Traditionalists also feared that in the women’s attempt 
to change they were not so much becoming new women, as slowly changing 
into something more masculine. To analyze this mockery effectively, I shall 
draw sources solely from New York City. It may appear that New York City, 
as the birthplace of the women’s rights movement, presented one of the most 
accepting locations for women’s suffrage to flourish. But in fact, New York 
City became a center for controversy in this time, with passionate fighters on 
both sides of the debate attempting to rally men and women.  The New York 
Times, as a widespread newspaper that printed letters from people who argued 
all along the spectrum of women’s rights, presents a good limiting lens through 
which to analyze this political trend. 
The multiple publications of H.Y. Mayer’s cartoons, each based around 
the mockery of women’s fashion, clearly show the fear created by the changes in 
women’s role. Between 1909 and 1913, Mayer was the author of five, full-page 
cartoons in the New York Times that related to new women. On each page 
Mayer depicted ten to twelve different, smaller cartoons, each telling a different 
12 Home Chat, Competition to Define the New Woman, Home Chat, September 21,1895. 
As seen in:  Margaret Beetham, A Magazine of Her Own?: Domesticity and desire in the womans 
magazine, 1800-1914 (New York: Routledge, 1996), 115.
13 Hernandez, 90. 
14 Irene Frieze et al., Women and Sex Roles (New York: W.W Norton and Company, 1978), 336.
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joke relating to new women. Together these images reveal the prevalent fear 
of the changing sex roles. 
Mayer drew a specifically detailed image in March 1912 in response to 
the traditionalists fear that new women may forget their motherly instincts. 
In the bottom left corner of his page, a single woman is portrayed with a look 
of extreme pride on her face. She is young, youthful and seems to be enjoy-
ing the new fashionable garment she is wearing as she reaches out her hand 
to meet someone, engrossed in this apparently glamorous world. Her dress is 
unnecessarily layered: folds of material draped around her body increase her 
size by at least half, but this is not the focus of humor in the piece. The quote 
below the reading suggests: “Now that the fashion of the panier permits it, 
why not bring the papooses along.”15 Only after reading this does the reader 
notice two babies, camouflaged by the elaborate folds of their mother’s dress, 
sitting in two of the drapes as if they were cradles. The humorous nature of the 
cartoon and the impracticality of the suggestion instantly cast aside the notion 
that this is a serious suggestion. Even when the children are with her, engulfed 
in her very dress, the woman does not notice them. Distracted by her new 
world this mother is far from the traditional cradling, stay-at-home woman 
that the Victorian era propagated. H.Y. Mayer seems to be insinuating that 
the new fashions have distracted her from her role as a good mother – perhaps 
he is even proposing that these two worlds simply should not mix. The literal 
picture is, of course, an exaggeration, but it portrays the very real fear, cradled 
by traditional New Yorkers, that women would forget their most basic human 
role as mothers. The fear seemed to be that turning away from motherhood 
would naturally lead to a more masculine persona.
Mayer played with the fear of a transition towards a masculine image in 
several of his cartoons, but two of the most obvious depictions of this fear were 
drawn into his April 1911 collection.16 In the bottom left hand corner of the 
page, a man is shown sitting in his chair, shaking a paper. The caption below 
reads, “Durn those fashion papers!”17 The reason for the man’s frustration is 
quite obviously due to the woman standing next to him who presumably, is his 
wife. It is hard to tell who she is at first for she is dressed as a man, in pants that 
15 H.Y. Mayer, Foolish Fashions, New York Times, March 6, 1912.
16 Mayer, Foolish Fashions, New York Times, April 2, 1911.
17 Ibid.
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18 Ibid.
19 An Artist, “Artist’s Appeal For Women,” New York Times, February 20, 1901. (No further 
name is offered for the author).
leave only a few inches of her ankles showing, a striped, button-up shirt, and a 
cone-shaped hat. The only telling signs of her sex are a ribbon on the hat, her 
long tied hair in a bun, and her earrings. Her face is strangely distorted, sug-
gesting that she is not attractive, though, judging by the man’s furious reaction, 
this was probably not always the case. The reader is given the impression that 
the prevailing fashion trends of the day transformed a once feminine, perhaps 
even beautiful woman, into an unattractive, almost male figure.
Further up the page in Mayer’s 1911 collection of cartoons is another 
depiction of this fear, propagated through the mockery of fashion, that suggests 
women’s new habits caused them to be almost indistinguishable from men. In 
this image, a priest is standing in front of what appears to be two men. The 
quote underneath it, however, states, “The Justice: Ahem – er – and which is 
the blushing bride?”18 Only then does it become clear that one of the figures is 
supposed to be female. This is hard to tell because the figures are standing with 
their backs to the reader. Both are dressed in identical, slightly baggy trousers, 
long coats, and large hats reminiscent of Napoleon Bonaparte. The suggestion 
Mayer hoped to make here is obvious – women, specifically through fashion, 
have decided to become so similar to men that soon enough there will hardly 
be a noticeable difference between the two. Once again, the literal depiction is 
imaginary; Mayer most likely did not believe that men and women would begin 
to dress in an identical manner. The suggested fear, however, that women were 
growing slowly more masculine, was all too real to traditional New Yorkers. 
It is no coincidence these last two cartoons have utilized women’s fashion as a 
tangible way to express the deeper fear society held about the evolving women. 
Traditionalists found fashion was a highly effective rallying tool against the 
‘shocking’ new women because New Yorkers were already in an uproar about 
the new trends. In one New York Times article a writer, who identified himself 
only as “an artist,” begged women to refrain from following the new fashions, 
specifically the new hairstyles, because he found them unattractive.19 Another 
New York Times article tells the story of a young woman who walked down 
Wall Street in an incredibly tight gown. After receiving an array of shouted 
ridicule, the woman tried to take refuge in a bank. But, she had attracted such 
the forum
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20 New York Times, “Tight Gown Stirs Wall Street,” New York Times, March 17, 1909.
21 Frieze et al., 336. This point was also reiterated in Aileen Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman 
Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920 (New York: W.W Norton and Company, 1965), 75.
a crowd of followers that the bank became full, and the mob of people flowed 
out onto the street, all the while catcalling and jeering at her. Eventually the 
woman took refuge in a telephone box until police could come and defuse the 
situation.20 Such an aggressive reaction suggests that the crowd was not simply 
letting the woman know she had made a fashion faux pas, but also that they 
felt the dress was representative of something bigger, a problem worth shouting 
about. The crowd clearly felt that the way this woman dressed represented a 
change in the way she perceived her role in society. In other words, the anecdote 
helps to prove the already prevalent association that the public held between 
fashion and the overall change in women. 
If the general changes to women were worthy of such an uproar, it was 
nothing to the fear instigated by the suffragettes. Traditionalists worried about 
the ideologies that new women embraced because they were privileges tradition-
ally attributed to men, including: leaving the home more often, expressing their 
sexuality, and generally defining the limitations for their own sex. The suffragettes 
took these philosophies to a new level because they declared themselves not 
only smart enough to help make decisions for society, but strong enough to be 
considered as eligible to do so as men. In other words, while the new women 
were seen to engage in offensive new habits, the suffragettes were attempting 
to create permanent change – a far more terrifying notion.
It was far easier for the traditionalists to prove that the new women (and 
by default, the suffragettes) lacked common sense because of their ridiculous 
clothing, than to address the various ideologies that constituted the suffragette 
debate. The dogmas of the suffragettes and the anti-suffragettes was compli-
cated by the fact that people varied greatly in their motivation for joining each 
respective group. As Irene Frieze acknowledges in her book Women and Sex 
Roles, the opponents of suffragettes argued their points based on a list of topics 
including: religion, the fear of defeminization and loss of motherhood.21 For big 
businesses, especially the liquor companies, the suffragettes posed other threats. 
There was already a fear that women’s suffrage may lead to prohibition, and big 
businesses were concerned that women were “reform-minded,” a trait which 
would alter the entire game of politics.22 Similarly, the supporters of suffrage 
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23 Frieze et al., 337.
24 Ibid., 337.
25 A. Meerman, “Foolish Fashion and Suffrage,” New York Times, June 12, 1913.
26 Ibid.
27 E. N. Hepburn, “A Question Not of Sex Appeal; But of Prevailing Mode,” New York Times, 
May 15, 1913.
28 Mayer, Foolish Fashions, New York Times, March 9, 1913.
varied in their reasoning.23 Some women argued simply that the vote was just, 
and others, that it would increase white, native supremacy. Abolitionists also 
supported women’s suffrage as a step towards their own cause. Populists felt 
that women could be made into “party loyalists,” and people who concerned 
themselves mostly with the Labor Party supported suffrage in correlation to equal 
pay for women, which would reduce the competition of cheap female labor.24 
Several New York Times articles also help to suggest that the suffragette 
was seen as the epitome of the new woman, and that mocking the fashion 
of both was considered a justifiable and inarguable way to undermine them. 
One article in particular, a letter written in June of 1913, expressly shows this 
trend. One man named A. Meerman wrote in to the New York Times on 
June 12 of that year, to complain about recent trends in fashion for the new 
women.25 He referred to a trend from Paris that called for women to wear wider 
brimmed hats and larger skirts, so big that it was hard for the wearer to sit. To 
conclude he exclaimed “And yet women want the right to vote! It’s the joke 
of the century!”26 In other words, the fashions that Meerman, like so many 
others, depicted as impractical, became a prevalent source of opposition to the 
notion that women were sensible enough to vote. Mrs. Dodge, the leader of 
an anti-suffragette organization, took this connection even further when she 
reportedly blamed suffragettes for the indecent new fashions.27 The suffragettes 
faced similar ridicule through the early twentieth century, much of which was 
difficult to directly argue with because it was presented in an indirect manner. 
H.Y. Mayer propagated this connection in a light yet distinct way in his 
cartoons, when he focused on the lack of sense that he felt was displayed in 
women’s fashion as an attempt to prove the impracticality of women voters. 
In 1913, Mayer drew a picture of two women, each with a fashionable hat 
pulled over one eye with the caption “to restore perfect vision exponents of 
the ‘Hat-over-one-eye’ idea should travel in teams.”28 In short, he suggested 
that the two women traveled together so that the girl with only her left eye 
the forum
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29 Mayer, Foolish Fashions, New York Times, October 29, 1911.
30 Such as: Mayer, Foolish Fashions, New York Times, October 3, 1909.
31 Mayer, Foolish Fashions, New York Times, October 29, 1911.
revealed could combine with the other, who had only her right eye revealed, and 
together they could have the vision of one person without a hat. The comedic 
nature of the page proves this was not a serious suggestion. Mayer instead, was 
arguing that the women were dressing in such an impractical way that they 
could not function individually, that they lacked skill and vision. This could 
easily be extrapolated to suggest that women lacked the vision needed to vote. 
Similarly, an image in 1911 showed a woman crawling along the floor because 
this was the only way to get her incredibly large hat through a doorway.29 The 
fact that Mayer saw women as utterly nonsensical is clearly shown through 
these depictions and many others like them, including those that focus on 
masculinity and a digression from motherhood, as discussed above.30 It can be 
expected that New Yorkers would have understood these depictions of mild 
stupidity as, at least in part, an argument against the suffragettes due to the 
political prevalence of the suffragette debate at the time. Whether they did or 
not, the continual propagation of the asinine nature of the new women was 
a bitter struggle for the suffragettes. To help ensure that this connection was 
made, however, Mayer also drew several cartoons that connected to the suf-
fragette movement far more directly. 
Mayer’s many images of ridiculous women frame several drawings that 
directly relate to women’s suffrage, making it is all too clear that he intended to 
propagate a lack of respect for the new women, and the suffragettes especially. 
The first also appeared in 1911. Near the top of the page an elegantly dressed 
woman, an elderly gentleman and a young boy are all individually chasing 
their hats that were blown off in the wind. The caption above it reads “No 
More Hatpins. Equal Rights For Women.”31 The suggestion here is that the 
woman, sure that she deserves all the rights and restrictions that men receive, 
decided to disregard the hatpins that most women used at this time to keep 
their less-than-form-fitting hats on their heads. Consequently the woman has 
gained the right to chase her hat, which fell off just like those of the men. This 
trivial attempt at equality suggests that this is indeed what Mayer believes of 
all issues in women’s rights: they are trivial. In other words, the right to vote 
for women would be about as useful as the disregard of hatpins. 
Many of the Mayer’s images commented on women’s rationality and 
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implicitly discussed politics, one image however, plainly showed the disrespect 
Mayer felt for the suffragette movement. Published in 1912 one drawing, sig-
nificantly placed on the top, center portion of the page would have attracted 
the viewer’s instant attention. The title: “Suffrage and Fashion – The Parade” 
is placed so closely to the title for the entire comic that it could almost be con-
sidered a subtitle.32 Below the text is a row of four women, drawn from a side 
angle, each following the one in front, holding signs with “vote for women” 
printed upon them.33 Through this description so far, the image seems like a 
credible depiction of women’s rights parades, there are however, a few major 
differences. Firstly, the women are all entirely blacked out. This artistic choice 
suggests several subsidiary arguments. Firstly, it implies less of a human pres-
ence in each character, as though the women are not parading due to their 
own intelligent, political analysis, but for some other reason, perhaps merely 
to ‘follow the pack’. This idea is exacerbated further by the portrayal of a 
poodle at the end of the line, following along obediently, much like the women 
themselves. To increase the association between the women and the poodle, 
each of them, rather than standing straight, is bent in a kind of hop. Their feet 
are a few inches from the floor in mid-jump, prancing like the dog along the 
pavement. The women’s outlines, conveniently enhanced from being blacked 
out, are also distorted by strange curling lines and bulges caused by the strange 
clothing they are wearing. If anything these distortions make the women more 
similar to the poodle, which is stereotypically shaved to accentuate the balls of 
fur along his body.34 The artist suggests that the women and the poodle share 
a lot in common. Neither is particularly graceful or intelligent and both are 
simply on the street to parade their odd new styles and get attention. While 
Mayer clearly mocks women and, implicitly, suffragettes in many of his draw-
ings, this depiction represents the pinnacle of his distaste. Sadly, Mayer’s desire 
to advertise his distaste was not a rare sentiment at this time. 
Mayer was only one of many traditionalists who mocked the suffragettes, a 
fact that is made evident by the reappearance of Mayer’s work over four years and 
the other articles in the New York Times that have already been discussed. The 
continuous mockery of the early suffragettes that Gurko adamantly describes, 
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did not significantly fade as 1920 drew closer.35 On the contrary, the ridicule 
spread throughout the beginning of the twentieth century from the occasional 
harsh comment and political opposition to this more widespread ridicule, 
propagated by the mockery of fashion, which became slowly more desperate 
as the suffragettes power to effect change became evident. Analyzing the work 
of H.Y Mayer, it seems that the mockery of fashion was lighthearted. His work 
was in fact, simply a lighthearted twist on the otherwise heated ridicule of suf-
fragettes through the use of fashion, a fact made clear through further analysis 
of the New York Times.
Several articles in the New York Times reveal the prevalence of fashion as 
a way to mock the suffragettes, in a more serious manner than cartoons may 
suggest. One example of this came from a New York Times reporter after his 
visit to a fashion show that was displaying the work of a prestigious fashion 
designer by the name of Mrs. White.36 Despite the non-political nature of the 
show, Mrs. White was asked in a question and answer section what she felt suf-
fragettes should wear. In response, White began by asking why on earth women 
would want to vote. She then continued to suggest that if women wanted to 
vote they should wear cassocks (long, single colored gowns, most commonly 
related to ecclesiastical dress). Knowing that White did not support women’s 
suffrage, it seems unlikely that she suggested such a thing so as to depict the 
women as holy. More likely she was suggesting that they try to move away from 
the ‘scandalous’ gowns that new women were so often mocked for wearing. 
The very fact that the issue of suffrage would be brought up at a fashion show 
reveals the prevalence of a correlation between the two. On top of that, the fact 
that White responded so adamantly that she was in opposition of the suffragette 
cause suggests that she felt this a prevalent topic, so in need of discussion that 
she could waiver from her own clothing collection for a minute or two. It surely 
would be beneficial for White to stay away from highly charged political topics 
due to a desire not to offend any potential clients. White’s reaction then sug-
gests that either she was uniquely passionate about the topic — which seems 
unlikely in comparison to other articles — or that being vehemently against 
women’s suffrage was so common that she was not concerned about offending 
a great number of people. This latter option is given credence by the other New 
York Times articles that suggest the commonality of such brash opposition. 
35 Hernandez, 90.
36 “Suggests Cassocks for Suffragettes,” New York Times, March 17, 1909. 
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Further articles, from several different New Yorkers, varying in importance 
from a bishop to an average citizen, reinforce the commonality of this ridicule. 
So prevalent was the suffragette debate that the New York Times covered one 
incident in which a bishop spoke at an all-girls’ school graduation. In his short 
speech to the young ladies he apparently felt that one of the most important 
messages to communicate to them was that the new women were freaks, each one 
a “horrible, misshapen monster.”37 In another article, covering an anti-women’s 
rights lecture, one Mrs. Maud Ernest described the suffragettes as conceited 
and egotistical. She even went as far as to say that they were disgusting.38 These 
are only two examples of many that flooded the pages of the New York Times, 
varying in both length and severity.39
The few historians who refer to the mockery of later suffragettes, tend 
to focus on specific, overt instances of mockery, such as those found in the 
book Selling Suffrage by Margaret Finnegan. 40 Specifically, Finnegan refers to 
demonstrations of violence at suffrage parades. The most pertinent of these in 
proving the opposition to the suffragettes involved a parade in 1913, during 
which several men jumped onto the suffragette floats where they accosted and 
fondled the women. Ultimately the riotous crowd injured three hundred people. 
Finnegan however, transitions from these tales to noting the positive effect of 
parades for the suffragettes due to the emotional effect they created. She then 
claims that suffragettes were able to fight off this kind if harassment most of 
the time by using simple logic. Such a refusal to demonstrate the significance 
of this overt ridicule is shocking, though the very fact that she acknowledged 
it at all means she did more than many other historians in investigating the 
real struggle of the suffragettes.
37 “New Woman a Freak Says Bishop Doane,” New York Times, June 9, 1909.
38 “Anti-Woman’s Right’s Lecture—The Views of Mrs Maud Ernest,” New York Times, March 
31, 1870.
39 “Spoiling the Women of Kansas,” New York Times, August 13, 1893.; “Woman Suffrage,” 
New York Times, April 7, 1889.; Margaine Lacroix, “Do Women Like Eccentric Clothes,” New York 
Times, March 24, 1912.; Gilbert E. Jones “Anti-Suffrage ‘Deception,’” New York Times, December 
31, 1909.; “Suffrage and Women’s Ideals,” New York Times, May 13, 1913.; Arthur Dodge, “Anti-
Suffragists Active,” New York Times, February 10, 1913.; Gabrielle Stewart Mulliner, “Woman’s 
Suffrage as a By-Product,” New York Times, January 5, 1908.; G.O Shields, “The Slaughter of 
Birds,” New York Times, April 27, 1900.; Richard M. Bent, “The Question Not One of Sex But of 
Brains,” New York Times, March 29, 1908.
40 Finnegan, 52-53.
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This ‘real struggle’ can be seen through the distinction between the mock-
ery discussed by Finnegan and the mockery discussed in this paper. Evidently, 
opposition to the suffragette cause would have occurred at suffragette events 
such as parades. By only focusing on this type of mockery, however, it is implied 
that suffragettes and their supporters could avoid mockery most of the time. 
The mockery presented in this paper, however, was all detailed in the New York 
Times, a general publication that would have been found throughout the homes 
and streets of New York City. This proves that the mockery was not only present 
for the women who threw themselves into the thick of suffragette controversy, 
or only on certain days when events were held. I have shown that this ridicule 
was pervasive around New York City, on a daily basis. Not only that, but while 
one failed parade may be forgotten, the indirect propagation of ideas through 
daily ridicule - that women were stupid and incompetent - lingered on. The 
mockery I have discussed was less obviously hostile than the examples presented 
by Finnegan. However, it was constant and subtle enough to ensure that the 
suffragettes had a difficult time directly addressing the stereotypes it propagated. 
This is evident due to the fact that instead of supporting this mockery with 
extensive argumentation, traditionalists, such as Bryant Lazelle, who wrote a 
letter to the New York Times in 1910, explained that he felt that no argument 
was necessary to prove that the suffragette ‘movement’ was nothing more than 
a “species of modern hysteria.”41
While the mockery varied in seriousness from cartoons to political speech-
es, and in credibility from average citizens to bishops, it is evident that new 
women, and suffragettes especially, faced mockery on all sides. Rather than delv-
ing solely into political argumentation, traditionalists found that larger crowds 
of opponents could be rallied behind the mockery of women’s fashions, due 
to the fact that these trends already outraged New Yorkers and were visible to 
even the most politically uneducated. The array of mockery proves that, despite 
their increased numbers, maybe even because of their increased numbers, the 
women of the later suffragette cause faced incredibly prevalent ridicule and 
opposition. While this in no way undermines the brave efforts made by the 
earlier suffragettes, it does imply that the second wave of suffragettes deserve 
further acknowledgement for the mockery they endured. While more subtle, 
the ridicule was no less persistent. No doubt, these ideas carried on past 1920 
and the achievement of women’s suffrage, less overt but ever-present.
41 Lazelle Bryant. “Woman Suffrage,” New York Times. February 27, 1900.
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